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I. INTRODUCTION

Claimant was injured in the workplace and solicited and entered into a fee agreement
(referred to hereinafter as "The Fee Agreement") with Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. (Claimant's
Counsel) under which Claimant's Counsel agreed to provide legal counseling and representation
on all matters related to the Claimant's case in consideration of the contingent fee set forth in the
Fee Agreement!, who provided lawful services as counselor and advocate. In that capacity,
Claimant's Counsel ultimately negotiated a Lump Sum Settlement Agreement (LSSA), which
was submitted to the Commission for approval in May, 2009. The Commission issued its
ORDER2 on September 4,2009, in which it approved the LSSA as between Claimant and
Defendants, but ruled pursuant to IDAPA 17.02.08.033 that Claimant's Counsel's claims for
attorney fees were not reasonable in part. The rules applicable to that determination and this
hearing are IDAPA 17.02.08.033(01)(a) and (c)(ii) referred to hereinafter as the "applicable
IDAPA attorneys fees rules".3 The Commission staff provided no statement of reasons for its
ruling, and rebuffed Claimant's CoUnsel's attempts to discover the factual and legal basis for the
ruling.
At a hearing on Nov. 23, 2009, Claimant's Counsel argued that Seiniger Law Offices is
constitutionally and legally entitled to the claimed attorney fees in full, that the Commission's
regulations relating to the definitions of "available funds" and the associated standard defining
them as benefits "primarily and substantially" made available as a result of the efforts of

1 That

agreement was entered into evidence at the hearing in this matter.
ORDER APPROVING IN PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM
SETTLEMENT, entered September 4, 2009 (hereinafter "ORDER"). The ORDER states that attorney fees ''have
not been substantiated to the Commission as reasonable in accordance with IDAPA 17.02.08.033."
3 The ORDER found that part of Counsel's request for attorney fees on PPD benefits was not reasonable pursuant to
. However, at hearing on Nov. 23, 2009, the Commission stated that it was modifying its original ORDER, and that
the only issue was Counsel's entitlement to attorney fees on the PPI benefit. So the amount in controversy is now
$1,942.19.
2
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Claimant's Counsel are vague and unconstitutional under controlling case law laid down by the
Idaho Supreme Court, that the fee contract involved was reasonable, especially when viewed at
the time that it was entered into, and that Claimant's Counsel and Claimant are constitutionally
entitled to have their fee contract honored unless it is patently unreasonable (outside the
guidelines furnished by IDAP A attorneys fees rules. Claimant testified by affidavit in support of
Claimant's Counsel's position. Defense Counsel spoke in support of Claimant's Counsel's
position. No party presented any contrary evidence. For purposes of these proceedings only, and
without waiving the right to raise the constitutionality of the applicable IDAP A attorneys fees
rules on appeal, Seiniger Law Offices stipulates that its attorneys were not "primarily or
substantially" responsible for securing the PPI benefit involved -- whatever "primarily or
substantially" may mean in the context of defining "available funds" as those terms are used in
the relevant IDAPA rules.
Thus, Seiniger Law Offices withdraws any claim that it is entitled to attorneys fees under
applicable attorneys fees rules, and seeks an award of attorneys fees consistent with the terms of
its fee agreement with the Claimant based upon the fact that those fees and terms are reasonable
under the circumstances and considering the totality of the services provided to the Claimant as a
result of, and relying upon, the entry into and terms of that fee agreement. Therefore, Claimant's
Counsel seeks a contingent attorney fee pursuant to the Fee Agreement from the impairment
rating given to the Claimant based solely upon work performed exclusive of obtaining any
impairment rating and benefits paid for that rating.

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are not in dispute. They are set forth in the pleadings; the Affidavit ofWm. Breck

Seiniger, Jr. In Support of Claim for Attorneys Fees (hereinafter "Seiniger Affidavit"); the
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affidavits of Claimant's Counsel Andrew Marsh and Claimant Laurel Ku1m; and the exhibits to
the affidavits contained in the Commission's file in this matter. In the interest of administrative
economy, they need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that Claimant's Counsel requests an
award of fees based upon its services to the Claimant rendered to the time of the execution of the
Lump Sum Agreement and thereafter, exclusive of anything that it may have done to obtain
"available funds" with respect to the Claimant's impairment rating.
It appears from the Commission's questions at hearing and from communications from
Commission staff throughout this case that the Commission considers there to be one particular
issue applied to the facts before it: namely, whether Claimant's Counsel was "primarily or
substantially" responsible for securing the PPI benefit out of which Claimant's Counsel seeks to
be paid. IDAP A 17.02.0S.033.01.c. To this point, the Commission's staff's analysis of the right
of Claimant's Counsel to the fees claimed turns entirely and solely upon the resolution of this
issue of fact.

III.

ISSUES AND ARGUMENT
A. LIMITATIONS ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE COMMISSION TO TAKE
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS INTO CONSIDERATION IN
ADOPTING, IMPLIMENTING, AND INTERPRETING ITS OWN
REGULATIONS

One of the fundamental issues raised by the Commission is whether its lack of authority
to decide constitutional issues frees it from any duty to pass regulations that comport with clearly
defined constitutional law as handed down by the Idaho Supreme Court. Claimant's Counsel is
aware of no authority supporting that premise, and, suffice it to say, the premise is illogical given
the predictable consequences of its adoption by any court. The Commission has the authority
that duty. Furthermore, if the Commission's authority were so limited, it would have no
authority to consider whether Curr has been implicitly overruled, as it has already done.
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Specifically, the Commission may not adopt a regulation that clearly flies in the face of the
constitutional limitations on its authority set forth in Curr and cannot apply its "primarily or
substantially" rule in such a way as to patently violate that authority.
If the Commission were limited from even considering whether its regulations violate
clearly established law, it could simply flout the import of the constitutional holding in Curr by
simply adopting regulations seriatim that restate a constitutionally prohibited regulation in new
words. This is precisely what has occurred with respect to the regulations at issue here, since, in
the words of the late George Wallace (quoted here though concededly neither an authority on,
nor and advocate of, constitutional rights other than those he believed were related to
segregation) there is not a "dimes worth of difference" between "new money" and "available
funds" as presently defined by the Commission's regulations. It would appear that upholding the
relevant regulations as against in the face of the constitutional prohibitions of Curr would leave
the Commission free to simply rephrase its regulations each time the Idaho Supreme Court
strikes a particularly worded regulation based on the same grounds relied upon in Curro

B. THE CONSITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL AND
CLAIMANT ARE GOVERNED By CURR V. CURR
At hearing, much of the discussion focused on whether the constitutional holdings in
Curr V. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (1993) controlling the rights of claimant's counsel in

a Worker's Compensation case remain good law and control the bounds of discretion of the
Commission in determining the reasonableness of a claim for attorneys fees and other aspects of
the authority granted to the Commission and the and the exercise of that authority. The
Commission appears to consider Curr to have been implicitly overruled by Rhodes V. Indus.
Comm., 125 Idaho 139, 868 P.2d 467 (1993), Mancilla

(1998), and Johnson
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
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willing to entertain the arguments of Claimant's Counsel to the contrary.
1. The Curr Holdings

We begin by reviewing the actual holdings from Curr, set forth in quotes (emphasis added):
•

For an attorney fee agreement, "Reasonableness ... derives from the totality ofthe
circumstances from the perspective of the parties at the time that the fee agreement
was made."

Curr, at 690.

•

The "parties to a contract have a property interest in the subject matter of the
contract that is protectable both under the Contract Clause and the Due Process Clause
of the United States Constitution."

Curr, at 691-692.
•

In Idaho, "the right to follow a recognized and useful occupation is protected by a
constitutional guarantee of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13."

•

The Commission must permit the Claimant to "compensate an attorney for acting solely
as a counselor."

•

The Commission must "recognize [advocacy] efforts that do not generate monetary
awards such as [sometimes] obtaining permission for medical care or procuring an
impairment rating."

•

The Commission may not make suspect an attorney's "integrity in the eyes of their
clients."

•

The Commission may not limit attorney fees to "new money."

•

The Commission may not limit representation to "disputed matters."

•

The Commission "must have clearly articulated evidentiary standards that will be
used at the hearing .. : and formally publish clear guidelines upon which it will base the
fee modifications."

Curr, at 692.

•

"This Court has recognized that a reasonable contingent fee must be 'sufficiently high
to compensate the lawyer not only for the reasonable value of the time he or she
anticipates devoting to the particular lawsuit, but also for the time devoted to other
lawsuits undertaken on the same basis but unsuccessful in result. '"

Curr, at 693.

c. RHODES DISTINGUISHED FROM

CURR

Next, we look at whether the Rhodes decision overruled the Curr holdings. The key point
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
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is that the Court in Rhodes addressed only the validity of.2.!!!: specific regulation, to-wit:
4. Maximum attorney fee to be charged by a claimant's counsel.
... [A]ny contingent fee agreement between counsel and a claimant in a workers'
compensation case shall provide that the amount of attorney fees will not exceed
25% ... [or] after hearing, ... up to 30%. Rhodes at 143.

Accordingly, Rhodes has no application to any worker's compensation regulation other than the
constitutional issue of whether the percentage of an attorney fee can be limited to 25% and 30%
as applied across the board to all attorneys fees for all services pursuant to a regulation that
defines the rights of the parties at the time of entry into the agreement. 4 That regulatory limit on
attorney's fees is unrelated to the vicissitudes of the case, and does not limit compensation to
only certain services provided by an attorney. Neither does the holding of Rhodes limit the
review of the Commission to determine the reasonableness of an attorney's claim for attorneys
fees on a case-by-case basis, as opposed to authorizing the Commission to carve out certain
services that may be furnished by an attorney to which it presumptively (and apparently
conclusively) denies the right to compensation - such as here. Some analysts fail to recognize
the narrowness of the Rhodes holding. This is probably because the "specific regulation at issue"
is not identified in the Court's opinion until it is quoted verbatim in the dissenting opinion by
Justice Trout, IDAPA 17.02.08.033 at 143, in which she correctly observes that the opinion is
limited to the regulation under consideration; an undisputed principle of law.
Accordingly, Commissioner Baskin's observation at hearing that the current IDAP A
rules were upheld in Rhodes" is, respectfully, not a correct statement of the law. (Transcript,
p.lO, Line 22) Moreover, the current version ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033 took effect in 1994;
Rhodes was decided in 1993. The Rhodes case does not even mention Curr; much less address

4

Note: the "specific regulation at issue" no longer exists; it has been superseded (IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.e.).

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

CLAIMANTS COUNSEL'S
OPENING BRIEF

PAGE 8 OF 29

/g/

the constitutional questions that were raised in Curro Nor does Rhodes perform a review or
analysis of any provision of the attorney fee regulations at issue here. Accordingly, Rhodes
cannot be said to implicitly overrule Curr, even if a case establishing specific constitutional
rights could ever be implicitly overruled by a case challenging an unrelated regulation.
Fundamentally, the fact that a regulation limiting fees to 25% was found to be
constitutional in Rhodes, does not lead to the logical conclusion that every IDAP A rule that the
Commission enacted thereafter relating to attorneys fees (including the "available funds" and
"primarily or substantially" regulations challenged here) are constitutionally valid. Nor does it
mean that the Court overruled or abandoned all of the other constitutional requirements it set
forth in Curro For example, if that were this the case, a holding that a particular regulation
intended to protect the environment survives constitutional challenge would compel the
conclusion that all regulations protecting the environment are constitutional. For example, after
Rhodes could this Commission adopt a regulation voiding all contract property rights of

attorneys and claimants? Of course not. As a matter of simple logic it must be concluded that
Curr has not been implicitly overruled and remains good law.
1. Mancilla and Johnson Distinguished from Curr

Likewise, the Mancilla and Johnson cases do not mention Curr or address the
constitutional questions that were raised in Curro As with Rhodes, they cannot be read as
implicitly overruling Curr's constitutional requirements. It is axiomatic that when a
constitutional issue is neither raised by the parties, nor considered by a Court of Appeals, the
issue has not been determined.
The Court's holdings in Mancilla and Johnson were very narrow and were limited to a
review of whether or not the Commission acted within the bounds of its discretion: "We hold
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that substantial and competent evidence exists to support the Commission's order denying Pena's
motion for reconsideration of the Commission's previous order partially denying Pena's request
for attorney fees." Mancilla at 689. The reason for the narrow holding is that the issue presented
to the Court was itself very narrow-and only an evidentiary issue, not a constitutional one. The
Court's holding affirmed that weighing evidence and making rulings on attorney fee issues is
within the Commission's discretion, but the Court did not address whether the Commission was
acting within the outer limits of that discretion-because the appellant in Mancilla and Johnson
did not raise this issue in the context of constitutionality.
Since the Mancilla and Johnson cases provide no guidance on the constitutional
principles set forth in Curr, Mancilla and Johnson have no precedential value on whether, in the
instant case, the Commission's regulations and their application is within constitutional limits
generally nor the constitutional limits specifically addressed in Curr. 56
Until such time as the Idaho Supreme Court explicitly overrules its constitutional
holdings in Curr, it remains the touchstone for determining the rights of Claimant's Counsel and
Claimant, and the bounds of the Commission's constitutional authority and discretion.
What, then, is the precedential value of Mancilla/Johnson? As with any other such case
in which the Supreme Court narrowly and specifically limits its holding to a finding ''that
substantial and competent evidence exists to support the Commission's order,,,7 the import of the
case is limited to that holding. Anything else is just dicta. 8 The Commission is found to have

At hearing, defense counsel Alan Hull agreed with Claimant's Counsel that Mancilla and Johnson should not be
seen as having any important precedential value. (Transcript, p. 18, Line 17 et seq.)
6 Indeed, the issue of what the outer bounds of that discretion are generally, which might have included its
Constitutional limitations, was not addressed, and therefore the decision has no Constitutional significance
whatsoever, nor does it define the outer bounds of the Commission's discretion for all purposes.
7 Mancilla at 689.
8 At hearing, Commissioner Baskin stated: "As I look at [the Mancilla] case and the Johnson case that came after, it
5
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acted within the bounds of its discretion; however, these two cases do not discuss or define the
constitutional limitations on the parameters of that discretion. By no stretch of imagination do
they overrule or limit the holdings in Curro

D. THE COMMISSION'S ApPLICATION OF ITS RULES VIOLATES THE
"CLEARLY ARTICULATED EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS"
REQUIREMENT 9

Having established that the legal principles of Curr must govern the Commission's
interpretation of its IDAP A rules, we now examine how the Commission may apply those rules.
The Commission in its ORDER has found that the attorney fees sought by Claimant's
Counsel are not reasonable. IDAPA 17.0.08.033.0 I.e. defines "reasonable" as requiring three
elements,IO two of which are not believed to be in dispute: that the attorney fees must be
consistent with the fee agreement, 11 and that they must be subject to the element of
reasonableness in IRPC 1.5. 12
1. The Meaning of "Primarily or Substantially" is Unclear, in Violation of
Curr

Although Claimant's Counsel stipulates for purposes of these proceedings that their
actions did not "primarily and substantially" result in the payment of permanent impairment

seems to me that the court has upheld rulings of the Commission finding that the would have and should haves and
what may have happened had counsel not been involved isn't sufficient to meet that burden of proof, that there has
to be something more, something to show that, again, the efforts of counsel were instrumental in obtaining that
award." (Transcript, p. 14) Counsel respectfully disagrees. What Mr. Baskin concluded was "upheld" is mere dicta.
9 Although Claimant's Counsel does not assert that its services ''primarily and substantially" resulted in obtaining
the impairment rating in this case, they do argue that the application of that standard during any phase of these
proceeding was and is Constitutionally prohibited, and that the Commission must consider clearly established
Constitutional rights in the application of authority. For example, the Commission is not free to imprison an
attorney without charges or the right to tria~ simply by virtue of the facts that it has adopted a regulation arrogating
to itself that authority and that no Constitutional holding has been issued on that regulation. Constitutional
guarantees would have no meaning is they were not to be reasonably interpreted by those legally empowered to
exercise the authority of the state.
10 For a chart that sorts out the interconnectivity of the elements of "reasonable," See Seiniger Affidavit, Exhibit 6
11 See Seiniger Affidavit, including ExhIbit 1, which is a copy of the fee agreement, which shows it to be in writing
and to conform to IRPC 1.5.
12 See Seiniger Affidavit, including Paragraphs 32-106, which set forth facts proving the factors listed in IRPC 1.5.
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benefits to the Claimant, this issue is not moot because Claimant's Counsel were required to
expend time and effort to at least defend themselves from charges made and transmitted to their
client that they were seeking unreasonable attorneys fees. As reflected in the record, this has
become the customary practice of the Commission and left unchallenged these regulations will
continue to require Claimant's Counsel either to forego any attorneys fees denied by the
Commission staff (without a hearing) or risk having their integrity made suspect in the eyes of
their clients at best, worse yet being reported to the Idaho State Bar for consideration of
disciplinary action, or at worst being sued by the client.
The element of reasonableness in question in the determination of to what a "Charging
Lien" may attach involved at issue in this case is the requirement "ii. The services of the
attorney operated primarily or substantially to secure the fund out of which the attorney seeks to
be paid."

As observed by Commissioner Baskin during the telephone conference preceding the

hearing in this matter, the meaning of that standard is obscure.
Moreover, it appears from the Transcript of the hearing (e.g., pp. 11, Line 10; 38, Line
20; 39, Line 13; 55, Line 2) that the Commission itself remains uncertain both as to the meaning
of the phrase, and the standard of proof required to meet it. Claimant's Counsel respectfully
submits that the Commission's uncertainty is the establishing that IDAPA 17.0.08.033.01.c.ii.
violates Curr, which requires "clearly articulated evidentiary standards ... and clear guidelines"
for determining the reasonableness of attorney fees. Curr, at 692. Moreover, Claimant's
Counsel pointed out at hearing (citing specific examples) that ''the Commission historically has
changed its interpretation of what those regulations mean," which further demonstrates that the
regulations are not clear and that there application is arbitrary, "and, therefore, they are
constitutionally invalid" pursuant to Curro (Transcript, p. 27, Line 23)
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2. The Meaning of "Disputed" is Unclear, in Violation of Curr
Returning now to the defInition of "Available Funds,,,13 not only does it include the
Charging Lien, but it excludes "compensation ... not disputed to be owed prior to claimant's
agreement to retain the attorney." At present, the Commission seems to be requiring a showing
by attorneys that ''the specifIc benefIt was disputed;,,14 or that there is "evidence that the surety
disputed the impairment rating;,,15 or that there was a "fIght, contest, or dispute" between the
claimant and defendants over a PPI rating. 16 This defInition, if it is one, is highly ambiguous.
The standard clearly requires the attorney seeking approval of an attorney fee agreed to by his
client to prove a negative! The problems with applying such a defInition need not be repeated
here, as they are set forth in great detail in the Seiniger Affidavit, Exhibit 8, and in Par. 54 et seq.
(see also Transcript, p. 29, Line 23, et seq.) Where "clearly articulated evidentiary standards and

clear guidelines" are lacking, as they are here in regard to the meaning of "disputed" and the
proof required thereof, the constitutional requirements of Curr have not been met, and therefore
that criteria cannot be the basis of denying Claimant's Counsel's claim to attorneys fees on the
benefIts paid resulting from the impairment rating. Further, this standard fails to account for
compensation that is merely delayed, or which is uncertain, and with respect to which an
attorney is hired for purposes of applying pressure on the surety to follow the law by virtue of the
fact that the claimant has a highly trained, skilled and experienced advocate on his or her side
providing the "vigilance" historically and universally required to keep the peace - which in this
case means the Defendant's compliance with the law. Indisputably, the fact that the claimant has
counsel strengthens the claimant's bargaining power with respect to benefIts that the defendants

17.0.0S.033.01.a
Seiniger Affidavit, Exhibit 27, "Statement of Reasons for Denial" of fees on the Drotzman claim, page 1, par. 5.
15 Seiniger Affidavit, Exhibit 32, "Order Releasing Retained Proceeds," Sandra Perez v. Idaho Fresh Pak, Inc. and
Liberty Northwest Insurance Corp., Ie No. 2005-530757 (2009) (hereinafter "Perez")
16 Seiniger Affidavit, Exhibit 33, "Order Denying Reconsideration," Perez
13

14
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might withhold on marginal grounds. With respect to such benefits, the defendants would
seldom risk the hazard of attorneys fees under I.C. 72-804 if a client is represented, but might
well assume such a risk as long as a claimant in unrepresented and there is little chance that the
unrepresented claimant would even be aware of his or her rights under that statute. The
testimony of Defense Counsel, Alan Hull, implicitly makes that clear.

3. The Present Practice Is Unconstitutional Because It Requires Claimant's
Counsel to Prove A Negative and Violates Their Constitutional Right Not
Have Their Integrity Needlessly Called Into Question
The Commission's practice of finding all attorneys fees to be unreasonable unless the
attorney can prove the negative that the subject benefits would not have been paid but for his
efforts necessarily renders the attorney suspect in the eyes of his client in contradiction to the
considerations giving rise to the constitutional rights recognized in Curro More importantly, it is
presently impossible to avoid a situation in which the Commission issues an order that must be
sent to the claimant holding that the attorney has sought fees that are unreasonable - in clear
violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct - unless the attorney limits his claim for
compensation to benefits expressly denied by the Defendant. Clearly this would have a "chilling
effect" on the willingness of attorneys to undertake representation in cases where the
unwillingness of the Defendants to pick up a claim or pay benefits was implicit in their conduct thereby infringing upon the claimant's right to counsel. This outcome may be a "consummation
devoutly to be wished" by defendants, but one that if not unconstitutional, should not be
desirable to the Commission and is clearly contrary to the spirit of Idaho's Workers
Compensation Act.

4. It is Often Impossible to Prove That the Defendants Paid PPI Benefits
"Primarily or Substantially" Because of Claimant's Counsel's Efforts
Given the indefinable nature of the phrase "primarily or substantially," and the confusion
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over the level of proof required for same, Claimant's Counsel submits that it will often be is
impossible for him to prove that he was "primarily or substantially" responsible for securing the
PPI benefits, absent a stipulation to such facts by the Defendants or an evidentiary hearing
entangling the Defendants in an adversary proceeding after they have assumed that they have
bought their peace and relieved themselves of the obligation to continue to pay for the defense of
the case. Defendants are at best unlikely to stipulate that they "unreasonably" denied or delayed
payment of benefits. But such a showing would appear to be required by the regulations
challenged here and their past interpretation by the Commission.
At hearing, in response to a question from the Commission about what is Claimant's
Counsel's evidence on the issue at hand, Claimant's Counsel replied: "I don't know and I can't
know what caused the surety to decide to pay that [pPI] benefit. .. I can't know what
discussions [defense counsel] had, if any, with the adjuster. I can't really know what the
adjuster's thought process is. I can't know whether they decided to pay the benefit because we
got [our own IME] report, so they had to go out and get another report and, then, they decided to
pay that. As far as I'm concerned it's simply impossible for me to meet that evidentiary burden."
(Transcript, p. 46, Line 9) (See also Seiniger Affidavit, ,107-110)
The following exchange is even more enlightening:

12
13
14
15
16

17
18
19

20
21
22
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COMMISSIONER BASKIN: I'm guided by the language of
the statute. Primarily and substantially responsible.
What does that mean to you?
MR. SEINIGER: Well, I don't know. And part of the
reason that I don't know is this: I'm assuming that if!
were to call [defense counsel] to testify and I said to him, well,
I want to know whether or not these were paid as a result
of my efforts, so I'd like you to tell me about your
conversations with the adjuster. He'd refuse to do it
based on privilege and he would be correct.
COMMISSIONER BASKIN: And you could certainly ask
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that question of the adjuster.
MR. SEINIGER: I'm not so sure that you can, based on
the present rules that create a privilege. (Transcript, p. 39, Line 12)17

Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 502(a)(1), an adjuster is protected consulting with an
attorney is a client and is protected by the attorney-client privilege. As the Commission is well
aware, the largest Workers Compensation surety in the State of Idaho is the Idaho State
Insurance Fund. Ibis privilege is easily invoked by a representation by the adjuster that it
investigation is being conducted under the oversight of an attorney, or, better yet, that its actions
with respect to the subject benefits involved consultation with the sureties attorney.
Even if the adjuster were not protected by this privilege, it is difficult to conceive of an
adjuster willingly stating under oath that they would not have paid the PPI benefit but for the
intervention of claimant's counsel- such could be considered an admission of bad faith
practices by the surety, or subject the surety to penalties pursuant to I.C. 72-804.
That issue aside, implicit in Commissioner Baskin's question is the notion that claimants'
attorneys would have to go to hearing to examine the adjuster in an attempt to establish their
right to attorney fees in each and every PPI case in which the Commission denies fees. No
claimants' attorney in the state could afford the enormous investment of time and costs that such
a policy would require. Indeed, as the record reflects, Claimant's Counsel has long since eaten
up the contested attorneys fees in dispute here with the time and efforts spent on this matter prior
to hearing.
5. The Commission May Not Require "Absolute Proof"
Commissioner Baskin insightfully raised the issue of burden of proof in the context of
whether Claimant's Counsel should be required to prove the causal link between his

17

See also Seiniger Affidavit, ,110
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representation and the payment of benefits by demonstrating nothing less than that without his
representation, the benefits would not have been paid. "I think it does veer into the speculative to
say, well, if Mr. Seiniger had not been retained in this case the surety may not have obtained the
rating as quickly as it would have." (Transcript, p. 14, Line 20)
The Commission appears to have taken the position that Claimant's Counsel must
"prove" that without Claimant's Counsel's assistance, the surety would not have paid the PPI.
Besides the fact that the attorney is required to prove a negative, this burden is a logically
impossibility for Claimant's Counsel to meet. Consider this example: Can you prove that if your
doctor had not given you that flu shot last winter, you would not have avoided the flu? Of course
not, because whether you catch the flu depends on a host of factors besides the flu shot, such as
whether you were exposed to the virus, your degree of pre-existing immunity, and how much
sleep you get. Does the Commission believe that at the end of the winter, if they did not catch the
flu, they should not have had to pay their doctor for that flu shot? After all, in retrospect there is
no "proof' that his service was primarily and substantially responsible for them avoiding the flu!
The adjuster involved might well have relented and paid the benefit because he or she "got into
the Christmas spirit", or began to worry about the affect of callousness and insensitivity upon his
or her soul- a consideration not unworthy of reflecting on in the estimation of Claimant's
Counsel, and one to which Mr. Seiniger has often obliquely appealed.
This analogy demonstrates why the law only requires a preponderance of the evidence to
support a claim for attorney fees, and not some kind of higher level proof or sine qua non
"absolute proof." So although Claimant's Counsel cannot absolutely "prove" that without his
representation the Claimant would not have received PPI benefits, the preponderance of the
evidence shows that with the Claimant hired skilled counsel, of good reputation and long
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experience in Worker's Compensation cases, and that after retaining Claimant's Counsel's
representation, the Claimant did receive benefits that the Defendants did not dispute To prove
more, without the Defendants stipulating that they would otherwise have withheld payment of
benefits for an undisputed impairment rating if only to put pressure on the claimant to settle his
or her entire case on a lump sum basis, would require speculation.

6. The Commission May Not Apply Different Standards to Different
Benefits, in Violation of Curr
In terms of Curr 's requirements for clear guidelines, the next question is whether the
Commission may "cherry-pick" benefits to which it will apply its interpretation of the "primarily
or substantially" standard, i.e. whether it must apply the same level of proof and the same
standards to requests for attorney fees based on disability benefits obtained as it applies to
impairment benefits obtained.
At hearing, Counsel stated that it "sort of seem[s] to be a tacit, de facto position of
the Commission that, well, with respect to the impairment rating, we are going to require
them to show that it was disputed, but with respect to the disability above impairment, we
are not going to really require that. And the reason that I'm saying that is that we have
been -- if I may say so -- hassled by the people who do the informal [determinations] for
years now and we have never once been asked to demonstrate that there was a dispute
with respect to the PPD benefits or that ... they were awarded substantially and primarily
as a result of our efforts ... the definition of the available funds as including only those
activities that primarily and substantially produce these [benefits are] not clear guidelines,
because ... they couldn't possibly be clear guidelines if they are being applied in
different circumstances different ways by the Commission." (Transcript, p. 36, Line 10,
thru p. 37)
Claimant's Counsel submits that the Commission may not apply the "primarily and
substantially" standard, facially applicable to all benefits to disallow attorney fees on the PPI, to
certain selected categories benefits to the exclusion of others. To do so arbitrarily discriminates
based on the type of benefit obtained, and this would be a direct violation of Curro
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E. CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S ATTORNEY FEE REQUEST Is
REASONABLE As DEFINED By CURR

When a potential client first consults an attorney, it is never clear what benefits, if any,
the claimant will ultimately actually be paid or denied. There are many unknown and
unknowable factors, and many potential defenses that the surety could raise. The risk of no
recovery is great. These risks are set forth in detail in the Seiniger Affidavit, , 41 et. seq.

1. "Reasonableness" is determined by the perspective of the parties at the
time of contracting and may not be determined in hindsight based upon the
outcome of the case
Given the risks and the unknowable factors, the Supreme Court recognizes that
"Reasonableness [of a fee agreement] ... derives from the totality of the circumstances from the
perspective ofthe parties at the time that the fee agreement was made." Curr at 690. For
example, if at the time of contracting for an attorney the contracting parties had reasonable
concerns that legal counseling or advocacy might be needed to address existing or potential
disputes or issues, the benefit of hindsight may not be used for a finding that it was unreasonable
to so contract. The Commission's present stance ignores this legal principle. Additionally, in
most circumstances, unless a benefit has been guaranteed to a claimant, the attorney must
speculate as to what events, nascent in the womb of time, may give rise to a denial of that
benefit. No experienced counsel would ever guaranteed a client what will ultimately transpire in
a case, and if the attorney were not retained, doing so might well be malpractice.
Moreover, under the Commission's current approach, an attorney trying to decide
whether to take a case has to do the following:
•

Speculate as to whether the injured worker will eventually have a PPI rating. (That is a
lot to ask, given that "it is impossible for a layman or even for a physician to know, or to
accurately predict, whether an injured worker will ultimately have an impairment rating,
or what the percentage of that rating might be, until the injured worker has completed his
or her medical treatment." Affidavit of Dr. Richard Radnovich, attached as Exhibit 10 to
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Seiniger Affidavit.)
•

Speculate as to whether the surety will dispute the rating. (Even the surety itself probably
doesn't know whether it intends to dispute any eventual rating.)

•

Speculate as to whether, if disputed, it will be possible to prevail at a hearing so that the
claimant will actually receive benefits from which the attorney can take a fee. (That is a
lot to ask, given that no one knows what will be the testimony~ofthe physicians.)

By analogy, this would be like requiring a physician, at the very first appointment, to predict
how much medical help the patient will need, what infections or other medical complications
mayor may not crop up during treatment, how long it will take to get better, and what will be the
end result of treatment. The medical concept of "working diagnosis" speaks to the problem of
even establishing a finn diagnoses at the earliest stages of medical treatment.

If benefits can be guaranteed as of the date of the formation of the attorney-client
relationship, the Commission should adopt a procedure whereby the Claimant simply comes to
its staff, explains the facts as he or she understands them, and the Commission will guarantee
that the benefits will be paid. As the saying goes: ''Not in my lifetime."
This is why a hindsight-based approach is prohibited by the Idaho Supreme Court. In the
instant case, the evidence shows that Claimant thought she needed help, Claimant's Counsel
agreed to help her, and did provide legal services to her - for years. That more than meets the
reasonableness test of Curro The Commission may not lawfully second-guess the parties'
decisions through the denial of a claim for attorney fees essentially upon a categorical basis.

F. THE SUPREME COURT SPECIFICALLY ALLOWS A REASONABLE
CONTINGENCY FEE

"This Court has recognized that a reasonable contingent fee must be 'sufficiently high to
compensate the lawyer not only for the reasonable value of the time he or she anticipates
devoting to the particular lawsuit, but also for the time devoted to other lawsuits undertaken on
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the same basis but unsuccessful in result. '" Curr, at 693. In other words, Idaho specifically
allows attorneys' contingency fees to compensate claimants' attorneys for the risk factors
referenced above, in addition to the value of their time. This applies to the instant case.

G. THE COMMISSION'S ApPROACH CREATES ETHICAL PROBLEMS
FOR ATTORNEYS

The Commission's approach creates a myriad of serious ethical concerns for both
claimants' attorneys and defense attorneys, not the least of which is the obligations of defense
counsel regarding communications with a represented party when informed by claimant's
counsel that the scope of his representation is limited to disputed matters. These need not be
repeated here, as they are set forth in great detail in the Seiniger Affidavit, Par. 38,85, 111-118
(see also Transcript, p. 31 Line 4 et seq.)

H. THE COMMISSION Is ACTING IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
AND IN VIOLATION OF THE ATTORNEYS RIGHT To PRACTICE HIS
PROFESSION

The Commission has been interpreting or applying IDAPA 17.02.08.033 in such a way
that it brings about the following results, all of which are against public policy:
•

Claimants are less likely to be able to find counsel to take their case. 18

•

Attorneys are discouraged from taking workers' compensation cases because the
Commission does not honor their fee agreements with their clients.

•

The attorney-client relationship is damaged by the Commission's creation of a conflict of
interest between attorney and client each time the Commission finds the requested
attorney fee to be unreasonable, and by the implication in each such instance that the
attorney acted unfairly, unethically, or unreasonably.19

•

The confidence of claimants and attorneys in the legal system is undermined when the
Commission, via its website and its publications (see discussion infra), strongly
encourages claimants to seek legal advice, but at the end of the case tells claimants and

For legal authority on the importance of workers being able to obtain counsel, see Seiniger Affidavit, Exhibit 5.
The latter is a violation oflaw as well as public policy, in that the Commission may not make suspect an
attorney's "integrity in the eyes of their clients." Curr at 692.
18

19
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attorneys that it will not honor their fee agreement, and/or tells them that portions of the
attorney's services were of no value, not timely, or not of consequence. 20
•

When attorneys discontinue taking workers' compensation cases because the Commission
does not honor their fee agreements, and when as a result claimants are unable to find
counsel to take their case and as a result do not receive their full benefits under the
workers' compensation law, the burden of medical and financial care for these unassisted
claimants shifts from the insurers who collected employers' premiums to various public
welfare and private charity organizations. 21
A related set of public policy concerns is whether the Commission should be prohibited

from interpreting or applying IDAPA 17.02.08.033, including especially the "dispute" language
of .Ol(a), in such a way that one or more of the following results:
•

The plaintiffs bar is encouraged to work toward finding ways to foster, or at least to
demonstrate and document, that there was a "fight, contest, or dispute" between the
claimant and defendants.

•

The more reputable 22 attorneys are penalized, because they are less likely to have benefits
disputed by the surety, and therefore, less likely to receive approval from the
Commission for their attorney fees (and less likely to take on injured workers' cases in
the future).

•

The surety is essentially put in charge of determining how much a claimant's attorney
will be paid, because attorney fees are based more on the surety's decisions of what to
"dispute" than on the parameters of Curr or any of the factors enumerated in Rule 1.5 of
the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct regarding the value of the attorney's services.

The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that public policy favors ensuring that claimants have
access to counseL 23 Claimant's Counsel submits that the Supreme Court has never intended, nor
would public policy favor, depriving Idaho's injured workers of their constitutional right to seek

Seiniger Affidavit, Exhibit 27, "Statement of Reasons for Denial" offees on the Drotzman claim, page 1, par. 5.
Put another way, injured workers who do not receive their full medical and income benefits due to lack of access
to legal counsel do not just disappear; they still need help, so they surface at emergency rooms for medical care and
welfare departments for income problems. The net cost to society is same---it is just that the cost of caring for
injured workers is shifted from insurance companies who are protected from having to pay on policy claims (even
though they collected premiums) to other governmental and charitable institutions. This shifting of the cost is clearly
counter to public policy.
22 Seiniger Affidavit, , 33 et seq.
23 The Curr Court noted that "two general philosophies for the Commission to consider" are to "encourage claimants
to pursue rightful legal claims and attorneys to take on such claimants' interests. Hogaboom, 107 Idaho at 17, 684
P.2d at 994." Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 693, 864 P.2d 132, 139
20

2!

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

~~S:"I~~~i:t
(208) 345-1000

CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S
OPENING BRIEF

PAGE 22 OF 29

,.... -

the advice and advocacy of counsel at every stage of a worker's compensation matter. 24
In addition, the Commission's interpretation and application of its IDAPA rules leads to
results, including those listed above, that are contrary to the legislative intent of "sure and certain
relief for injured workmen" (I.C. 72-201) in enacting the worker's compensation law, and
contrary to the delegation of power under I.C. 72-508 to "promulgate reasonable rules and
regulations for effecting the purposes of this act. ,,25

I. THE HEARING HELD PURSUANT To 17.02.08.033.03(B) WAS NOT
A DE Novo HEARING AND DEPRIVED CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL OF A
MEANINGFUL HEARING AND THE RIGHT OF CRoss-ExAMINATION
After the Commission failed to comply with its own rule in IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(a)
that "Commission staff will notify counsel in writing of the staffs informal determination, which
shall state the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not reasonable." Therefore,
Claimant's Counsel made every reasonable effort to discover the legal or factual basis for the
ORDER so that he could prepare for the hearing. These were unsuccessful with the Commission.
The Commission declined to rule on Claimant's Counsel's MOTION FOR FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW flied September 18,2009, where the grounds for
said Motion were that the Commission staff did not "notify counsel in writing of ... the reasons
for the determination that the requested fee is not reasonable" pursuant to IDAP A
17.02.08.033.03(a). The Commission declined to allow Claimant's Counsel to take a deposition,
notice of which was filed on September 18,2009, of Scott McDougall, the Commission staff
member who issued "the staffs informal determination ... that the requested fee is not
At hearing, defense counsel Alan Hull made an excellent argument on many of these public policy issues.
(Transcript, p. 6, Line 14, et seq.)
25 "Without clear guidelines nestled in appropriately promulgated regulations, attorneys' actions are plagued by
doubt, which may have a chilling effect on the underlying purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act that the
Commission is constrained to promote." Curr at 691-692.
24
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reasonable." The Commission declined to rule on Claimant's Counsel's MOTION TO
PRODUCE COMMISSION'S CLAIM FILE OF CLAIMANT filed September 18,2009, and
declined to produce said file. On Nov. 3, 2009, Claimant's Counsel subpoenaed four witnesses
(employees of the Commission26) to testify at the hearing, and spent much time preparing to
examine the witnesses. At the hearing itself, Claimant's Counsel was surprised to learn that he
would not be allowed to examine the witnesses, even though there had been no motion to quash
and no notice of any kind that the Commission declined not allow their testimony.
The Commission failed to follow its own rule in IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03(a) Although the
rule requires that Counsel be notified "in writing" of ''the reasons for the determination that the
requested fee is not reasonable," the letter from Commission staff 27 does not list any reasons,
nor does the ORDER itself. This is a violation of Claimant's Counsel's and the Claimant's
constitutional right to due process and notice and opportunity to be heard. 28
Commissioner Baskin acknowledged the Commission's ex parte decision-making when
he stated at the hearing that ''we are prepared at this time to entertain any additional argument or
receive any additional testimony or facts that you wish to offer in support of the claim for
attorney's fees." (Transcript, p. 3, Line 22) (emphasis added) Clearly, the purpose of the hearing
was to address the findings of unreasonableness that the Commission has already made, and to
consider additional evidence, implying that previous evidence, supplied by unknown witnesses,

There is no legal basis for refusing to testify, as the employees subpoenaed (the manager of the benefits section
and his staff members known as compensation consultants) do not perf{)rm any judicial, quasi-judicial, or other
privileged functions in making the staffs informal determination pursuant to 17.02.0S.033.03(a), as shown by their
job descriptions, of which the Commission can take judicial notice.
27 Seiniger Affidavit, Exhibit 13.
28 "In order to justifiably modify attorney fee agreements in the interest of public welfare, the Commission must
afford due process to the contracting parties, i.e., notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time." Curr
at 692. Moreover, since the "due process" requirement applies to both parties, the Claimant, too, should have had
notice and an opportunity to be heard on whether she wished the contract to be enforced on its terms, before the
ORDER was entered.
26

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise. Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S
OPENING BRIEF

PAGE 24 OF 29

II}

I

would be considered. 29 Moreover, because Claimant's Counsel were denied a statement of
reasons for the initial finding that their fees were unreasonable, they went to hearing completely
in the dark as to what evidence had already been considered by the Commission and unable to
cross-examine those who provided that evidence.
The net result is that Claimant's Counsel was forced to appear at hearing without any
information as to the factual or legal basis for the Commission's ex parte ORDER, and certainly
without any knowledge as to the contrary evidence that Commission staff must have had in order
to have found that the preponderance of the evidence went against Claimant's Counsel's position
(see discussion supra). This is a violation of Claimant's Counsel's constitutional right to due
process and notice and an opportunity to be heard. 3o \Vhile it might be inferred that the initial
order finding that Claimant's Counsel's claim of attorneys fees were declined solely upon the
basis that benefits for the impairment rating were not denied by the Defendants, without a
statement of reasons as required by the rule, Claimant's Counsel is completely in the dark as to
any other reason for the denial of those fees, and therefore must go to hearing in the dark.

J.

THE COMMISSION Is PROHIBITED FROM ENCOURAGING CLAIMANTS
To SEEK LEGAL ADVICE, AND THEN REFUSING To ALLOW THE LEGAL
ADVISORS To BE PAID

What is the Commission stance on the issue of "compensat[ing] an attorney for acting
solely as a counselor and ... efforts that do not generate monetary awards such as obtaining
permission for medical care or procuring an impairment rating ... "? Curr at 692. Its regulations

29 Claimant's counsel sought to depose the Commission staff members involved in the determination confirmed by
the Commission in its initial order and to subpoena them to hearing, but were denied the opportunity to do so by
order of the Commission.
30 "In order to justifiably modify attorney fee agreements in the interest of public welfare, the Commission must
afford due process to the contracting parties, i.e., notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time." Curr
at 692.
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and their application are at odds with the information provided on its own web site.: 31
There are many reasons for a dispute to arise in a claim. These disputes can
sometimes center around complicated legal issues. The assistance of an attorney
may be needed.
If an injured worker (claimant) has a disagreement with the insurer/employer that
cannot be resolved informally, the claimant can use the formal judicial process.
Due to the complexity of the judicial process, it is recommended that you
contact an attorney.
After filing the complaint, the case must be prepared and presented to the Hearing
Officer. Some typical steps are listed below but this is not a complete list. If you
have questions, you may want to consult an attorney.
Some costs may be incurred in preparing for and attending a hearing. If you have
questions for [sic] concerns about costs and expenses you may want to seek legal
counsel.
Legal representation is not required to file a Complaint with the Industrial
Commission. However, due to the complexity of the judicial process, you may
wish to consider legal counsel.
If your employer does not have workers' compensation insurance and you believe
that you should receive workers' compensation benefits, you may contact an
Idaho Industrial Commission Compensation Consultant by calling toll free 1-800950-2110 VITDD; or consult with an attorney.

Industrial Commission employees can assist you with many of your questions or
concerns about workers' compensation. However, they cannot provide you with
legal advice. If you believe that you need legal advice, you should consult an
attorney.
If you choose to formally contest the decision of your employer or the employer's
insurance company, you may want to consult an attorney.
You may obtain a copy of the Complaint Form from the Industrial Commission or
your attorney.
To obtain a date for your hearing, you or your attorney must file a "Request for
Calendaring" with the Idaho Industrial Commission. 32
Over and over again, the Commission officially recommends that claimants seek legal

Exhibits 16-18,23-24 (bold emphasis added on all quotes)
See also the "Facts for Injured Workers" pamphlet. Seiniger Affidavit, Exhibit 17. Also, the "General Information
on Representing Yourself in a Workers' Compensation Case" (Seiniger Affidavit, Exhibit 23) pamphlet says:
1. The materials you have received are not a substitute for legal advice from an attorney.
2. Workers' compensation laws and Industrial Commission rules are complex...
4. It is a good idea to talk to an attorney before proceeding on your OWO.
MY CHECKLIST 0 I understand it would help me to talk with an attorney about my case.
31

32
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advice; warns claimants of the complexity of the law; and officially urges claimants to talk to an
attorney. Does the Commission intend for the public to assume that legal advice is free? Does
the Commission intend for attorneys to assume that they are required to provide legal advice for
free? (See the oath taken by attorneys not to decline representation based on personal
considerations or because a client cannot pay. ) We assume not.
What, then, does the Commission intend by its recommendations? The only logical
interpretation is that the Commission expects that a claimant will contract with an attorney for
legal advice, and then pay the attorney pursuant to that contract. Under that interpretation, it
must be presumed that the Commission intends to honor the parties' contract as required by
constitutional law.
But the Commission does not stop with just recommending that a claimant seek legal
advice, it goes into detail of how and where to obtain it:
4. It is a good idea to talk to an attorney before proceeding on your own. You
may contact the Idaho State Bar at 208-334-4500 for a referral. Information
about obtaining an attorney may also be found at www2.state.id.us/isb. 33
The information contained in this pamphlet is general in nature and is not
intended as a substitute for legal advice. Changes in the law or the specific facts
of your case may result in legal interpretations which are different than those
presented here.
The Idaho State Bar can provide you names of lawyers in your area
who are familiar with workers' compensation issues and related matters. The
Idaho State Bar is located in Boise, Idaho, and can be reached by calling 1208-334-4500 or toll-free at 1-800-221-3295. 34
Exhibit 23, "General Information on Representing Yourself in a Workers' Compensation Case"
Exhibit 17, "Facts for Injured Workers" (emphasis added in all quotes). Here are more from the IIC website:
Can the Industrial Commission recommend a workers' compensation attorney?
It is not appropriate for the Commission to recommend counsel. However, you can call the Idaho State
Bar Lawyer Referral Service at (208) 334-4500 or look in the Yellow Pages in the Attorneys - Workers'
Compensation section.
The information contained in this web page is general in nature and is not intended as a substitute for legal
advice. Changes in the law or the specific facts of your case may result in legal interpretations, whlch are different
than presented here.
The Idaho State Bar can provide you names of lawyers in your area who are familiar with workers'
33
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Apparently, it is so important to the Commission that injured workers consider getting legal
advice before proceeding on their own that the Commission tells them exactly how to go about
getting a lawyer. Moreover, the Commission also makes it clear that its staff cannot give legal
advice:
Industrial Commission employees can assist you with many of your questions or
concerns about workers' compensation. However, they cannot provide you with
legal advice. If you believe that you need legal advice, you should consult an
attorney. Ibid
Again, the Commission makes it clear that the only way for claimants to get legal advice
is from an attorney. Let us apply all of this to the instant case. The Commission, via its website
and pamphlets, tells people like Claimant Laurel Kulm to seek legal advice. Laurel seeks advice
from Seiniger Law Offices. So far, it is clear that Laurel did nothing wrong, because the
Commission says that she is doing what it wants Claimants to-do. Laurel signs a contract with
Seiniger Law Offices in which she agrees to pay them for their services, but rather than require
an hourly fee,35 Seiniger agrees to take a risk and accept a contingency fee on PPI benefits.
Again, the Commission never says that the legal advice should be free, so neither Laurel nor
Seiniger Law Offices did anything wrong by signing this contract. Laurel asks her attorney for
advice and he provides it. Again, this is exactly what the Commission says it wants.
How is it, then, that several years later, the Commission staff is prepared to :find that in
retrospect, Laurel should not have sought advice, Seiniger should not have provided it, and
therefore Seiniger should not be paid? What, exactly, did Laurel or Seiniger do that was different
than what the Commission specifically said they should do? In sum, public policy and
fundamental fairness prohibits the Commission from encouraging claimants to seek legal advice,

compensation issues. The Idaho State Bar is located in Boise, Idaho and can be reached by calling ...
35 It is not even clear that a claimant could agree to pay an hourly fee out of the benefits that she receives for an
impairment rating.
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and then preventing their legal advisors from getting paid.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Commission should approve all of Counsel's attorney
fees as set forth in the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement.
Dated January 19, 2010.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

.'

Andrew Marsh
Attorney for Claimant

V.CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on January 19,2010, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
to be served as follows:
Alan Hull
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL
250 South 5th, Ste. 700
POBox 7426
Boise ID 83707-7426
VIA Fax: (208) 344-5510
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

Andrew Marsh
Attorney for Claimant
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IC 2006-012770
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
RELATING TO COUNSEL'S
REQUEST FOR APPROVAL
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES

FI LED

MAY-2 0 2010
INlJlJSTRIAL COMMISSION

This matter came before the Commission at the request of Seiniger Law Offices
(hereinafter, Counsel) following an informal determination by Commission staff on the issue of
attorney's fees payable to Counsel from the proceeds of a lump sum settlement agreement.
Hearing was held on November 23, 2009, at which time the Industrial Commission entertained
argument from Claimant's Counsel and counsel for Defendants in support of Counsel's claim for
attorney's fees. As well, the Commission received and considered the affidavits of Counsel and
Claimant, and the various attachments thereto, offered in support of Counsel's claim for
attorney's fees.

Finally, the Commission has reviewed and considered Counsel's closing brief,

filed with the Commission January 20,2010.
Per the October 13, 2009 Notice of Hearing, the following Issue IS before the
Commission for determination:
"The extent and degree of claimant's attorney's entitlement to an attorney fee on
funds paid to claimant subsequent to her attorney's retention, including, inter alia,
};JNDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LA\V RELATING TO COUNSEL'S
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whether those funds constitute "available funds" subject to a "charging lien"
under the applicable regulation."

I.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

At all times relevant hereto Claimant, Laurel Kuhn, was an employee of Mercy

Medical Center, Employer herein.
2.

Mercy Medical Center insured its workers' compensation obligations under a

policy issued by Indemnity Insurance Company of North America (hereinafter, Surety).
Industrial Claims and Management was the third party administrator for Surety in the state of
Idaho.
3.

On or about November 2, 2006, Claimant suffered an industrial accident arising

out of and in the course of her employment with Employer.
4.

As a consequence of the subject accident, Claimant contended that she suffered

injuries to her low back and lower extremities.
5.

Medical evidence established that Claimant suffered from pre-existing low back

problems for which she had received chiropractic treatment.

Claimant's pre-injury medical

history was also significant for bilateral meniscus tears and repairs in the summer of 2006.
6.

Although Claimant's knee discomfort largely returned to its pre-injury level, her

low back complaints persisted. An April 5, 2007 MRl demonstrated the presence of a moderate
sized disc herniation at L3-L4, with possible mass effect on the descending right L4 nerve root.
7.

Following her review of the April 5, 2007 MR.L Nancy Greenwald M.D.,

proposed that in order to ascertain whether Claimant's low back injury was causally related to
the subject accident, it would be prudent to review all of Claimant's past chiropractic records.
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8.

Concerned that she was getting the "runaround", from the workers' compensation

adjuster assigned to her case, and because she had been told that her injury might not be covered
due to the' possibility that her condition was related to a pre-existing degenerative condition,
Claimant decided to retain the services of Seiniger Law Offices, P.A., to represent her interests
in her workers' compensation claim.
9.

On or about June 1, 2007, Claimant executed a contingent fee agreement with

Seiniger Law Offices, P.A., which provided, inter alia:
"2) For their representation of Client, Attorneys will be paid a fee which will be
in lien upon the cause of action and will be equal to a portion of all amounts
recovered by way of settlement, or award including attorney fees, and including
sums recovered in satisfaction thereof from any third party. That portion will be
as follows:
i)
Twenty-five percent (25%) of all amounts obtained for Client after
execution of this agreement if the case is settled before a hearing. If
Client is receiving temporary disability benefits at the time of the
execution of this agreement, Attorney will not take a percentage of that
benefit until such time as the surety discontinues or threatens to
discontinue payment of said benefit; if Client has received an impairment
rating which has been admitted and is being paid, Attorney will not take a
percentage of the balance of the impairment rating unless it is later
disputed.
ii)
Thirty percent (30%) of such amounts after a hearing and the
claim is resolved without the filing of an appeal by either party;
iii)
Forty percent (40%) of such amounts if the claim is resolved after
an appeal has been filed by either party;
Attorney will take a percentage of any benefits obtained by Client with
respect to permanent partial impairment if a rating is given after the parties
execute this agreement. In the event that there are attorney fees awarded against
the defendant(s) by the commission Attorney shall be entitled to be paid those
attorney fees or the percentage calculated above, whichever is greater."
10.

At the instance of Counsel, Claimant was evaluated by Richard Radnovich; D.O.

In his report of June

7~

2007, he diagnosed Claimant as suffering from lumbar spondylosis with
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right-sided L3-L4 disc protrusion, and lumbar and radicular pain secondary to that protrusion.
Importantly, he also proposed that Claimant's condition was, more likely to not, related to the
industrial accident of November 2,2006. Although Dr. Radnovich noted that Claimant was still
receiving medical treatment for her condition, including occasional epidural steroid injections, he
nevertheless proposed that Claimant was entitled to a 12% whole person PPI rating under the
applicable edition of the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment.
11.

By letter dated June 6, 2007, Dr. Greenwald reported that she had had the

opportunity to review and consider Claimant's pre-injury and chiropractic records. Following
her review of those documents, Dr. Greenwald concluded Claimant's low back ccmdition was
either related to the industrial accident, or to a near fall Claimant suffered following a physical
therapy visit prescribed for Claimant as a result of the subject accident.
12.

On August 2, 2007, Claimant was seen for the first time by Beth Rogers, M.D.

Dr. Rogers proposed that Claimant's lumbar spine radiculopathy was causally related to the
November 2, 2006 accident. With respect to Claimant's bilateral knee complaints, Dr. Rogers
proposed that Claimant was close to her baseline pre-injury condition. Dr. Rogers recommended
a right L4 transforaminal epidural steroid injection for treatment of the right L4 radiculopathy.
She felt that Claimant might require a brief course of directed physical therapy following the
injection.

In the interim, she gave Claimant modified duty restrictions, with no repetitive

bending, no rapid walking, and no lifting greater than 15 to 20 pounds.
13.

Claimant was seen by Dr. Rogers on November 7,2007. On the occasion of that

visit, Dr. Rogers noted that Claimant's right leg pain and overall back pain was much improved.
Dr. Rogers concluded that Claimant's L3-L4 disc protrusion with right L4 radiculopathy had
resolved with non-operative treatment.

Dr. Rogers proposed that Claimant was medically
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stable, and entitled to a 5% permanent partial impairment (pPI) rating per the applicable edition
of the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment. Dr. Rogers gave Claimant
permanent work restrictions to avoid lifting more than 50 pounds.
14.

Following Dr. Rogers visit with Claimant of November 7, 2007, but before the

execution of the April 28, 2009 Lump Sum Settlement Agreement, Surety paid to Claimant, and
her attorney, a 5% PPI rating, i.e. 25 weeks at $310.75 per week or $7,768.75.
15.

Claimant's Counsel took a 25% fee on the PPI rating, or $1,942.19, and disbursed

the balance of the rating to Claimant.
16.

In support of Claimant's claim for disability in excess of the physical impairment,

Counsel engaged the services of Mary Barros-Bailey,

a private

vocational rehabilitation

counselor. In her report of August 22, 2008, Ms. Barros-Bailey proposed that Claimant had
sustained permanent partial disability (PPD) in the range of 7 to 10% of the whole person,
inclusive of impairment. This opinion was rendered under the assumption that the 50 pound
lifting

restriction

imposed

by

Dr.

Rogers

was

Claimant's

only

extant

physical

limitation/restriction.
17.

In a report dated October 10, 2008, Ms. Barros-Bailey issued a revised disability

evaluation based on additional information provided by Dr. Radnovich concerning Claimant's
permanent limitationslrestrictions. Based on the limitationslrestrictions recommended by Dr.
Radnovich, Ms. Barros-Bailey proposed that Claimant had suffered a permanent partial disability
(PPD) in the range of22% of the whole person, inclusive of impairment.
18.

Subsequent to the preparation of Ms. Barros- Bailey's report of October 10,2008,

but before the execution of the subject Lump Sum Settlement Agreement, Surety voluntarily paid
disability benefits to Claimant and her attorney, in the amount of $5,438.13.
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19.

Prior to the execution of the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement, Claimant's

Counsel took a 25% attorney fee against PPD benefits of$5,438.13, or $1,359.53, and disbursed
the balance of the PPD award to Claimant.
20.

Total attorney fees taken prior to the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement equaled

$3,301.72. Total costs taken prior to the execution of the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement
equaled $1,394.37.
21.

At some point prior to June 26, 2009, the parties agreed to resolve remaining

extant issues by way of Lump Sum Settlement Agreement. Pursuant to the terms of the Lump
Sum Settlement Agreement filed with the Industrial Commission on June 26, 2009, Claimant
agreed to resolve all remaining issues for the additional sum of$13,OOO.
22.

The Lump Sum Settlement Agreement further provided that Claimant would pay

her attorney a 25% fee on the additional monies paid pursuant to the Lump Sum Settlement
Agreement ($13,000 x 25% = $3,250).
23.

Contemporaneous with the preparation of the proposed Lump Sum Settlement

Agreement, Counsel submitted his Form 1022, Report of Expenses and Statement of Claimant's
Counsel, filed with the Commission on or about May 5, 2009. That document reflects that
Counsel took fees against the benefits paid prior to the execution of the Lump Sum Settlement
Agreement in the amount of $3,301. 72. However, the Form 1022 report does not contain an
itemization of the type of benefits against which Counsel asserted an attorney fee claim prior to
the execution of the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement.
24.

In the Form 1022 Report, Counsel also stated, inter alia: ''Before Counsel was

retained, Defendants denied, discontinued, or disputed Claimant's right to additional medical
benefits and treatment, time loss benefits, and impairment compensation, and disability beyond
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impairment, and retraining and attorney fees.

Subsequent to retaining Counsel, Claimant

received additional medical treatment and time loss benefits and impairment compensation and
disability beyond impairment compensation."
25.

The proposed Lump Sum Settlement Agreement, supported by Counsel's Form

1022, was submitted to the Industrial Commission, Benefits Department, for review and
evaluation. Thereafter, Counsel also submitted a Memorandum of Law in Support of Form
1022, filed with the Commission on July 24,2009, along with the supporting affidavit of Andrew
Marsh, also filed with the Commission on July 24,2009.
26.

The supporting affidavit of Andrew Marsh contains itemization information that

was absent from the Form 1022. Specifically, the affidavit reflects that attorney fees taken on
benefits paid prior to the execution of the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement were calculated as
follows:

27.

a.

PPI benefits of$7,768.75 times 25% equals $1,942.19

b.

PPD benefits of$5,438.13 times 25% equals $1,359.53

c.

Total attorney's fees taken prior to Lump Sum Settlement $3,301.72

By letter dated August 12,2009, Counsel provided the Benefits Department with

Claimant's "Workman's Compensation Summary", a document prepared at or around the time
Claimant first retained the services of Seiniger Law Offices, P .A., which document purports to
synopsize some· of the concerns that led Claimant to believe she would benefit from the
assistance of Counsel.
28.

By letter dated September 3, 2009, Scott McDougall, Manager of the Industrial

Commission Claims and Benefits Department, advised Counsel that Commission staffhad made
an initial determination that the settlement was in the best interest of the parties, except for that
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portion of the agreement which memorialized attorney's fees taken on benefits paid prior to the
execution of the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement. In this regard, the letter states:
"The Industrial Commission (Commission) is in receipt of the proposed
settlement agreement referenced above. In our review of the proposed settlement,
the Commission has also considered your letters and attachments of May 5, July
24, and August 12 regarding your representation of the claimant and your
proposed fees. The Commission staff has made an initial determination that the
settlement is in the best interests of the parties, except for the portion of the
requested fees related to benefits in excess of the $12,223.13 Lump Sum
Consideration, which have not been found to be reasonable per IDAP A
17.02.08.033.
Please be aware that this is an initial determination, and, in accordance with
IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03, you may request a hearing on the matter within 14 days.
Also in accordance with this rule, the Commission will shortly be issuing a partial
order releasing available funds, and fees which have been determined to be
reasonable."
29.

On or about September 4, 2009, the Industrial Commission entered its Order

Partially Approving the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement. Adopting staff's recommendation,
the Commission stated, inter alia;
'1t is further ordered that the Commission approves the request for attorney fees
and costs as those services related to the lump sum consideration. The total lump
sum consideration amount is $12,223.13. Fees from that amount have been
requested at 25%, which is reasonable. Fees and costs amount to $3,055.78 and
$10.00 respectively, for a total of $3,065.78. However, Attorney has previously
withheld $3,301.72 as fees, un-itemized as to the specific benefits obtained other
than "Benefits, paid prior to Lump Sum.. " Such fees have not been substantiated
to the Commission as reasonable in accordance with IDAPA 17.20.08.033. Thus,
no fee proceeds from the settlement shall be made payable to Attorney. Surety
will release to Attorney $10.00 for costs. Further, inasmuch as the fees previously
taken exceed by $245.94 those fees found reasonable, Claimant's attorney shall
reimburse the trust account for this claimant the amount of $245.94.
It is further ordered that the Surety release to Attorney the sum of $3,250.00,
which is the balance of the amount of proceeds of the Lump Sum Agreement
requested for unsubstantiated attorney fees. This amount shall be held in trust by
Attorney pending further order of the Commission."
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30.

. Claimant filed a Motion to Reconsider the Industrial Commission's Partial

Order, as well as a Request for Hearing on the Partial Order pursuant to IDAP A
17.02.0S.033.03.b.
31.

A telephone conference was held between the parties on October 6, 2009, at

which time various motions filed to that date by Claimant were discussed, and the issues to be
heard at the November 23,2009 hearing were identified.
II.

COUNSEL'S CONTENTIONS
In addition to the issues identified in the October 13, 2009 Notice of Hearing, Counsel
has identified a number of additional issues, as set forth in his November 22, 2009 Statement of
Issues for Attorney Fee Hearing, filed with the Commission on November 23, 2009, the day of
hearing. In addition to the issue of whether or not Counsel has met his burden of proving
entitlement to attorney's fees on monies paid prior to the execution of the Lump Sum Settlement
Agreement, Counsel raises a number of constitutional challenges to the current attorney fee
regulations. Counsel also challenges the manner in which staff made its initial determination, as
set forth in Mr. McDougall's letter of September 3, 2009. Counsel asserts, inter alia, that staff
improperly failed to articulate the basis for its determination that the requested fee was not
reasonable.

Finally, Counsel raises a number of policy considerations arguing against

Commission rules which limit fees from workers' compensation benefits.
As developed below, the Industrial Commission declined to approve the requested

attorney's fees on sums paid prior to the execution of the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement
because Counsel failed to adduce evidence tending to demonstrate that the requested fees were
reasonable under the applicable regulation. Specifically, the Industrial Commission declined to

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RELATING TO COUNSEL'S
REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY'S FEES - 9

approve the fees in question because Counsel failed to demonstrate that the fund against which
fees had previously been taken constituted "available funds" against which a "charging lien"
could be asserted. Central to this question is the issue of whether or not Counsel was "primarily
or substantially" responsible for securing the fund from which he subsequently took a fee.
Although the question of whether or not Counsel's efforts were "primarily or
substantially" responsible for securing the fee from which he hopes to be paid was the basis of
the Commission's decision, Counsel has elected to concede that his services were not "primarily
or substantially" responsible for securing the PPI award from which he previously took a fee:
"For purposes of these proceedings only, and without waiving the right to raise
the constitutionality of the applicable IDAP A attomeys fees rules on appeal,
Seiniger Law Officers stipulates that its attomeys were not 'primarily or
substantially' responsible for securing the PPI benefit involved-whatever
'primarily or substantially' may mean in the context of defining 'available funds'
as those terms are used in the relevant IDAPA rules."
Claimant's Counsel's Opening Brief, p. 4.
Rather, Counsel contends that he is entitled to an award of attorney's fees consistent with the
terms of the Contingent Fee Agreement executed. by Claimant, the regulatory scheme
notwithstanding.
Even though Counsel has chosen, for purposes of the instant proceeding, to concede that
his services were neither primarily nor substantially responsible for securing the PPI award from
which he has taken his fee, the Commission feels constrained to address this issue, inasmuch as it
is the Commission's interpretation of those regulations which informed its decision to deny the
fees in question. As well, we will attempt to address the other challenges made by Counsel to
the Commission's process for reviewing attorney's fee issues on lump sum settlement
agreements.
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CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Although Counsel initially posits that the Industrial Commission does not have
jurisdiction to consider constitutional challenges to the provisions of the Workers' Compensation
Act, or regulations implementing the same, he has nevertheless devoted considerable energy to
discussing the constitutional issues relating to the Commission's actions in the matter, as well as
the alleged unconstitutionality of the current regulations relating to the payment of attorney's
fees on llunp sum settlement agreements.

Counsel argues that even though the Industrial

Commission does not have jurisdiction to consider constitutional challenges to its statutes or
regulations, it is nevertheless bound to apply and follow Supreme Court decisions treating
constitutional issues that may arise in the application of the Workers' Compensation Laws.
Counsel aSserts that in adopting the current provisions of IDAPA 17.02.08.033 et. seq., and in
applying those regulations to the facts of the instant matter, the Commission has erroneously
conclude~

that Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (1993) has been overruled by Rhodes

v. Industrial Commission, 125 Idaho139, 868 P.2d 467 (1993), Mancilla v. Greg, 131 Idaho 685,
963 P.2d 368 (1998) and Johnson v. Boise Cascade Corporation, 134 Idaho 350, 2 P.3d 735
(2000). According to Counsel, that the Industrial Commission does not have jurisdiction to
consider constitutional challenges to its statute, in no way abrogates its responsibility to apply
the direction contained in Curr v. Curr, supra.
The Commission agrees that Curr v. Curr, supra, gave direction to the Commission
concerning the constitutionality of the process utilized by the Commission, at that time, to
approve attorney's fees on lump sum settlement agreements. That case makes it clear that the
Industrial Commission may not, sua sponte, modify attorney fee agreements without first
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enacting guidelines upon which the Commission will base fee modifications, and without
providing counsel an opportunity for a meaningful hearing before the Commission makes a
decision to modify the agreement. Notably, Curr does not endorse an outright prohibition of
Commission modification of attorney fee agreements. Instead, the case makes it clear that such
modifications can only be undertaken in the context of an appropriately adopted regulation
which affords proper notice to counsel and an opportunity to be heard.

Curr was decided in 1991. To comply with Curr, and after an extensive public process,
the Commission adopted formal regulations treating claimant's attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho
Code § 72-508. Those regulations were to take effect on December 1, 1992. Howe'ler, in the
interim, members of the Claimant's bar sought a writ of prohibition restraining the Industrial
Commission from implementing the provisions of the former IDAP A 17.01.01.803.d, a true and
correct copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix A. That challenge was treated in Rhodes v.

Industrial Commission, 125 Idaho 139, 868 P.2d 467 (1993).
Although Counsel acknowledges that the Rhodes Court determined that the 25% cap on
attorney's fees passed constitutional muster, he argues that the decision should be limited to that
particular finding, and that nothing in the decision supports the conclusion that the Court found
all of the other provisions of the regulation to be constitutional. Specifically, Counsel argues that
the Rhodes Court's narrow holding that the 25% cap is constitutional lends no support to the
proposition that the current regulation treating "available funds" is constitutional.
In response to this argument, it is first notable that nothing in the majority opinion
suggests that the Court's finding concerning the constitutionality of the regulation was limited
only to that portion of the regulation treating the 25% cap on attorneys' fees. The petitioner's
brief in that case makes it clear that the writ of prohibition was sought against the entirety of
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IDAPA 17.01.01.0803.d. See, Petitioner's Brief in Support of Alternative Writ of Prohibition and
Peremptory Writ of Prohibition, p. 2. Indeed, in the subsequent case of Mancilla v. Greg, 131
Idaho 685, 963 P.2d 368 (1998) the Court commenced its discussion of the current IDAP A
17.02.08.033, et seq, by noting that the constitutionality of the prior attorney fee regulation had
been upheld in Rhodes, on the basis that the regulation was a reasonable interpretation of the
power vested in the Commission pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-803. Nothing in
Mancilla suggests that it was only a small portion of the regulation that was subjected to
constitutional scrutiny in Rhodes.
Second, even if it be assumed that the Rhodes majority intended to address only that
portion of the regulation which capped attorney's fees at 25%, it seems clear that in considering
this issue, the Court necessarily considered the nature of the fund subject to the 25% cap. In
support of his argument, Counsel quotes the regulation interpreted by the Rhodes Court as
follows:
"4. Maximum attorney fee to be charged by a claimant's counsel.
... [A]ny contingent fee agreement between counsel and a claimant in a workers'
compensation case shall provide that the amount of attorney fees will not exceed
25% ... [or] after hearing, ... up to 30%. Rhodes at 143.
Claimant's Counsel's Opening Brief, p. 8.
Without Counsel's redactions, the language of the former IDAPA 17.01.01.803.d (4) actually
reads as follows:

"Maximum attorney fee to be charged by a claimant's counsel. After the
effective date of this regulation, any contingent fee agreement between counsel
and a claimant in a workers' compensation case shall provide that the amount of
attorney fees will not exceed 25% of any new money received by the claimant,
whether such new money is acquired pursuant. to a Lump Sum Settlement
Agreement, other Agreement, Mediation, or an Award of the Commission.
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a.

Provided, however, that after hearing by the Commission and upon its own
motion, the Commission may award attorney fees up to 30% of new money
awarded.

b. In cases where a claimant is deemed totally and permanently disabled,
attorney fees may be deducted from no more than 500 weeks of workers'
compensation benefits.
(Emphasis added).
The portion of the regulation arguably at issue in Rhodes did not simply cap attorney's fees at
25%. Rather, the provisions of paragraph 4 capped attorney's fees at 25% of "new money".
New money is defined at the former IDAP A 17.01.01.803.d (3) as follows:
'''New money' as used herein shall refer to monetary benefits to the claimant that
counsel is responsible for securing through legal services rendered in connections
with the client's workers' compensation claim."
Accordingly, in considering the constitutionality of the cap on attorney's fees, the
Supreme Court had before it, and necessarily considered, the constitutionality of a regulation
which capped attorney's fees at 25% of "new money." The "new money" provision of the
former regulation is the direct antecedent of that portion of the current regulation which caps
attorney fees at 25% of "available funds." From the Rhodes decision, the Industrial Commission
can discern nothing in the language of that case that would suggest that the former provision
limiting an award of attorney's fees to 25% of "new money" did not pass constitutional muster.
There is nothing in Rhodes that argues against a conclusion that the successor language to the
"new money" provision of the former regulation is anything but constitutional.
Finally, even if it be assumed that the majority in Rhodes only intended to narrowly
address the constitutionality of a 25% cap (not a 25% j::ap on "new money"), it would seem that

the constitutional analysis applied to that portion of the regulation would also apply to the
balance of the regulation. In Rhodes, supra, the Court applied a rational basis test to assess
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whether the regulation bore a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. The Court
found that there was a rational relationship between the legitimate legislative purpose to foster
sure and certain relief for injured workers and the attorney fee regulation. The limit imposed by
the regulation furthers the purpose by making the cost of attorneys paid from new money less
burdensome. The Court also concluded that the regulation satisfied due process analysis for the
same reason.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Court's analysis was limited to consideration of whether a
25% cap is constitutional, the application of the rational basis test to the balance of the statute
would seem to yield the same conclusion that the Court reached concerning the 25% cap.
Therefore, nothing in Rhodes seems to suggest that the Court found, or would find, that only
certain of the provisions of the former IDAP A 17.01.01.803.d are constitutional.
Contrary to the assertions made by Counsel, the Commission has not determined that
Curr v. Curr, supra, has been overruled by Rhodes, Mancilla and/or Johnson. Rather, it appears

that after Curr, the Industrial Commission followed the direction of the Supreme Court, and
adopted a regulatory scheme pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-508 that addressed the shortcomings
noted in Curro

Moreover, it is apparent that in considering the regulation adopted by the

Commission in 1992, the Rhodes Court found either the entire regulation, or, at the very least,
that portion of the former regulation that is the direct antecedent to the provisions of the current
regulation which are at the heart of the instant dispute, to be constitutional.
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IV.

APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF IDAPA 17.02.08.033
TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE
With an effective date of July 1, 1994, the Industrial Commission adopted the current
IDAP A 17.02.08.033 et seq, pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-508. A true and
correct copy of that regulation is attached hereto as Appendix B.

The current regulation

preserves the notion of a 25% cap on attorney's fees, but instead of applying that cap to "new
money", the current regulation allows attorneys to take a 25% fee on "available funds". Per
IDAP A 17.02.08.033(a) "available funds" is defined as follows:
"Available funds" means a sum of money to which a charging lien may attach. It
shall not include any compensation paid or not disputed to be owed prior to
claimant's agreement to retain the attorney.
Therefore, available funds do not include (a) compensation paid to Claimant prior to the
retention of Counselor (b) compensation which is not disputed to be owed prior to the retention
of Counsel.

Counsel acknowledges that the definition of available funds unambiguously

specifies that money paid to claimant prior to the retention of Counsel does not constitute
available funds. Therefore, Temporary Total Disability (TTD) or PPI benefits paid to an injured
worker before he or she retains an attorney can never constitute available funds which might
later form the basis of an award of attorney's fees.

However, Counsel argues that what

constitutes compensation "not disputed to be owed" prior to the retention of counsel is
ambiguous. In his brief, Counsel identifies a number of meanings that may be ascribed to the
regulatory language. However, we think that what is clearly intended by this portion of the
definition of available funds is that if the evidence establishes that employer/surety
acknowledged responsibility for a particular benefit payable under the Workers"Compensation
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Laws prior to the retention of Counsel, these benefits do not constitute available funds for
purposes of regulation. For example, let us assume that prior to the retention of Counsel, surety
acknowledged responsibility for the payment of TID benefits during claimant's period of
recovery. Those payments would not constitute "available funds" even though their payment
continued after the retention of CounseL However, if, subsequent to the retention of counsel, a
dispute arose concerning claimant's ongoing entitlement to TTD benefits, such that surety denied
responsibility for further payment, any funds eventually paid as a result of counsel's efforts to
reinstate TTD benefits would constitute available funds. We think that the language of this
portion of the regulation is clear, and provides a well understood rule that an attorney is not
entitled to assert a claim against benefits, responsibility for which was acknowledged by surety
prior to the retention of counseL
The definition of available funds, however, does not address that class of benefits, the
entitlement to which does not arise until after the retention of counseL These benefits do not
constitute compensation "not disputed to be owed" prior to the retention of counsel.

For

example, let us assume that at the time of counsel's retention on an accepted claim, claimant was
still in the period of recovery, and was receiving TTD benefits. Let us further assume that at
some point in time after counsel's retention, claimant's treating physician declared claimant to be
medically stable and awarded claimant an impairment rating. Finally, let us assume that this
impairment rating was promptly paid by surety, without dispute. In this hypothetical, the PPI
award, though not disputed by surety, was also not disputed to be owed prior to the retention of
counsel.

Since the entitlement to the PPI award was not ascertained until after counsel's

retention, it would be impossible for surety to acknowledge responsibility for the payment of this
benefit prior to the retention of counseL Technically, then, such a fund of money constitutes
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«available funds" for purposes of the regulation. Indeed, it is exactly this scenario, or one of
many permutations thereof, which forms the basis of attorney fee disputes in most settled cases,
as in the instant matter.
Although this interpretation of "available funds" seems to be mandated by the provisions
ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01(a), it is worth noting that certain language in Mancilla v. Greg, 131
Idaho 685, 963 P.2d 368 (1998) suggests that the Idaho Supreme Court may read the regulation
more narrowly. As discussed in more detail below, in Mancilla, a non-disputed impairment
rating was generated by claimant's treating physician after claimant retained the services of
attorney Pena The Industrial Commission declined to approve an award of attorney's fees on
the PPI rating, concluding that Pena's services were not "primarily or substantially" responsible
for obtaining the PPI award. The Court affirmed the Commission's decision in this regard,
ruling that there was substantial and competent evidence supporting the Commission's
conclusion that Pena's efforts were not "primarily or substantially" responsible for securing the
fund from which he hoped to be paid.

However, the Court also noted that because Pena

conceded that the PPI rating was not disputed, this concession, too, supported the conclusion that
the rating could not constitute "available funds". In this regard, the Court stated:
"This testimony is also significant because it supports a conclusion that however
the PPI rating came into existence, the rating and amount of the award were never
disputed. According to IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.a and 01.e, "undisputed funds
cannot be used to satisfy claims for attorney's fees."
Therefore, the Court's opinion suggests that even if claimant's entitlement to nondisputed funds arose after the retention of counsel, such funds cannot constitute "available
funds" for purposes of the attorney fee calculation. The quoted portion of the decision is not
critical to the affirmation of the Commission ruling, since the Court clearly held that there was
substantial and competent evidence supporting the Commission conclusion that counsel's efforts
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were not primarily or substantially responsible for securing the fund from which he had
previously taken a fee.
Whether the quoted language is dicta may not be of any particUlar significance in light of
the further restrictions on attorney's fees created by the definition of "charging lien". The term
"charging lien" is defined at IDAP A 17.02.08.033.01.c as follows:
"Charging lien" means a lien, against a claimant's right to any compensation
under the Workers' Compensation laws, which may be asserted by an attorney
who is able to demonstrate that:
1.

There are compensation benefits available for distribution on
equitable principles;

11.

The services of the attorney operated primarily or substantially to
secure the fund out of which the attorney seeks to be paid;

lll.

It was agreed that counsel anticipated
compensation funds rather than from the client;

IV.

The claim is limited to costs, fees, or other disbursements incurred
in the case through which the fund was raised; and

v.

There are equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition
and application of the charging lien.

payment

from

Although IDAPA 17.02.0S.033.01.a, specifies that a charging lien may attach to
"available funds", it is apparent from a review of the definition of "charging lien" that that term
further constrains the available funds that may be subject to a claim of attorney's fees.
Importantly, a charging lien can only attach to available funds where it is demonstrated that the
services of the attorney operated "primarily or substantially" to secure the fund out of which the
attorney seeks to be paid.

(See, IDAP A 17.02.0S.033.01.c.ii.)

This is but one of five

requirements that must be satisfied before a charging lien can be said to exist against "available
funds". As important is the fact that these requirements are not in the disjunctive. Per the
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language of the regulation, all of these requirements must be satisfied before a charging lien can
be said to exist.
This construction of the regulation finds support in two subsequent Idaho Supreme Court
decisions. See, Mancilla v. Greg, l31 Idaho 685, 963 P.2d 368 (1998) and Johnson v. Boise

Cascade Corporation, 134 Idaho 350, 2 P.3d 735 (2000).
In Mancilla, Mancilla suffered an amputation injury to his right thumb on October 12,

1993. In December of 1993, Mancilla was released by Dr. Rockwell to return to work at his pre-

injury job. Following his release to return to work, surety terminated Mancilla's TID benefits.
On February 24, 1994, Mancilla entered into a contingency fee agreement with Pena. Shortly
thereafter, Pena contacted Dr. Rockwell to express his concern about Mancilla's ongoing
difficulties.

Thereafter, Dr. Rockwell examined Mancilla again, and reversed his previous

decision to releaSe Mancilla to unrestricted work activities. On April 5, 1994, Dr. Rockwell
awarded claimant an 11 % PPI rating for his injuries. Surety did not dispute the rating and paid
it. Pena took a 25% attorney fee against the $11,632.00 PPI award. Thereafter, Pena and surety
came to an agreement concerning the resolution of the balance of the issues involved in
claimant's case. The parties executed a lump sum settlement agreement, which memorialized
the past payment of the PPI award and other benefits, and proposed the payment of an additional
$12,125.00 to claimant to resolve the matter. The lump sum settlement agreement was submitted
to the Commission for approval pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-404. The Commission questioned
whether Pena was primarily or substantially responsible for securing the PPI award. After a
hearing on the issue, the Commission issued an order denying Pena a fee from the PPI award.
Pena appealed.
In discussing the current statutory scheme, the Court stated:
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"The authority granted to the Commission under Section 72-803, to "approve"
attorney fees, does not conflict with the judicial penumbra. The regulation under
challenge, promulgated to foster ease, utility, and predictability in the application
of Idaho Code § 72-803, in tum does not overstep the legislative bounds of Idaho
Code § 72-803, read in pari materia with the entire Workers' Compensation Act.
See, Heese v. A&T Trucking, 102 Idaho 598, 600, 635 P.2d 962, 964 (1981)
(various provisions of Workers' Compensation Act must be read in pari materia).
The regulation is not a fee schedule. It is a framework establishing uniform
grounds for fee approval. The language of Idaho Code § 72-803 contemplates
that the Commission will monitor the appropriateness of fees on behalf of
claimants, and therefore the regulation provides a reasonable interpretation of the
power vested by Idaho Code § 72-803.
In this case, the operative word in Idaho Code § 72-803 is "approve." Rhodes
argues that the word "approve" means simply that, to approve. It does not mean
to "regulate." Given the broad empowerment provided by Idaho Code § 72-508,
coupled with the purpose underlying the Workers' Compensation Act., i.e., to
provide "sure and certain relief for injured workmen and their families," Idaho
Code § 72-201, we cannot agree with Rhodes' contention. The absence of the
word "regulate" in Idaho Code § 72-803 is not legally significant and does not
exact a reading that the legislature intended to confine the Commission's
regulatory authority. "The Workers' Compensation law is to be liberally
construed with a view to effect its objects and promote justice." Mayo v. Safeway
Stores, 93 Idaho 161, 166,457 P.2d 400, 405 (1969). Accordingly, we hold that
the word "approve" is sufficient to establish the proper delegation of the power to
regulate attorney fees."

(footnotes omitted).
In considering whether to uphold the Commission decision that Pena failed to adduce

evidence and that his efforts had "primarily or substantially" secured the PPI award, the Court
found it significant that the evidence demonstrated that it was Dr. Rockwell who initiated the
determination of claimant's PPI award and that Pena simply agreed that the impairment rating
was fair. The decision also addresses one of the points raised by Counsel in the instant matter.
Counsel asserts that staff's initial determination places him in the difficult position of being
required to prove a negative. He argues that it is impossible for him to show what might have
happened (or what might not have happened) had he not become involved in the case, and that,
therefore, a presumption should exist that he is entitled to an award of fees on any non-disputed
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monies paid to Claimant following the retention of Counsel. After all, who is to say that the
Surety's decision to pay an impairment rating is not the result of Surety's conclusion that it
would be pointless to decline to pay the rating since Claimant has retained an attorney who
would assuredly take surety to task for its recalcitrant behavior? Pena made the same argument
in Mancilla:

Further evidence that Pena did not primarily and substantially secure the PPI
benefits is his testimony that it was "possible" his client would have received no
more benefits had Pena not become involved:
... I submit to you the possibility that Mr. Mancilla, had I not been able to s'ee
him, would be in Mexico right now and would have never received one more
penny other than the first few weeks of total temporary disability payments.
Here, Pena seems to suggest that because neither he nor the Commission can
predict what may have happened had Pena not become involved in the case, the
Commission should allow fees from all benefits, including the PPI, which were
awarded after he was retained. The Commission found this argument to be
speculative at best, and that an award of attorney fees upon such conjecture would
be inconsistent with the requisites of attorney charging liens pursuant to the
Commission's rule. IDAPA 17.02.08.033."
131 Idaho 685.
Therefore, Pena was unable to prove that his efforts were primarily or substantially
responsible for securing the PPI award simply by speculating that surety might not have been
inclined to pay the award absent his appearance as counsel in the matter. Recognizing that it is
Counsel who bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the assertion of a
charging lien, there is nothing untoward about the Commission's rejection of such specUlation.
In truth, however, Mancilla could be seen as a close case. Although it is difficult, at this
remove, to appreciate what the subtle factual nuances of that case might have been, it seems
arguable that the case could have gone a different way. It will be recalled that prior to Pena's
retention, Dr. Rockwell had released claimant to return to work without limitation. Claimant
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attempted to return to work, but found that he continued to experience discomfort in his hand.
He was, in fact, unable to perform his job duties, and was discharged by his employer. As well,
TID benefits were curtailed. This evidently proved too much for Mr. Mancilla, who decided to
leave Idaho and return to Mexico. There, the matter would surely have ended, but for the
intervention of a friend who persuaded Mancilla to retain Pena. It was Pena who contacted Dr.
Rockwell and persuaded him to see claimant again. It was as a result of that visit that Dr.
Rockwellgave claimant an impairment rating. Could it not be argued that Pena's intervention
was responsible, in some sense, for the acquisition of the 11 % PPI rating? The real question, of
course,is whether it could be said that Pena's actions were "primarily or substantially"
responsible for Dr. Rockwell's generation of an impairment rating. On the facts before it, the
Commission found that Pena did not meet his burden of proof

However, neither the

Commission's nor the Court's decision provides practitioners with much guidance on the
standard that must be satisfied before one can be said to have "primarily or substantially"
secured the funds from which a fee may be paid.
In Johnson v. Boise Cascade Corporation, supra, Johnson suffered a partial left foot
amputation in the course of his employment. He had two surgeries on his foot before he retained
the services of Pena on July 28, 1995. Thereafter, on August 7, 1995 and August 19, 1995,
claimant had additional surgeries, eventually resulting in the amputation of his left leg below the
knee.

Boise Cascade, a self-insured employer, accepted responsibility for the payment of

medical and other benefits associated with surgeries one and two. However, the company denied
responsibility for the payment of medical and other benefits associated with surgeries three and
four.
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In November of 1995, Pena met with representatives of the company and demanded

payment for the medical bills associated with the third and fourth surgeries. In turn, Boise
Cascade retained outside counsel, who reviewed the file. Very shortly thereafter, the company
acknowledged responsibility for the payment of the medical expenses associated with surgeries
three and four. Time passed, and in February of 1996, claimant's treating physician pronounced
claimant medically stable, and gave him a 28% whole person rating for his work related injuries.
Thereafter, the parties entered into a lump sum settlement agreement, under the terms of which
the parties agreed that claimant would receive $75,000 to resolve all outstanding issues, inclusive
of the $30,877 PPI award. Pena asserted a 25% fee against the $75,000 settlement.

The

Industrial Commission declined to approve the fee on that portion of the award representing
claimant's PPI award.

As in the instant matter, the Commission entered a partial order

approving the lump sum settlement agreement amount, but requiring surety to retain the disputed
fee pending further proceedings concerning Pena's entitlement to fees on the PPI award. At a
subsequent hearing, the Commission determined that Pena had failed to demonstrate his efforts
were primarily or substantially responsible for his client's receipt of the PPI award.
In support of his position, Pena argued that Boise Cascade initially refused responsibility

for the entire PPI award, and it was only through Pena's efforts that the company eventually
agreed to pay the full award. However, the only evidence before the Commission was that Pena
was, perhaps, responsible for obtaining the company's agreement to pay for the third and fourth
surgeries. The Court seemed reluctant to acknowledge even this contribution, noting that it
seemed likely that it was Boise Cascade's counsel that had advised the company to pay for the
procedures, not Pena. The Court concluded that, on balance, the testimony was only sufficient to
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support the conclusion that any work Pena did was directed only to encouraging Boise Cascade
to accept responsibility for the medical bills.
However, after noting that the third and fourth surgeries did not increase claimant's
impairment rating, the Court offered the following comment:
''While Pena may have contributed in some part to Boise Cascade's decision to
acknowledge responsibility for impairment resulting from the third and fourth
surgeries, the impairment rating was not increased as a result. We therefore hold
that substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission's determination
that Pena was not primarily or substantially responsible for securing Johnson's
PPI award."
Let it be supposed that the third and fourth surgeries had resulted in additional
impairment. Were this the case, would the fact that Pena contributed "in some part" to the
company's decision to acknowledge responsibility for impairment resulting from the third and
fourth surgeries have been sufficient to satisfy Pena's burden of proof? In other words, is the
burden to show that counsel's efforts were primarily or substantially responsible for securing the
fund from which he hopes to be paid satisfied by a showing that some, but not all, of the
responsibility for securing the funds is attributable to his efforts? Johnson, like Mancilla before
it, provides little guidance on what, precisely, is meant by the term "primarily or substantially".
As discussed above, an attorney's charging lien can only attach to available funds.
However, a charging lien can only attach where attorney is able to demonstrate, inter alia, that:
"ii.

The services of the attorney operated primarily or substantially to secure
the fund out of which the attorney seeks to be paid;"

At issue is the meaning of the language "primarily or substantially". In particular, it is
important to understand what it is an attorney must do in order to meet his burden of
demonstrating that his or her efforts were "primarily or substantially" responsible for securing
the fund out of which attorney hopes to be paid. In order to understand what is meant by the
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language in question, the Commission must engage in statutory interpretation, the objective of
which is to derive the intent of the legislative body that adopted the regulation. See, Callies v.

O'Neil, 147 Idaho 841,216 P.3d 130 (2009); Farber v. Idaho State Insurance Fund, 147 Idaho
307, 208 P.3d 289 (2009). Thus, statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the
statute. The provisions of the statute should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in
the context of the entire document. The statute should be considered as a whole and words
should be given their plain usual and ordinary meanings. Importantly, in interpreting the statute,
the Commission must give effect to all words and provisions of the statutes so that none will be
void, superfluous or redundant. Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Pocatello Chubbuck Auditorium District,
146 Idaho 202, 192 P.3d 1026 (2008). In construing the statute, words and phrases are assumed
to have been used in their popular sense if they have not acquired a technical meaning. Meader

v. Unemployment Compensation Division of Industrial Accident Board, 64 Idaho 716, 136 P.2d
984 (1943).

As to the term "substantially", it has been defined as follows: "essentially; without
material qualifications; in the main; in substance; materially; in a substantial manner", Black's
Law Dictionary 1428 (6 th Edition 1990). See also, State of Idaho v. Christian F. Schmoll, 144
Idaho 800, 172 P.3d 555 (2007). The term can also, however, mean "considerable in amount,
value or the like; large", Webster's New International Dictionary 2514 (2nd Edition 1945).
However, the meaning of "substantially" most naturally conveyed by the phrase "substantially to
secure the fund ... " is not "secured to a high degree", but rather "secured in substance, or in the
main" that is, secured to a degree that would satisfy a reasonable person. Pierce v. Underwood,
457 U.S. 552, 108 S.Ct. 2541 (1988).
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There is somewhat more difficulty in ascertaining what definition of "primarily" was
intended, as that term is used in the applicable regulation.

The term "primarily" has two

potentially applicable definitions. On the one hand, it is defined to mean "essentially; mostly;
chiefly; principally", See, Dictionary.com Unabridged Based on the Random House Dictionary
(Random House, Inc., 2010); The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language,
(Houghton Mifflin Company 4th ed. 2009), as in "They live primarily from farming". On the
other hand, primarily is also defined as meaning "in the first instance; at first; originally." Ibid.
If primarily means "essentially; mostly; chiefly; or principally", its meaning is very similar to the

definition of "substantially", as used in the regulation. In this usage, however, "primarily" may
implicate a higher standard, or constitute a more difficult burden of proof. If this definition of
"primarily" is utilized, then the term "primarily or substantially" as used in the regulation is
problematic. If "primarily" is but a stronger version of "substantially", and if an attorney can
satisfy his burden by demonstrating that he either primarily or substantially secured the fund
from which he hopes to be paid, then the term "primarily" is superfluous; if an attorney can
satisfy his burden of proof by demonstrating that he secured the fund from which he hopes to be
paid "in the main", or "essentially", then the higher standard of "chiefly" or "principally"
securing the fund is rendered meaningless. Any time an attorney's efforts were sufficient to
demonstrate that he had substantially secured the fund from which he hoped to be paid, then the
term "primarily" becomes mere surplusage, if one assumes that "primarily" is but a stronger
version of "substantially".
However, if "primarily" is interpreted to mean "at first; originally; initially", then it is
possible to give the disjunctive statement "primarily or substantially" some meaning, since
interpreting primarily in this fashion gives the term a meaning that is different from, or in

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RELATING TO COUNSEL'S
REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY'S FEES - 27

addition to, the definition that we have attached to "substantially". For example, it is possible
that an attorney could undertake some action in a particular case that might be deemed to be

responsible for initiating or originating the fund from which he hopes to be paid, without being
able to satisfy his burden of showing that his efforts were "in the main" responsible for obtaining
the fund from which he hopes to be paid. Granted, there is a great deal of overlap between these
concepts, and a venn diagram of the definitions we have adopted for "primarily" and
"substantially" would show that "primarily" is a sizable subset of "substantially", and vice versa.
In summary, in order to meet his burden of proving that his efforts were "primarily or

substantially" responsible for securing the fun4 from which he hopes to be paid, Counsel bears
the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he originally, or initially, took
action that secured the fund, or that his efforts essentially, or in the main were responsible for
securing the fund, i.e. that his efforts were such that a reasonable person would conclude that he
was responsible for securing the fund from which he hopes to be paid.
A few examples may help illustrate the Commission's interpretation of the regulatory
language:
1.

Claimant suffers an industrial injury, and the claim is accepted by surety.

Attorney is retained at some point after surety has accepted responsibility for the claim. It is
clear from the nature of claimant's injuries that she will be entitled to an impairment rating of
some type.

Immediately after being retained, counsel writes a letter to claimant's treating

physician, requesting of the doctor that he generate an impairment rating for claimant as soon as
claimant reaches a point of medical stability.

Some months later, when claimant does reach a

point of medical stability, and thus becomes ratable, physician remembers counsel's letter, and
generates a letter to counsel in which he gives claimant her impainnent rating. Attorney may be
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primarily responsible for securing the impairment rating, since it was his letter that originated, or
initiated the rating. However, it is important to note that in order to meet his burden of proof,
counsel would need to demonstrate that there existed some nexus between his letter to the
physician and the physician's action. In other words, counsel would need to demonstrate that the
physician acted because of counsel's letter.

On the other hand, attorney's actions probably

would not be sufficient to demonstrate that his actions "substantially" secured the PPI award,
since attorney's efforts were not, in the main, or essentially, responsible for obtaining the PPI
award. There was no dispute that claimant had suffered a significant injury, and there was no
dispute that she was going to be entitled to some type of an impairment rating. There was no
evidence that surety contested the rating eventually given by the treating physician.
2.
by surety.

Claimant retains counsel following an industrial injury, which has been accepted
Again, claimant's injuries are of a type which will probably entitle her to an

impairment rating of some type at the end of the day. Claimant reaches a point of medical
stability, and surety arranges for an independent medical evaluation (IME) for the purpose of
assessing claimant's permanent physical impairment. The exam is set to take place in three
months. Claimant's counsel arranges for his own independent medical evaluation, which he is
able to secure within the month.
renders an impairment rating.

The physician he has chosen evaluates the claimant, and

Surety agrees to pay the rating, reserving the right to curtail

periodic payments depending on what is shown at the time of surety's scheduled exam. That
evaluation takes place two months later, and results in the surety's physician coming up with the
same rating that was given by counsel's physician. Attorney asserts that he is "primarily or
substantially" responsible for securing the PPI award and proposes to take a fee on the same.
Counsel cannot satisfy the "substantially" leg of the analysis since claimant was clearly entitled
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to a rating, and since counsel's efforts did not result in any increase in the rating awarded by
surety's IME physician. In connection with whether a reasonable person would conclude that
counsel's efforts were responsible for securing the PPI award, the most important fact may be
that in this hypothetical, surety had already taken reasonable steps to secure claimant's
impairment rating independent of anything counsel did.

However, could it be argued that

counsel was "primarily" responsible for securing the rating? Counsel did schedule an earlier
1MB and, as a result, managed to obtain PPI payments for claimant sooner than she would
otherwise have received them.

However, the benefit secured by counsel's efforts is

disproportionate to the 25% fee he proposed to take on the entire PPI award. Perhaps counsel is
entitled to a 25% fee on these PPI payments he managed to obtain for claimant sooner than she
would otherwise have obtained them.
3.

Claimant retains counsel following a denial of the claim by surety. Surety takes

the position that claimant did not suffer a compensable accident.

Following his retention,

counsel investigates the claim, interviews witnesses, and is able to identify a co-worker who will
confirm the occurrence of an untoward mishap/event. He presents this information to surety,
who reverses its denial, and accepts responsibility for the claim. Thereafter, TID and medical
benefits are paid.

After claimant reaches a point of medical stability, surety arranges for

claimant to be rated, and immediately pays the impairment rating. Finally, the parties reach
agreement concerning a lump sum settlement agreement to resolve the remaining issues.
Counsel asserts a 25% fee against all benefits paid to, or on behalf of, claimant, following the
surety's agreement to reverse the denial. Fees are payable to attorney either on the theory that he
originated or initiated the payment of benefits or that he was essentially, or in the main,
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responsible for securing the benefit. A reasonable person would conclude that it was as a result
of attorney's efforts in persuading surety to overturn its denial that claimant received benefits.
4.

Claimant suffers a compensable injury that is accepted without question by surety.

TID and medical benefits are being paid to claimant.

However, because claimant knows

nothing about the workers' compensation system, and is skeptical of anything surety says or
does, she retains counsel. In due course, claimant reaches a point of medical stability and surety
immediately requests that treating physician issue an impairment rating. The physician does so,
and surety immediately pays the rating. Attorney attempts to assert a fee against the PPI rating,
arguing that had he not become involved in the case, there is no guaranty that surety would have
continued to act promptly and appropriately in connection with the handling of the claim.
Attorney asserts that the fact of attorney representation caused surety to ''toe the line" rather than
drag its feet. Attorney is not entitled to a fee on the PPI award. Attorney bears the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his efforts were primarily or substantially
responsible for securing the fund from which he hopes to be paid. That burden is not met by
engaging in speculation as to what might have happened absent attorney involvement. As in

Mancilla, supra, to approve an award on the basis of this argument would require the
Commission to engage in pure speCUlation. Having failed to make some affirmative showing of
the existence of a nexus between his efforts and the creation of the fund in question, attorney has
failed to meet his burden of proof
5.

Building on the preceding hypothetical, let it be supposed that instead of soliciting

an opinion on claimant's impairment from her treating physician, surety'arranged for claimant to
be rated by an independent medical examiner (!ME). This particular examiner is well known to
the claimant's bar and might charitably be described as having a defense bias. Prior to the
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scheduled IME counsel spends several hours preparing claimant. Since counsel has made a
study of this particular defense physician, he knows all the ways that the physician will lay
certain traps for claimant as a way of marshalling facts that will allow him to assert that
claimant's SUbjective complaints are not credible. Counsel warns claimant about the importance
of being forthright and deliberate in describing the nature and extent of her pre-existing
symptoms. He counsels her about Waddell's signs and tells her how to avoid inconsistencies on
exant. He counsels claimant that she should count on being observed both before and after the
exam, either by physician, or by an investigator hired by surety. The IME is performed, and
claimant is given an impairment rating consistent with her injuries. Absent from the final report
is any suggestion by the treating physician that claimant was attempting to maximize her
complaints. Is counsel entitled to assert a fee against the PPI award? This is a close case. On
these facts, it is difficult to imagine how counsel could meet his burden of proving that his efforts
were "primarily" responsible for securing the PPI award. The independent medical evaluation
was scheduled by surety, and was going to take place independent of counsel's efforts. Counsel
could not be said to have originated or initiated the PPI award. However, it would seem to be a
much closer question as to whether or not counsel's efforts were essentially, or in the main,
responsible for securing an appropriate PPI award for claimant. To some extent, it is speculative
to propose that absent counsel's efforts, the rating that would have been returned by the IME
physician would have been lower, or given with significant caveats. Certainly, to allow fees
from the entire PPI rating is to speculate that the rating from the IME physician would have been
zero absent claimant's preparation. However, upon a rigorous enough showing of counsel's
familiarity with the IME physician in question, and a showing that the outcome of the IME
would likely have been different without counsel's intervention, it could be argued that a
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reasonable person would conclude that counsel's efforts were substantially responsible for
securing some portion of the award. Again, this is somewhat of a close call, and would require
of counsel a significant showing.
Of course, these are but a few of myriad scenarios that might arise, although they are
representative of scenarios that frequently come before the Commission.

It goes (almost)

without saying that every claim for an attorney's fee will be judged on its own peculiar facts.
Turning to the facts of the instant matter, the Commission appreciates that Counsel has
conceded that his efforts were neither primarily, nor substantially, responsible for securing the
fund from which he expects to be paid.

Counsel has, instead, challenged the applicable

regulation on constitutional grounds. However, since the Commission has not concluded that the
current regulation is contrary to the court's ruling in Curr, we deem it appropriate to consider
whether Counsel's actions were primarily or substantially responsible for securing the fund from
which he hopes to be paid.
First, a few comments on the Commission's procedure in this matter are appropriate.
Contemporaneous with Counsel's submission of the executed Lump Sum Settlement Agreement
for review and approval, he submitted his Form 1022, which contain Counsel's recitation of the
facts and circumstances underlying his claimed entitlement to an attorney charging lien, all as
required by IDAPA 17.02.08.033.02. Following receipt of the proposed Lump Sum Settlement
Agreement, and supporting documents, pursuant to IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03 staff designated by
the Commission attempted to determine the reasonableness of the requested fee. Of particular
concern, was one of the averments in Counsel's Form 1022. At paragraph 9 of that document,
Counsel stated:
"Before Counsel was retained, defendants denied, discontinued, or disputed
claimant's right to additional medical benefits and treatment, time loss benefits,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RELATING TO COUNSEL'S
REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY'S FEES - 33

and impainnent compensation, and disability beyond impairments, and retraining
and attorney's fees.
Subsequent to retaining Counsel, claimant received
additional medical treatment and time loss benefits and impainnent compensation
and disability beyond impainnent compensation."
The clear import of the quoted language is that prior to the retention of Counsel, Surety
disputed Claimant's entitlement to PPI benefits, and that as a result of Counsel's actions
following retention, additional PPI benefits were obtained. In making its informal determination,
staff attempted to ascertain the factual basis of this averment. Counsel was unable to provide the
requested information, and by a letter dated September 3, 2009, staff issued its informal
determination as required by IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.a. 1 That section specifies:
"Upon receipt of the affidavit or memorandum, the Commission will designate
staff members to determine reasonableness of the fee. The Commission staff will
notify counsel in writing of the staff's informal determination, which shall state
the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not reasonable.
Omission of any information required by Subsection 033.02 may constitute
grounds for an informal determination that the fee requested is not reasonable."
As Counsel has noted, the regulation specifies that in notifying Counsel of staff's
informal determination, staff shall state the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is
"not reasonable." However, the obligation to notify Counsel of the basis for the determination
presupposes that staff is able to make an affirmative pronouncement, on the facts before it, that
the requested fee is not reasonable. Here, no such determination was made because insufficient
facts were adduced in the course of staff's investigation that would allow it to say, one way or.
another, whether the requested fee was not reasonable. Instead, staff advised Counsel as follows:
"In our review of the proposed settlement, the Commission has also considered
your letters and attachments of May 5, July 24 and August 12 regarding your
1 Interestingly, in a companion case, treating a similar demand for approval of a requested fee, Counsel offered a
Form 1022 that contained language identical to that quoted above. At hearing on the motion to approve the
requested fee in that case, Counsel acknowledged that the quoted paragraph is "boilerplate" and goes into all of his
Form 1022 recitations even where, in a particular case, surety had not denied or disputed Claimant's entitled to a PPI
rating prior to Counsel's retention. This may explain why staff was unable to obtain a satisfactory explanation for
the averments made in the quoted paragraph.
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representation of the Claimant and your proposed fees. The Commission staff
has made an initial determination that the settlement is in the best interest of the
parties, except for the portion of the requested fees related to benefits in excess of
the $12,223.13 lump sum consideration, which have not been foUnd to be
reasonable per IDAPA 17.02.08.033."
In essence, staffs September 9, 2009 informal determination advises Counsel that due to
incomplete information, staffwas unable to conclude that the requested fee was reasonable.
That the September 3,2009 letter should be construed in this fashion is further supported
by the Partial) Order issued by the Industrial Commission on September 4, 2009. That Order,
rather than referencing any affirmative finding by staff that the requested fee was not reasonable,
simply references the fact that "such fees have not been substantiated to the Commission as
reasonable in accordance with IDAP A 17.02.08.033."
.In addition, Counsel argues that absent a specific articulation of the facts and
circumstances underlying staffs informal determination, Counsel was not on notice of the issues
that were of concern to the Commission, and could not, therefore, mount a suitable defense of
Counsel's position on the issue of attorney's fees. In essence, Counsel argues that he was denied
due process by virtue of staff s failure to articulate the particular reasons for the issuance of the
September 3, 2009 letter. Notwithstanding that staffs letter did not constitute a conclusion that
Counsel's request for fees was not reasonable; Counsel's argument fails for another reason, as
well.
As noted, following the issuance of the September 3, 2009 letter, Counsel requested a

hearing on the matter before the Commission, as provided at IDAP A l7.02.08.033.03.b.
Thereafter, the Commission held a status conference with the parties on October 6, 2009, at
which time the parties agreed to set the matter for hearing before the Commission on November
23, 2009. Importantly, on the occasion of the October 6, 2009 telephone conference, the parties
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discussed the specific issues to be addressed at the November 23,2009 hearing. Those issues are
articulated in the Notice of Hearing filed October 13, 2009. Accordingly, Counsel had ample
notice of the Commission's specific concerns, i.e. whether there was sufficient evidence showing
that Counsel was "primarily or substantially" responsible for securing the fund from which he
hoped to be paid.
At hearing, most of the discussion and argument was devoted to underlying constitutional
issues which we have previously addressed. Precious few insights were provided on the question
of whether or not Counsel's efforts were primarily or substantially responsible for securing the
fund from which he hoped to be paid. However, one serious failing of staff was identified and
corrected at hearing. Concerning attorney's fees taken by Counsel prior to the execution of the
Lump Sum Settlement Agreement, the Commission noted, in its Partial Order of September 4,
2009, that these fees were "un-itemized" as to the specific benefits obtained other than "benefits
paid prior to the Lump Sum ... ".

In fact, Counsel's July 24,2009 affidavit, a document which

was purportedly reviewed by staff prior to the issuance of the informal determination, does
itemize the sources of the $3,301.72 in attorney's fees taken prior to the execution of the Lump
Sum Settlement Agreement. In this regard, the affidavit of Counsel provides:
"The benefits paid prior to Lump Sum Settlement Agreement (listed in my form
1022) include PPI benefits of $7,768.75, on which attorneys fees of $1,942.19
were paid, and PPD benefits of $5,438.13, on which attorneys fees of $1,395.53
were paid (see demand letters to the surety dated 9/18/08 and 9/28/08, attached
hereto as Exhibit E and F respectively.)"
Affidavit of Andrew C. March in Support of Memorandum of Law, p. 3.
Therefore, fees in the amount of $1,942.19 were taken from the PPI award, and fees in
the amount of $1,359.53 were taken on PPD benefits which were paid prior to the execution of
the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement.
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Concerning the 25% fee assessed by Counsel on the PPD. payments made prior to the
execution of the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement, the Commission now finds that those
benefits were, assuredly, secured both primarily and substantially as a result of the efforts of
Counsel. Following the pronouncement of medical stability, Counsel engaged the services of
Mary Barros-Bailey, a vocational rehabilitation consultant, for the purpose of assessing the
extent and degree to which Claimant had suffered disability in excess of physical impairment,
based on her permanent limitationslrestrictions and other relevant non-medical factors.

Ms.

Barros-Bailey eventually generated a report in which she concluded that Claimant had suffered
disability in the range of 22% of the whole person, inclusive of her permanent partial
impairment. As noted, Surety began to pay a disability rating, without protest, prior to the
execution of the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement. Because Counsel's efforts in retaining Ms.
Barros-Bailey were initially, in the main and reasonably responsible for the generation of the
PPD dollars from which he hoped to be paid, the Commission finds that the requested fees were
primarily or substantially secured through the efforts of Counsel.
With respect to the 25% fee of $1,942.19 taken on the PPI award previously paid, the
Commission is unable to conclude that Counsel's efforts were "primarily or substantially"
responsible for securing the PPI award.
As noted, on or about April 26, 2007, Dr. Greenwald reviewed the April 5, 2007 MRI,
and proposed that in order to understand whether Claimant's disc herniation was causally related
to the subject accident, further review of pre-injury chiropractic and other records was indicated.
On May 30,2007, Claimant retained Counsel. Among her reasons for retaining Counsel was her

concern that she was getting the runaround from Surety. Shortly after he was retained, Counsel
arranged for Claimant to undergo a medical evaluation by Richard Radnovich, D.O.
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Dr.

Radnovich saw Claimant on June 7, 2007, and proposed that Claimant was entitled to a 12% PPI
rating. Also on June 6, 2007, Dr. Greenwald concluded that Claimant's low back problems
were, indeed, related to the subject accident, following her review of pre-injury chiropractic
records.
Although Dr. Radnovich had pronounced Claimant medically stable, Claimant continued
to treat, and Surety continued to pay for treatment, including, inter alia, a transforaminal epidural
steroid injection. Surety did not accept Dr. Radnovich's impairment rating and declined to pay
the same. However, on November 7, 2007, Beth Rogers, M.D., one of Claimant's treating
physicians, pronounced Claimant medically stable and awarded her a 5% PPI rating. Surety
promptly initiated payment of this rating, but did not agree to pay the average of the 5% and 11 %
ratings per the usual convention in such cases.
Against this background, we must ascertain whether Counsel's efforts were "primarily or
substantially" responsible for securing the PPI award.
As to the first prong of the test, it does not appear that there is sufficient evidence to
support a conclusion that Counsel originated or initiated the creation of the PPI award. Although
it might be argued that it was the action of Counsel in obtaining the Radnovich rating that
spurred Surety to obtain a rating from Dr. Rogers, it seems just as likely that Dr. Radnovich's
report had nothing to do with the timing of Surety's actions in obtaining a rating from Dr.
Rogers. As noted, Claimant continued to treat subsequent to the preparation of Dr. Radnovich's
rating, and even underwent an additional transforaminal epidural steroid injection before Dr.
Rogers felt that Claimant was a candidate for an impairment rating. Indeed, it might well be
argued that Dr. Rogers' rating came in lower than the rating issued by Dr. Radnovich because
Claimant was in need of firrther medical treatment at the time Dr. Radnovich evaluated her. At
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any rate, to propose that it was the preparation of Dr. Radnovich's rating that produced the
Rogers' impairment rating would require the Commission to veer into the realm of speculation
that was found offensive in Mancilla, supra.

On the whole, the evidence fails to satisfy

Counsel's burden of showing that the PPI award was secured primarily through his efforts.
Likewise, there is no preponderance of the evidence establishing that Counsel's actions
essentially, in the main, or reasonably, could be said to have secured the payment of the PPI
award. There is no way to establish a nexus between Counsel's actions and the creation of the
PPI award that does not require speculation. The Commission does not believe that a reasonable
person would conclude that Counsel's efforts were responsible for securing that award.
For the foregoing reasons, the Industrial Commission approves the prior fee taken in the
amount of $1,359.53 on the PPD award, but declines to approve the $1,942.19 fee previously
taken on the PPI award.

V.
COUNSEL'S DEPOSITION NOTICES, SUBPOENAS,
AND PUBLIC INFORMATION REQUESTS
Counsel argues that he was deprived of a meaningful hearing before the Commissioners.
After learning of the staff's informal determination, Counsel attempted to depose Commission
employees, and submitted a pl~thora of public records requests. Counsel also expressed surprise
that he was not allowed to examine members of the Commission staff at the hearing before the
Commission, because he had not received a motion to quash the deposition or notice of any kind
that the Commission declined to allow him to depose Commission employees for the hearing on
his entitlement to attorney's fees.
Counsel's argument that he was unaware prior to the hearing before the Commission that
he would not be able to question Commission staff at the hearing before the Commissioners is
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disingenuous. On September 18,2009, Counsel submitted Notices of Deposition Duces Tecum
of Scott McDougall and Sharon DeLanoy which ordered them to appear on October 14, 2009 for
deposition for the following purpose:
The complete claim file of the Idaho Industrial Commission for the claim of
Laurel Kulm, Claimant in the above-captioned matter, including without
limitation all documents, notes, records and other evidence of the deliberations
regarding, and reasons for, any determination that any attorney fees requested by
Claimant's Counsel were not reasonable or not substantiated as reasonable.
No such depositions occurred on October 14, 2009. Further, legal counsel for the agency
responded to Counsel's numerous public records requests and Counsel's notices of depositions
. prior to the hearing. Specifically, on September 29, 2009, legal counsel for the agency informed
Counsel that there was no authority for release of the information he was seeking by means of a
deposition or subpoena duces tecum, and that the Commission considered Counsel's request
contrary to the long-standing legal principle that documents which disclose deliberations of a
judicial or quasi-judicial body on a decision are privileged and generally not subject to
discovery.
Counsel persisted, and drafted four subpoenas that ordered several Commission
employees to appear at the attorney fee hearing and testify concerning Counsel's constitutional
concerns. Counsel had these subpoena documents delivered to the Industrial Commission on
November 5, 2009. Counsel signed the subpoenas himself Idaho Code § 72-709 states:
(1) The commission or any member thereof or any hearing officer, examiner or
referee appointed by the commission shall have the power to subpoena to
subpoena witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, issue subpoenas duces
tecum, and to examine such of the books and records of the parties to a
proceeding as relates to the questions in dispute.
(2) The district court shall have the power to enforce by proper proceedings the
attendance and testimony of witnesses, and the production and examination of
books, papers and records.
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Notably, Counsel does not fall under the categories of persons enumerated in Idaho Code
§ 72-709 who have the authority to issue subpoenas in Commission proceedings. As such, it is

unclear why he harbors the expectation that he can draft his own subpoenas and enforce them
against the Commission. Counsel's actions in this regard are most unusual among workers'
compensation practitioners before the Commission.

Allowing recipients of unfavorable

outcomes the authority to issue subpoenas on their own accord on Commission staff is contrary
to Idaho Code § 72-709, and would create many opportunities for mischief Counsel indicated
that Commission employees would be sanctioned for noncompliance with the subpoenas, yet
never attempted to collect the penalty from Commission staff. Further, the district court has the
power to enforce subpoenas from the Commission. Counsel has always had opportunities for
redress in the district court, but he has not pursued them. Counsel did not attempt to enforce the
subpoenas from the district court of the

4th

Judicial District, Ada County, Boise, Idaho prior to

the hearing.
Subsequently, on November 13,2009, Counsel indicated in a letter that he withdrew the
discovery request served on the Commission. In light of this withdrawal, and that fact that the
Commission never approved Counsel's notices of subpoenas duces tecum, or the subpoenas on
four Commission employees to testify at the hearing before the Commission, as the
Commission's procedures do not entitle Counsel the right to do so, the Commission considered
the matter closed. Instead, Counsel pursued a series of public record requests. Legal counsel for
the agency addressed Counsel's public requests. Counsel's brief makes it evident that he was
dissatisfied with the outcome of his public records requests. However, Counsel has failed to take
the laboring oar to appeal any of the public records determinations made by the Commission in
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the district court of the 4th Judicial District, Ada County, Boise, Idaho within the applicable
timeframe.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
The Commission is aware of its obligation to abide by decisions of the Idaho Supreme
Court which address constitutional issues relating to the administration of the Workers'
Compensation Laws. For the reasons stated above, the Commission is of the view that its
procedures and its current regulations pass constitutional muster. Nor does the Commission
believe that the current regulatory scheme is ambiguous. Applying commonly used definitions
of the terms at issue yields an understandable rule to be applied in determining whether
attorney's fees are awardable in a given case.

Of course, the rule is not perfect, and its

application over the years may, indeed, have resulted in a disinclination by members of the bar to
practice in this area of the law. As well, the current rule may make' it impossible for certain
injured workers who desire counsel to find someone who is willing to take their case for the
small recompense that the particular facts of that case may offer. Finally, it is undeniable that
the current regulation impinges upon the right of an injured worker, and his or her attorney, to
make their own agreement as to how counsel should be compensated. All of these concerns, and
others that have been expressed, are legitimate and have been considered over the years by both
the Industrial Commission and the Idaho Supreme Court. However, at the time the current
regulation and its predecessor were adopted, it was felt that overriding policy considerations
warranted the adoption of rules limiting attorney's fees chargeable on workers' compensation
cases. While it is arguable that some of the provisions of the current regulation would benefits
from refinement, at present the regulation is what it is, and in fairness to all, the Commission is
bound to apply its plain language.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

£0 ~day of May,

2010.

INDUSTRIAL CO:M:MISSION

ATTEST:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on thea~y of ~ . 2010 a true and correct copy of
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS~ RELATING TO COUNSEL'S
REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY'S FEES was served by regular United States
Mail upon:
BRECKSEINIGER
942 WMYRTLE ST
BOISE ID 83702

cs-mlcjh
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IDAPA 17.C1.Cl.S03.D

REGULATION GOVERNING ATTORNEY FEES
IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION P~bCEEDING8

In order that the Idaho Industrial com:m.ission (llcommission") may
properly and fairly discharge its responsibility pursuant to Idaho
Code Sections 72-803 and 72-404, the Commission hereby promulgates
the fol.lowing administrative regul.ation pursuant to Idaho Code
section 72-508.
---The Commission substitutes this regulation for the Informal.
Administrative Rules (IAR) 72-803.1., "Reporting of Attorney Fee and
Associated Expenses··- in LUlI1p SUll1 Proceedings," and IAR 72-803.2 ,
liRe:
Attorney- Fees in Workers I compensation Actions," dated
January 9, 1990.
1.

Idaho Code section' 72-803 provides:
"Claims of attorneys and physicians for medical and
related services -- Approval. -- Claims of attorneys and
claims for medical services and for medicine and related
benefits shall be subject to approval by the commission. II

2.

Idaho Code Section 72-404 provides:
"Lump SUllt pa.yments. -- Whenever the commission determines
that it is for the best interest dfall parties, the
liability of the employer for compensation may, on
application to the cononission by any party interested, be
discharged in whole or in part by the payment of one or
more lUllip sums to be determined, with the approval of the
commission. "

3.
"Nev Koney" defined. "New money" as used herein shall refer
to monetary· benefits to the ciaimant that counsel is responsible
for securing through legal services rendered in connec'tion with the
client's workers' compensation cl.aim.
4.
Maximum attor'ney fee to be charged br a claimant's counsel.
After the effective date of this regulation, any contingent fee
agreement between counsel and a claimant in a workers' cOlI1pensation
case shall provide that the amount of attorney fees will not exceed
25% of any .new money receive~ by the claimant, whether such new
moriey is acquired pursuant to a Lump SUlI1 Settlement Agreement,
other Agreement, Mediation, or an Award of the CommiSsion.
'
a.
Provided, however, that. after hearing by the coll1ll1ission
and upon its own motion, the commission may award attorney
'!ees tip to 30% of new money awarded.
b.
In cases where a claimant is deemed totally and
permanently disabled, 'attorney fees may be deducted from no
more than 500 weeks of workers' compensation benefits.
!DAPA-17.01.01.803.D

Effective 12/1/92
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5.
Fea agreements between a claimant and counsel shall be in
writing.
All fee agreements shall be' in writing and shall be
signed by the claimant and claimant's counsel.
A disclosure
statement in substantially the form prescribed in Appendix II of
this regulation 'shall be provided to clai1llant at the time of
signing the fee agreement.
Reporting of all attorney fees and associated ~E!nses in Lump
Settlement proceedings. Attorneys representing any party to a
Lump Sum Settlement Agreement or other Agreement subIUi tted to the
comm.:ission for its approval shall set forth in the Lump Sum
Settlement Agreemen'l;:_or other Agreement, or by letter or memorandum
accompanying such Agreement, the following:
'.
6.

SUlll

a.

the date upon which counsel became involved in the case;

b.

the issues then, and subsequently/ in controversy;

c.
the total amount of benefits which clanant I s counsel
cofltends constitute "new money" as defined above and an
itemization of those benefits;
d.
all information included in and substantially in the
format of Appendix I hereto.
7.
Request for Rearing regarding fee disputes between counsel and
client.
Where a dispute arises between a counsel and a client
regarding the appropriateness of an attorney fee in a workers'
compensation proceeding, either the counsel or the client may file
with the Commission a Request for Hearing :regarding the fee di.spute
and the Commission, upon receipt of such a Request; shall schedule
a hearing on the matter.
8.
Request for Rearing regardiilg fee dispute between counsel. and
the Commission.. 'Where the commission, upon re.viewof the file and
a LUlllp Sum Settl.ement Agreement or other Agreelllent submitted for
its approva~, concludes that the attorney fee s.et forth therein
exceeds the amount allowed in (2) ahc;Ive, commission staff shall
notify claimant' s
counse~
in writing of the commission's
calculations,
and
where
claimant's
counsel
disputes
the
commiss~on's calculations, claimant's counsel. may fi~e with the
commission a Request for Hearing for the purpose of presenting
evidence and argument on the matter.
Upon receipt of such a
Request, the Commission shall schedule a hearing on the matter.

IDAPA 17.01.0L803.D
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AppendixB

NOTICR

or

PROPOSED RULt

DOCKET NO. 17-0208-9401
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

RULES·COVERNINO APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY FIES
IN WOlI.KERS' COMPBNSATION CASES

DATED this 23nd day of March 1994.

E. Scott Harmon, Deputy Attorney OBneral
317 Main Street, Statehouse Mail
Bohe, Idaho 83720·
. Phone, (20B) 334-6000

rax,

(208) 334-2321

ACTION. The action, under Pocket No. 17-0208-9401 conc.rna the
adoption of rule. q.overninqthe .pprov!ll by the Indultrhl Comminion of attorney tau in w.ork.rli' oOllpanutton 0 . . . . , IDAPA
1'7, Title 02, Chap.ter 08, !luI.. Dovamin'l Approval ot. Attorney
Fe•• in Workera' Oompen,.tion C.......
AUTHORITY, In compliance. with Seot1on 67-5221(1). Idaho Cod ••
notic. i. her.by q1van that th1 • •qencY·ha. prapo ••d rule-lIIak1n'l.
The ..ction 1. authorb..d pul'luant to hcttl/nl 72-404. 508. 707,
735 IJjd 803, Idlho Coda.
PUSLIC IIl!.\l\INO· SClIIDULE, Public hearing! •. ) ooncerning thh rulemaking will be h.ld aat.ollowl'
Purauant to S.ct10n 67-5222(2), Idaho COde. an opportunity for
public h •• ring. "ill be hald if requ..tad in "r.tting by tw.ntyt.1ve (25)ptl'lon. a politioal _uhdiVidon, or an agency.
.The
r.qu..t mult be made within fllurt..n (14) day. of thlldata ot
pUblication ·of thl .. noti"e in the Bullet;ln, or w1thin fourt.en
(14) day_ prior to the end of the COllll1lent perl;>d. whichever h
lat.r.

The h.aring eite(e) will be acea •• lble to tho phy.i~ally di.ablad.
Interpr.ter. for per80n. with h.ar1n'l 1mpa1~lInt. and
b~a111.d or taped information· £&r par.ona with vi.ual impair.enta
clt.ll be proVided upon live. daye' !:Iotioe. for a"rlt.llg.mants contact
the und.rsign.d at (208) 334-6000.

SUMMARY, Th. follo"ing i. a .tatem.nt in nont.chni".l
lanquag. of the lIub.tlt.llce ot. the rul.,

DESCRIPTI~
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ORIGINAL
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700

zrno JUN -81 P 4: ttl
RECEIVED

INOUSTRI/\L COMMISSION

Attorneys for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Laurel Kulm,
Claimant,
I.C. No. 06-012770
vs.

CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S
MOTION TO RECONSIDER
ORDER DENYING ATTORNEY FEES
AND TO ISSUE A SUBSTITUTE
OPINION and MEMORANDUM

Mercy Medical Center,
Employer,
And

Industrial Claims Management,
Surety,
Defendants.
COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel, SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A., and files this
MOTION TO RECONSIDER the Commission's FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW RELATING TO COUNSEL'S REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES (hereinafter "KULM DECISION"), decided May 20,2010. The grounds for said Motion
are set forth below, together with the attached AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW MARSH IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER DENIAL OF ATTORNEY FEES.
Counsel acknowledges that the Commission has made its decision and respects that
decision. However, Counsel respectfully requests that the Commission reconsider portions of its
DECISION as follows and issue a substitute opinion for the reasons stated below:
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

CLAIMANTS COUNSEL'S
MOTION TO RECONSIDER DENIAL OF ATIORNEY FEES AND
MEMORANDUM
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OMISSION OF CLAIMANT'S POSITION
The focus of the Commission's decision in this case has obviously been on the
constitutionality ofthe Commission's regulation regarding "available funds" and whether or not
those funds were "primarily and substantially" obtained as a result of counsel's efforts. Counsel's
legal arguments were primarily focused upon the constitutionality ofthose regulations. However,
the basis of Claimant's Counsel's claim to attorney fees, given the fact that Claimant's Counsel
stipulated that they were not responsible for obtaining the impairment rating and award in this
case, remains an important part ofthe present dispute.
As the Commission will recall, Claimant's Counsel argued that they were entitled to a
portion of the impairment rating as a result of their contract with the Claimant by virtue of the
fact that they had provided services to the Claimant over a number of years at her request which
benefited her even if those services did not primarily or substantially bring about the payment of
her permanent partial impairment benefits. Claimant's Counsel's reasons offered in support of
that contention need not be elaborated upon further, either here or in the Commission's decision.
However, Claimant's Counsel would appreciate it if a substitute opinion could be issued
clarifying that Claimant's Counsel had a good faith basis for arguing that they were entitled to
attorneys fees to compensate them for other work done in the case, and not that they were
entitled to a portion of the impairment benefits simply because those benefits were obtained,
whether or not by their efforts.
In addition to the foregoing, Counsel respectfully submits that the Commission, in issuing

its opinion in this matter, did not address another basis of Claimant's Counsel's argument in
favor of an award of attorney fees. Claimant's Counsel argued and produced proof that Claimant
Laurel Kulm, herself, sought fervently to have her contract with Counsel upheld, and that she
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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MEMORANDUM
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testified by sworn affidavit with that request. Thus, one of the major issues in the Kulm case,
raised by Counsel from the beginning, has been whether an injured worker has the right to hire
and pay the attorney of her choice.
As Claimant's Counsel reads the present Decision there is an appearance that Claimant's
Counsel simply wants to now be paid a portion of the permanent impairment rating because he
was "on the case" without regard to anything further. As the Commission is aware, that is not
the case, and the inference that may be drawn from the Decision as presently written is damaging
to the reputation of Claimant's Counsel- a reputation built up over more than thirty years, and
one in which Claimant's Counsel has a keen interest in protecting. Claimant's Counsel requests
nothing more than that the Commission do nothing more than issue a substitute opinion making
it clear that these arguments were advanced by Claimant's Counsel as the basis of their claim to
an award of attorneys fees out of the monies paid to the claimant for her permanent impairment.

PAGE 39, FOOTNOTE 1
The same consideration as to Counsel's and his firm's reputation arise as a result of
Footnote No.1 contained in the decision:
Interestingly, in a companion case, treating a similar demand for approval of a
requested fee, Counsel offered a Form 1022 that contained language identical to
that quoted above. At hearing on the motion to approve the requested fee in that
case, Counsel acknowledged that the quoted paragraph is "boilerplate" and goes
into all of his Form 1022 recitations even where, in a particular case, surety had
not denied or disputed Claimant's entitled [sic] to a PPI rating prior to Counsel's
retention. This may explain why staffwas unable to obtain a satisfactory
explanation for the averments made in the quoted paragraph. (emphasis in
original)

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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The "quoted paragraph" to which the footnote refers is Par. 9 of FORM 1022, REPORT
OF EXPENSES and STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL filed in the instant case on
May 5, 2009, which reads as follows:
Before Counsel was retained, Defendants denied, discontinued, or
disputed Claimant's right to additional medical benefits and treatment,
time loss benefits, and impairment compensation, and disability beyond
impairment, and retraining, and attorney fees. Subsequent to retaining
Counsel, Claimant received additional medical treatment and time loss
benefits and impairment compensation and disability beyond impairment
compensation.
The Footnote does not cite or identify the alleged "companion case." However, Claimant's
Counsel assumes that the Commission is referring to the case of Drotzman v. Molson Coors
Brewing Company and Zurich American Insurance Company, I.C. No. 06-006711. A hearing

on Counsel's request for attorney fees was held in Drotzman on Feb. 3, 2010.
The Drotzman Transcript reads in pertinent part, page 42:
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

MR. SEINIGER: And, secondly, with respect to the
questions that you had about Mr. Marsh's affidavit or
declaration, I didn't prepare that, but I can tell you
that I'm responsible, essentially, for the boilerplate
language about things being disputed and it sounds to me
like either that was just completely incorrect or there
was a misunderstanding on Mr. Marsh's part. With respect
to the TID benefits that you asked about, there was, as I
understand it, a dispute and -- with respect to the IME
consultation -

In addition, the Drotzman Transcript reads in pertinent part, page 49-50, quoting Mr.

Seiniger:
20
21
22
23
24
25
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345·1000

. . . And that's the problem that we have and
I think that -- I take responsibility for this one thing
that you picked up on, Commissioner Baskin, this thing
about how benefits were denied or disputed. I asked Mr.
Marsh about that and he said, well, they had admitted them
and that -- that's the way he understood. But ifI'm
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S
MOTION TO RECONSIDER DENIAL OF AnORNEY FEES AND
MEMORANDUM
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2.G

1
2
3
4

incorrect, it's boilerplate, there wasn't any attempt to
pull the wool over anybody's eyes and I think lowe you an
apology for that. But I think, nevertheless, you see -you see my point. ...

The correct facts regarding the statements made in Drotzman are contained in the record
in that case, and are set forth in the AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO RECONSIDER DENIAL OF ATTORNEY FEES. Counsel respectfully requests
that the Commission reconsider the language and implications of Footnote 1, and revise said
Footnote to accurately reflect the facts and events that are the subject matter of said Footnote, if
such comment even need be made at all. The basis for Counsel's request is that the clear
implication of Footnote 1 is that Counsel knowingly files Form 1022's that are inaccurate or
misleading. Because said implication is untrue, and because it serves to attack Counsel's
integrity and ethics, the interest of fairness and justice require that it be corrected on the record.
It has been said that it takes ten years to build a reputation and ten seconds to destroy it.
Claimant's Counsel has the highest ranking for reputation and ethics given by Martindale
Hubbell. Claimant's Counsel is listed in the Workers' Compensation section of Best Lawyers in
America. Claimant's Counsel has already been advised that, amongst workers' compensation

practitioners, the Commission's FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
RELATING TO COUNSEL'S REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY'S FEES is the
"talk of the town." Given the fact that the footnote is in error, and that in any case any
discussion of it is not necessary to the determination of the limited constitutional issues raised by
Claimant's Counsel's requests for attorneys fees, it is respectfully requested that the footnote be
struck. It would appear that the footnote can serve no important purpose and, indeed, would not
appear to serve any legitimate purpose as written under the circumstances and that it will likely
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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have a seriously damaging effect on the reputation of Claimant's Counsel.

Respectfully submitted June 8, 2010.

Wm. Breck Seiniger, JI.
Attorneys for Claimant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on June 8, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to
be served as follows:
Alan Hull
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL
250 South 5th, Ste. 700
PO Box 7426
Boise ID 83707-7426
VIA Fax: (208) 344-5510

SEINI~~_~S' PA
//(;~
v.J:n.Breck' Seiniger, JI.
Attorneys for Claimant
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LAUREL, KULM
Ie 2006-012770
Attorney Fee Hearing

1
CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENT
IN A WORKER'S COMPENSATION CASE
This is an agreement for representation and consultation in a worker's
compensation claim before the Idaho Industrial Commission. This agreement is
between SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A., 942 Myrtle Street, Boise, Idaho
83702, (hereafter referred to as "Attorney") and Laurel Kulm, (hereafter referred
to as "Client").
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT AGREE AS FOLLOWS:
1) Attorney will represent Client in the following action: Kulm v. Mercy Medical
Center with respect to worker's compensation claim for date of injury of
November 2, 2006 only.
2) For their representation of Client, Attorneys will be paid a fee which will be in
lien upon the cause of action and will be equal to a portion of all amounts
recovered by way of settlement, or award including attorney fees, and
including sums recovered in satisfaction thereof from any third party. That
portiori will be as follows:
i) Twenty-five percent (25%) of all amounts obtained for Client after
execution of this agreement if the case is settled before a hearing. If
Client is receiving temporary disability benefits at the time of the
execution of this agreement, Attorney will not take a percentage of that
benefit until such time as the surety discontinues or threatens to
discontinue payment of said benefit; if Client has received an
impairment rating which has been admitted and is being paid, Attorney
will not take a percentage of the balance of the impairment rating unless
it is later disputed.
ii) Thirty percent (30%) of such amounts after a hearing and the claim is
resolved without the filing of an appeal by either party;
iii) Forty percent (40%) of such amounts if the claim is resolved after an
appeal has been filed by either party;

Attorney will take a percentage of any benefits obtained by Client with
respect to permanent partial impairment if a rating is given after the parties
execute this agreement. In the event that there are attorney fees awarded against
the defendant(s) by the commission Attorney shall be entitled to be paid those
attorney fees or the percentage calculated above, whichever is greater.

EXHIi3IT
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3) Client will not be required to pay attorney fees to Attorney if nothing is
recovered by way of settlement or award unless Attorney withdraws due to
lack of cooperation by Client. In the event that Attorney is required to
withdraw due to lack of cooperation in presenting and prosecuting Client's
claim, he will be compensated as set forth in paragraph 7 below.
4) Actual costs required to prepare and prosecute Clieut's claim by Attorney,
or to achieve a settlement, are to be paid by Client; if advanced by
Attorney, these costs will be repaid. from Client's portion of amounts
recovereg, as defined in Section 2, above; if a settlement is not reached in your
case, you will be responsible to make payments on these costs until they are
paid in full. These costs include fees for investigators if hired by Attorney,
filing fees, fees for COJlrt reporters, travel expenses, costs of service of process,
costs for medical records and reports, costs for expert witnesses and
physicians, long distance telephone and fax charges, postage and related
mailing costs, and all other costs associated with the prosecution of Client's
claim. Attorney is authorized, but not obligated, to pay all medical bills
outstanding at the time of settlement of Client's claim out of any funds received
by Attorney to the health care provider or their designated agent.
5) Client agrees that he will not make settlement except with Attorney's prior
approval, which approval shall not be reasonably withheld. Should Client do
so in violation of this Agreement, Client agrees to pay Attorney the sum and
share indicated in Paragraph 2(ii), above; upon settlement Attorney is
authorized to pay any outstanding medical bills of Client directly to the
provider. Attorney shall not settle the case without Client's prior approval.
6) Attorney makes no representations concerning the likelihood of a successful
resolution of Client's case, and does not guarantee to obtain sufficient funds to
reimburse Client for the costs or expenses incurred in the prosecution of the
case; it is expressly agreed that all statements of Attorney on these matters are
good faith statements of opinion only;
7) Attorney may be discharged by Client at any time. If Attorney is discharged

Attorney will be compensated for services rendered to the date of discharge, as
well as for all costs, expenses and disbursements, as follows:
i) If Attorney is discharged before the case is settled or tried, Attorney
shall be paid at the rate of$150.00 per hour or a percentage calculated
in accordance with paragraph 2 (based upon the highest settlement offer,
ifany, made by the defendants at the time of the discharge) whichever is
greater; Attorney will furnish Client with an itemized statement of such
services.

-:2.f.t, I

ii) If Attorney is discharged after the case is settled or tried, the
compensation of Attorney shall be computed in accordance with the
provisions of this agreement just as if the verdict, award, determination
or judgment had actually been collected in full for Client.
iii) Attorney has the right to retain possession of Client's documents and
money until Attorney's bill is paid in full by Client, and Attorney shall
have a lien on the cause of action.

8) Client will pay to Attorney an initial retainer as an advance against the costs
referred to in Paragraph 4 aboye in the amount of $1 00.
9) Client agrees that any interest earned on any of Client's funds held in trust will
be donated to the Idaho State Bar in connection with its Interest on Lawyer
Trust Accounts program.
10)Both Client and Attorney have read this agreement, have a copy of it, and
agree to its terms and conditions. There are no other oral or written
representations between Client and Attorney. Any modifications of this
contract shall be made in writing.
11 )This Agreement shall be binding upon the heirs, successors, representatives
and assigns of Client and Attorney.
12)Client has been advised that Client may pick up a copy of the file in this case
within 30 days after settlement or after the, attorney client relationship is
terminated by either party to this agreement. After that time, Attorney's file,
and ali documents and things in it from whatever sou.rce will be destroyed.
13)Client has been advised that Attorney may be retained on an hourly basis of
$150 per hour by depositing a retainer with Attorney of $2,000.00 which shall
be replenished as Attorney charges against it. In the event that Attorney is
retained on an hourly basis, Attorney shall not be entitled to any percentage of
any settlement or benefits recovered by Client. Client has declined to retain
Attorney on an hourly basis. and has chosen to retain Attorney on the
contingent basis described herein.

I have read the fOregOing~line to retain the attorney on an hourly
basis, this I &..f day of
, 2001-.

~(2~

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
1. In workers' compensation matters, attorney's fees normally do not exceed
twenty-five percent (25%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you in a case in
which no hearing on the merits has been completed. In a case in which a hearing
on the merits has been completed, attorney's fees normally do not exceed thirty
percent (30%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you.
2. Depending upon the circumstances' of your case, you and your attorney may
agree to a higher or lower percentage which would be subject to Commission
approval. Further, if you and your attorney have a dispute regarding attorney fees,
either of you may petition the Industrial Commission to resolve the dispute.

I certify that I have read and understand this disclosure statement and
Contingency Fee Agreement, and agree to the terms contained herein.
DATED this

I~

day of

9~

,200L..

~Q.~

Laurel Kulm

~daYOf~~~_ _'20fl.
Wm. Breck Seiniger,
SEINlGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
Attorney for Client

EXHIBIT

I

SEiNXGlER
LAV,J OFF!CES
ProjeJ'Sio11tJ!ArsociatWn
WM. BRECK SEINYGER, JR.

ANDREW C. MARSll

idaho, Ongoll, Wa.rhillgt()1I, alld tiN District tfColumbia
JULIE MAR~n SEINIGER
idaho, indiana, alld the Distrid tf Cokmbia

HEATHER M. MCCARTIIY

Idaho, Indiana, t1.IId Missouri
Idaho

June 18,2007

Sent via Facsimile (208) 939-4411
Richard Radnovich D.O.
Attn: Medical Records Department
4850 N. Rosepoint Way, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83713
Re:

Laurel Kulm
1110212006
Mercy Medical Center

Patient:
DOl:

Employer:
DOB:

Date range records requested/or:

1110212006

Dear Medical Records Clerk:
This office represents your patient, Laurel Kulm, in connection with the abovereferenced workers compensation claim. Our office is now in the process of attempting
to locate all of Ms. Kulm's medical records and itemized billing statements for review
and evaluation.
Enclosed, please find an Authorization to Release Medical Infonnation signed by
Ms. Kulm giving full authorization for release of records from your office. By this letter
we are requesting a complete copy of all records, notes, reports, evaluations, letters,
correspondence, bills, and any other record in your possession or control as it
pertains to herlhis care for the above period. Please direct these records to this office
at the above noted address. Pursuant to mAPA 02.04.322.02(a), the fmt copy of
medical records/reports shall be provided to a workers compensation Claimant at
no cost. If you have any questions or concerns regarding this matter, please do not
hesitate to call.

Thank you very much for your prompt attention to this matter.
Cordially yours,

'\ ~

Cat- lice )V/LX-->

Cade Woolstenhulme
Paralegal

942 W. MYRTLE STREET
BOYSE, IDAHO 83702

(208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700

cade@SeinigetLaw.com
www.SeinigetLaw.com

AUTHORIZATION TO USE OR DISCLOSE HEALTH INFORMATION

I2tz..

1.

1 hereby authorize
1Z.AntJO\.J I c....H
to use or disclose the following protected health information form the medical
records of the patient listed below. I understand that information used or disclosed
pursuant to this authorization could be subject to redisclosure by the recipient and,
if so, may not be subject to federal or state law protecting its confidentiality.

2.

Patient name: Laurel Kulm

3. ' Information to be disclosed to:

4.

Date of Birth:
Social Security No.:
Seiniger Law Offices, P.A.
942 Myrtle Street
Boise, ID 83702

DiscjlJSe the following information for

~

mplete Records Consult

ischarge Summary X-Ray
.story & Physical
Outpatient Reports
__Drug and Alcohol Records

5.

~ dates: ~~/o" to present date.
h sical erapy
mergency Reports
aboratory
athology
__Other:,--,-(_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

The above information is disclosed for the following purposes:
Medical Care
Legal Insurance
Personal _ _ __
, Litigation
Other ~_ __

X

6.

I understand I may revoke this authorization at any time by requesting such of the
above referenced hospital/physician practice in writing, unless action has already
been taken in reliance upon it, or during a contestability period under applicable
law.

7.

This authorization expires three (3) years from the date below.

8.

~uNRa.~~
Signature of Patient

Date

Signature of Legal Representative

Date

Ip/I/tU20 7

9.
10.
Relationship to patient or authority
To act for patient

.,... . . . (

"""m ss on

rl~.";::)<1

Data/Time
Loce I 10
Locel Name
Company Logo

rh
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2083454700
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Laurel A. Kulm
2309 E. Olympic Avenue
Nampa, Idaho 83686
June 14, 2007
ICM, Inc.
1150 W. State Street
Suite 330
Boise, Idaho 83702
Attention: Mr. Steven Haase, Claims Administrator
Re: Industrial Claims No: 06-54899
Dear Mr. Haase:
Dr. Nancy Greenwald has been in charge of my Workmen's Compensation Case. On our last
visit she looked at the MRI and was going to see about an epidural shot. She was not sure and
was going to check into this. I didn't know if this kind of treatment would work. I requested
from Dr. Greenwald and Valerie, her assistant, if I could keep continuing going to physical
therapy, they gave me an OK on this.
I've just completed last week the physical therapy. Jared Prince, Physical Therapist from Mercy
North was going to forward her his report. He feels that some of my symptoms have changed
and maybe we should go about making some changes to the treatment.
I also previously requested from Dr. Greenwald if she would OK a temporary handicap sticker
for my vehicle, she left me a message on my phone saying 'that I should walk from the back of
the parking lot due to a pinched nerve. This is a change from her written prescription to Physical
Therapy stating that it was a herniated disc. I feel that I'm not getting the communication needed
and have lost confidence in her. I would like to recommend Dr. Richard Radnovich. I believe he
would be able to help me with my problem.

Please get back to me on this. I can be reached at (208) 899-7580.
Sincerely,

~9-~

Laurel A. Kulm
Lak!

bcc:'Breck Seiniger, Esq.
Richard Radnovich, D.O.

REC'D JUN 18 2007

)
Laurel A. Kulm
2309 E. Olympic Avenue
Nampa, Idaho 83686
June 14,2007

ICM, Inc.
1150 W. State Street
Suite 330
Boise, Idaho 83702
Attention: Mr. Steven Haase, Claims Administrator
Re: Industrial Claims No: 06-54899
Dear Mr. Haase:
Dr. Nancy Greenwald has been in· charge of my Worlanen's Compens.anon Case. On our last

visit she looked at the MRI and was going to see about an epidural shot. She was not sure·and .
was going to check into this. r didn't know if this kind of treatment would work. I requested
from Dr. Greenwald and Valerle, her assistant:, if I could keep continuing going to physical
therapy, they gave me an OK on this.
Pve just completed last week the physical·therapy. Jared Prince; Physical Therapist from Mercy
North was going to forward her his report. He feels that some of my symptoms have changed
and maybe we should go about making some changes to the treatment.·
I also previously.requested from Dr. Greenwald if she would OK a temporary handicap sticker
for my vehicle. she left me a message on my phone saying that r should walk from the back of
the parking lot due to a pinched nerve. This is a change from her written prescription to Physical
Therapy stating that it was a herniated disc. I feel that I'm not getting the communication needed
and have lost confidence in her. I would like to recommerulDr. Richard Radnovich. I believe he
would be able to help me with my problem.
Please get back to me on this. I can be reached at (208) 899-7580.
Sincerely,

Laurel A. Kulm

Laki

LAW OFFICES
WM. BRECX SEINIGER,JR..

ANDREWC. MARsH
Idaho.lrriaN. aniMissatri

ldaJxJ, ~ Washitf!lmarrith?Dist:riaifOi:tniia
JWE MARsHSElNIGER
Idaho, IrrIit.rm ani the District ifOi:tniia

HEA1HERM Mc:::c:.ARTIiY

June 1,2007
Richard Radnovich, D.O.
Injury Care Medical Center
4850 N. Rosepoint Way, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83713
Fax: 939-4411

Re: Laurel Kulm
Dear Dr. Radnovich:
We represent Laurel Kulm. As you know she had a work related injury on
November 2, 2006. I have enclosed a copy of an authorization permitting you to
provide us with copies of her medical records.
I am also enclosing copies of certain records that your patient provided to my
office. She informed me that has been advised by Dr. Greenwald that she
sustained a disk herniation - or that was her understanding. In order to assist her I
will need to know the following as relates to her occupational injury:
1. Your diagnosis of any conditions that you relate to her fall at work
2. Her prognosis
3. Any temporary restrictions and their duration
4. Any permanent impairment rating
5. Any pennanent restrictions
6. Her anticipated future medical requirements and their cost
7. Any apportionment you would make to any pre-existing condition with
respect to any of the foregoing
To facilitate the provision of this information I have enclosed two fonns that
you can use to provide the above infonnation. Please feel free to copy the fonns.
When I receive the information above I will provide it to the opposing party and
942 W. MYRTLE STREET
RoT~F.

TnA'H() 83702

(208) 34S-1ooo
FI1X: (208) 345-4700

WB5@SeinigerLaw.com
www.SeinigerLaw.com

attempt to secure her workers compensation benefits. I anticipate that your patient
may not be stable, and, therefore I would request that you advise me of any
temporary restrictions and need for treatment so that I can request the appropriate
workers compensation benefits from the surety with your letter as support. Thank
you.
Cordially,

wm Breck Seiniger, Jr.

TEMPORARY FUNCTIONAL LIMITATIONS
ASSESSMENT
Name of Claimant: Laurel Kulm Date of Injury: 11102/2006Important: Please complete the following items based on your clinical evaluation of
the elaimant and other treating results based upon what is more probable than not.
Any item that you do not believe you can answer should be marked nla (not
answerable).
Period of limitations:

------------------------------

NOTE: In terms of an 8 hour work day, "occasionally" equals 0% to 33%; frequently,"
34% to 66%; "continuously," 67% to 100%.
I. In an 8-hr. work day, claimant can:
A.)
Sit
-No.1,
B.)
Stand
-No.1,
C.)
Walk
-No.1,

(Circle full capacity for each activity)
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, (hrs.)
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, (hrs.)
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, (hrs.)

II. Claimant can lift:

A.)
B.)
C.)
D.)

Never

Occasionally

Frequently

Continuously

Never

Occasionally

Frequently

Continuously

Up to 10 Ibs.
11-20Ibs.
21-50Ibs.
51-1001bs.

III. Claimant can carry:
A.)
B.)
C.)
D.)

Up to 10 Ibs.
11-201bs.
21-501bs.
51-1001bs.

"

..

N. Claimant can use hands for repetitive action such as:
Simple Grasping Pushing and Pulling Fine manipulating
A.)
Right
Yes No
Yes No
Yes No
Yes No
Yes No
Yes No
B.) Left
V. Claimant can use feet for repetitive movements as in operatingfoot controls:
Right
Left
Both
Yes No
Yes No
Yes No

Name of Claimant: LaurJKulm Date of Injury: 11102/2006
VI. Claimant is able to:
Not at all
A)
B.)
C.)

D.)

E.)

Occasionally

Frequently Continuously

Bend
Squat
Crawl
Climb
Reach above
shoulder level

VII. Restriction of activities involving:
None
A)
Unprotected
heights
B.)
Being around
moving machinery
C.)
Exposure to
marked changes in
temperature or humidity
D.)
Driving automotive equipment
E.)
Exposure to dust,
fumes & gases

Mild

Moderate Total

Remarks (on above, on other functional
limitations):._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

)
PERMANENT FUNCTIONAL LIMITATIONS
ASSESSMENT
Name of Claimant: Laurel Kulm
Date of Injury: 11/02/2006
Important: Please complete the following items based on your clinical evaluation of
the claimant and other treating results based upon what is more probable than not.
Any item that you do not believe you can answer should be marked nla (not
answerable). If these limitations are expected to increase with time please specify in
the comments section.
NOTE: In terms of an 8 hour work day, Itoccasionally" equals 0% to 33%; frequently,"
34% to 66%; "continuously," 67% to 100%.

I. In an 8-hr. work day, claimant can:
A.)
Sit
-No.1,
B.)
Stand'
·No.1,
C.)
Walk
-No.1,

(Circle full capacity for each activity)
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, (hrs.)
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, (hrs.)
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, (hrs.)

II. Claimant can lift:
A.)

Up to 10 Ibs.

B.)

11-20Ibs.
21-501bs.
51-1001bs.

C.)
D.)

Never

Occasionally

Never

Occasionally

..

Frequently

Continuously

Frequently

Continuously

III. Claimant can carry:
A.)

Up to 10 lbs.

B.)

11-20Ibs.
21-50Ibs.
51-100Ibs.

C.)
D.)

..

IV. Claimant can use hands for repetitive action such as:
Simple Grasping Pushing and Pulling Fine manipulating
Right
Yes No
Yes No
Yes No
A.)
Yes No
Yes No
Yes No
B.) Left
V. Claimant can use feet for repetitive movements as in operatingfoot controls:
Right
Left
Both
Yes No
Yes No
Yes No

:.21tf

VI. Claimant is able to:
Not at all
A.)
B.)
C.)
D.)
E.)

Occasionally

Crawl
Climb
Reach above
shoulder level

VII. Restriction ofactivities involving:
None
A.)
Unprotected
B.)
C.)

D.)
E.)

Frequently Continuously

Bend
Squat

Mild

Moderate Total

heights
Being around
moving machinery
Exposure to
marked changes in
temperature or humidity
Driving automotive equipment
Exposure to dust,
fumes & gases

Remarks (on above, other functional limitations, or anticipated increase in limitations
over time specifying the time period involved):

·
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ICM, Inc.
INDUSTRIALCLAIMSI
INSURANCECONSULTING
M' A NAG E MEN T
March 20, 2007
Attn: Luke Mayes, D.C.
Mayes Chiropractic, Inc.
5975 Overland Road
Boise, ID 83709
Re:

Employee:
"Employer:'
Claim No.:
Injury Date:

Laurel Kulm
, MercyMedicalCenter
06-54899
11-02-06

Dear Dr. Mayes:
As you know from previous correspondence, Dr. Ben Terry has referred Ms. Kulm to you for
chiropractic care dUI3 to Jow back pain caused by her November 2,2006 work injury.
According to the chart notes we've received, Dr. Terry initially approved six treatments and, in
January, approved six more for a total of twelve. However, we have received chiropractic
billings for twenty-four dates of service, ranging from November 2,2006 through February 15,
2007.

We can only pay for the twelve visits approved by Ms. Kulm's treating physician. As such, we
have processed the attach~ invoices for dates of service November 2, 2006 through December
12,2006 (totaling twelve vitits). Please note, the invoice for dates of service November 8, 2006
through November 22, 20b6 was paid on March 19,2007.
Thankyou..
Sincerely,
Steve Haase
Claims Administrator
cc:

Idaho, Industria] Commission
Karen Otter - Mercy Medical Center
Ben Terry, M.D.• Siltzer Medical Group

Laurel Kulm

1150 W. STATE STREET, SUITE 330· BOISE, IDAHO 83702 • TELEPHONE: 208/388-8768 • FAX: 208/388·

Ie ,Inc.
INDUSTRIALCLAIMSI
INSURANCECONSULTING
MAN AGE MEN T

Februaty 27,2007
Attn: Luke Mayes, D.C.
Mayes Chiropractic, Inc.
5975 Overland Road
Boise, ID 83709
Re:

Employee:
Laure] Kulm
. EmpJoyer: "_ . Mercy Medical Center
Claim No.:
06-54899
Injury Date:
11-02-06

Dear Dr. Mayes:
Based on telephone conversations with Saltzer Medical Group, it is our lmderstanding that Ms.
Kulm was authorized for six. treatments in November of2006 and in January 2007 for six
additional treatments. However, Saltzer has never received a chart note or status repoq with
regards to their referral for chiropractic care. No further treatment wiIJ be authorized without
first receiving these past chart notes.
Our office will reimburse the reasonable and customary amount for the approved twelve visits
but no additional care will be authorized for payment without a referral from Ms. Kulm's treating
physician, Ben Terry, M.D. In order to evaluate and pay the reasonable and customaty fee for
the past tweJve treatments, we will need an invoice and chart notes to support each visit.

Thank you.
Sincerely,
....

__ .

. _ . "

•••

___ ._. __

0' _ _ _ _ _

•

_ _ ._..

,

__

• _ _. . . . . . . . . . -

• •

--'-'--'--'-_.

-"'-'-'-

Steve Haase
Claims Administrator
cc:

Idaho Industrial Commission
Saltzer Medical Group
Karen Otter - Mercy Medical Center

Laurel Kulm

1150 W. STATE STREET. SUITE 330· BOISE, IDAHO 83702 • TELEPHON~:.208/3a8-8768 • FAX: 208/388·8;,.,-.,.

;J.7i

I

, Inc.

INO'USTRIALCLAIMSI
INSURANCECONSULTING

MANAGEMENT
February 16,2007
Attn: Luke Mayes, D.C.
Mayes Chiropractic, Inc,
5975 Overland Road
Boise, ID 83709
Re:

Employee:
Employer:
Claim No.:
Injury Date:

Laurel Kulm
Mercy Medical Center
06-54899
11-02-06

Dear Dr. Mayes:
We have received invoices for medical services provided by your clinic from November 2, 2006
througb February 6, 2007 (three months of treatment). OUf recor~s indicate that Ms. Kulm was
first seen at Saltzer Medical Group and has been under their care since her injury, which
occurred November 2, 2006.

In order to process your request for payment of services rendered, we will need a detaiJed
medical report of ber treatment and the name of the doctor who referred her to you for care.

Dr. &aD Te('r~

Thank you.
Sincerely,

-..-- -. -.-

-- .... .....
~

---~-

- -

.....,--....

-

Steve Haase
Claims Administrator

cc:

Idaho Industrial Commission
Laurel Kulm
Karen Otter - Mercy Medical Center
Ben Terry, M.D. - Saltzer Medical Group

1150 W. STATE STREET, SUITE 330" BOISE, IDAHO 83702 .. TELEPHONE: 2081388-8768 .. FAX: 2081388-8734

771

ICM, Inc.
INDUSTRIALCLAIMSI
INSURANCECONSULTING

November 8, 2006

MAN AGE MEN T

LaurelKulm
528 Tollman Place
Nampa, ID 83651
Re:
Employer:
Mercy Medical Center
... - .. ,.. ... -- --Employee:"--""', Laurel-Kulm ----- ,----Injury Date:
11-02-06
Claim No:
06-54899
Dear Ms. Kulm:
Our company handles the workers' compensation claims for your employer. We have received
your claim for benefits and will require additional information prior to making a decision on the
compensability (acceptance or denial) of your claim.
You will be contacted by either Susan Calvin or Carol Calvin within the next few days for the
purpose of taking a recorded statement over the phone. Please make every effort to be available
for them. in order to expedite your claim. We currently have your telephone number listed as
208-899-7580.

If this is incorrect, please contact our office as soon as possible so that we may correct our
records. You can reach me at: 1-877-388-8768.

- ----- .

Thank you in advance for your cooperation. Once our investigation has been completed, we will
advise you of the status of your claim by November 22, 2006.
----_ ... - ....---- .. _-- _.- .. -.. --_.-------_.
.. _-_._----_ ..
.. _._-----

__

--_._

Sincerely~

JJf~

Steve~;

n

Claims Examiner ~ r

/

1150 W. STATE STREET, SUITE 330· BOISE, IDAHO 83702 • TELEPHONE: 208/388·8768 • FAX: 20Bl38S.a73,

2. ¥ I

STATE OF NEW YORK
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD

THIS AGENCY EMPLOYS AND SERVES
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES WITHOUT
DISCRIMINATION

Norwich Shopping Plaza
6142 state Route 12 • Suite 13
Norwich, NY 13815

July 13, 2007

DATE:

WCB Case Number
29306832

Laurel Benzaquen Kulm

Date of Accident
1/28/92

Dear Sir or Madam:
We are in receipt of your request for a

121·
'.

A copy of the records will be sent

of the records in the above-captioned case.
upon receipt of the photocopying fee. The fee is: $15.25

NOTE: eODies do not include flt1IlJl"I(;J.JTIlnU{I~:$ or deposition transcripts. Please call the Senior Verbatim Reporter at
(516) 560-7753
for information on obtaining hearing minutes. For assistance in
obtaining 8 copy of any
transcript, speak to 8 Customer Service Representative at your
local District OffIce. Please have
letter available when you eal/.

Send a check or money order payable to

Compensation Board, with the lower portion of this letter, to:

Workers' Compensation Board
Norwich Shopping Plaza
6142 State Route 12 • Suite 13
Norwich, NY 13815

If you would like these records sent via Federal Express, thei'lldlditi!on,al
NOTE: Federal Express will not

o

a street address.

We are in receipt of your payment; however, we are unable
n,.,.,........... your request The number of
documents in the case file may have increased significantly. or rnA!r"C",,.,av
been a typographical error on
the check, or the check may be unsigned. Enclosed please find
Please resubmit payment of
this amount:
.
From: AnnMarie
Telephone No:

It Is unlawful to disclose individually identifiable lnfonnation from Workers' COlmJ)emlstlon'1Soarcl records to any person who
is not otherwise lawfully entitled to obtain these records. Any person who
willfully obtains workers'
compensation records which contain individually identifiable infonnation under false
or otherwise violates
ubJect, upon conviction, to
Workers' Compensation Law Section 110-a shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor and shall
a fine of not more than one thousand dollars.
this section and

Claimant's Name

Laurel Benzaquen Kulm
Photocopying Fee EnClosed:

WCB Case Number

29306832
Federal Express Fee Enclosed:

SENDTO: ____________________________________________

WEC·333 (8-06)

of Accident

AnnMarie Baker July 13,2007

··~d

,/13/01

)6d~!~53d@
2309 E. Olympic Avenue
Nampa, Idaho 83686
lune 13, 2007

.

NYS Workers' Compensation Board
P.O. Box 5205
Binghamton, NY 13902
..

<if

. . . . _ _ ..

.

".. . ,

....-.....

~

Re: Case #29306832
Year: 1992
Dear NYS W~rkers' Compensation Board!
I am enclosing $3.00 for a copy of my report, ifmore is needed please advise me at the above
address.

I recently got hurt and need a copy of this report to see ifit can be related in anyway.
Here is my pertinent information:
I was using my maiden name at the time: Benzaquen
My date of birth:
My Social Security Number:
I greatly appreciate your cooperation in this manner.
Sincerely~

'~Q~

Laurel A. Kulm
BncV

---.

Laurel A. Benzaquen
P.O. Box 21261
Alb~querque, NM
87154
1993

,,

RECEIVED

The Workmen's Compensation
175 Fulton Avenue
Hempstead, NY 11550
RE:

Attention:
De~

Laurel A. Benzaquen
WCB Case #: 29306832
Carrier ID#: W204002
Carrier Case #: 35878693106
Date of Accident: 02/28/92.
Social Security #:
W.C. Law Judge Eaton

Judge Eaton:

Please be advised that since the hearing I have
relocated to the State of New Mexico. I stated this
to you at the time of the hearing and I was told to
give my new permanent address and phone number.
(','''

l

"

,

"!""'U""''''''''

My new address is:
P.o. Box 2 1261
Albuquerque, New Mexico

87154

"JAN 5

1994

A residence address I can be reached at is:
2412 Gretta Street, N.E.
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87111

My new phone number is:
(50S) 299-3356 with answering machine.

A relative phone number is:
(50S) 293-9276 - Relative:

Carla Gallipoli or Mark Gallipoli.

If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate
to contact me. I greatly appreciate your cooperation in this
matter.
Sincerely,

~Q_~
Laurel A. Benzaquen

STATE OF NEW YORK

Social Securitv Number
mero d

\

.

\.YORKERS· COMPENSATION BOARD

ocial

EMPLOYEE'S CLAIM
FOR COMPENSATION

IMPORTANT: Your Social Security Number Must Be Entered
IMPORTANTE: EI Numero de au Seguro Social Debe Ser Indicado

WCB Case No.(If Known) ._~_~~~_~:~_._____.______________._ CarTier Case No. (If Known)._ji~~OO.2...._. ____.______._
ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS FULLY
1. NamL_!:~~:.~_.____._.._.._________•________..~.__.__..•__
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FIrft N.....
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rx: .....
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Nllmbet and Str••t (Include Apt No.)
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...
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ellr

State

"Ip Codo

.

3. Sex __.E'__.____ Age_~__Date of Birt
~.__ Married or single___..~~~~. ___ ._.._._._
4. Do you speak English?-_..!.':!-_______ If not, what lanJmage do you speak?•._____ ._•...•._...__._.___.
N/K'
5. Name 0 f union and local number) if member _____
.___________
.._ .••_______._..._____.__ ._.•_______.•__
. 6. State what ypur regular work was.•.aru;x:et.a.ti~.e-.G.o.feJ:J!.-deliv.e~-pi~k:=-Up....----....-.7. What were you doing when you were injured?_.E:.~~E5L_~.__~~!.~E...yel1.~.2!~:.·______..46-.o
8. Wages or average earnin~ per day) including overtime, board, rent and other allowances $ ____=...
9. Were you paid full wages for the day of injury?.....:________._..._____ X
Yes
No
1O. Were you at the time of'injury a piece worker? ______..._.__..____.•.._...
Yes
X No
Or a time worker? ___._.___.._..._.•_.___._lx
Yes
No
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b••lulda
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--:-....
----.
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::J~
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Family Nlm.

2. Address _.192_~~E.!'?~~~~~__~tr!=~____ ._~r~~li~_~~:!..~..__ .__... _m___._~~9]:~ ::::~.
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~

Benzaquen

Mlddlo Name
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Place
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Time
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we.,)
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0==
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Injury

w~
:IE ....
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..::; .....

WesLon Northe.rrL.s.tat~__.ParkH.a'YL-.t~.aff.~c
stopped due to merging of lanes. I ~.in...l.ef.t.....la.nsL.at:_...a...d.e.ag._~..t.Q1l. __
I was hit from behind by a 1980 Chevrolet. _
_ _._._. _~._. _....... ..
1. State. fully nature of your injury/illness {In~ury to Low~r Back anctN~£~ ______.__
·_

1. How did injU.ty occur?_.I.....was headj ng

..---

--------------'--~-------.-----.---.---------

~

rx:IX:
~m~
W
EDeLl: • 4. :DQes injury keeJ}.you from work? .----.-----------IJ- is ...
of"
5. It.:e.yeu done any work during period of disability? __N/A
__
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N~...
2 , HOn what dateturndidedYOu sto~.?wo~~~kecauseIfo~,thisy· ,~nju:ry?h-d~L~_--..-~!!~ne ---=--==:--19
a d d .3' ave you re
es on w at ate ______________
'_-"_
t0 worl\,. _J,U.£______
.-

19

XINo I

aM "eu """elVed any wages 81'nee your'ffiJ.,........,.
_:..::________________
6• HIlT........·
,A) _NO'
".
If "Yes" for what

~. '"

.'

.-----------(check one) I
IHourlyl I IDallyl I I Weekly I
7. ltUMjGry resulted in amputation? .-NL.tL___..lf so, describe same ____________-t01d.at that rate? JU~L____._____

..... .

-----~~~~~.~~~====~~==?==========--===-======-==-====~~-==r=~=-r--~·-·~==
-~
.:.. 1. Did you receive medical care?
-----_______
_
X Yes
No
• •••
2. Are you now receiving medical care? ____
X Yes
No
3. Are you now in need of medical care? - - - - - ----X Yes
No
4. Have you requested your employer to authorize medical care? ___
Yes
No
Benefits
5. Name and address Dr. Joeph Lacerenza
D • R
11 M' 11 r
of attending doctor~~~~r: Aye ••.__
F?AnK~ffi Ave~._~E~l~~~.:_.
6. If you were in a hospital, give thetates hospitalized _____ N/A____________•___•...__ •___. ______..
Name and address of hOSPital.J-f A__.
___
1. Have you received workers' compensation payments for the injury
Workers'
reported above? - - -..-----..---.---------_.---Yes
X No
CompeJloo 2. Are you receiving workers' compensation payments? _________..___._
Yes
X No
saDon
3. Do you claim further workers' compensation payments? .________
Yes
X No
Payments
If "Yes" explain _._
______________________._______.__...__.__ ._
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Medrcar·
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Notice

1. Have you given your employer (or supervisor) notice of injury? .... _..
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.
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.75-35 31st Avenue, East Elmhurst. New York 11370 • Tel. (718) 426-6999 • Toll Free (800) 551-5015' Fax (718) 426·8266

MEDICAL DETERMINATIONS, P.C.

April 29, 1994
INSURANCE CO.:
ADDRESS:
INSURED:
CLAIMANT:
CLAIM NO.:
WeB CLAIM NO.:

DATE OF ACCIDENT:
ATTENTION OF:
DATE OF EXAM:

State Insurance Fund
Hempstead, NY
Frame Auto Call., Inc.
Laurie Benzaquen
35878693106(4)
29306832
January 28, 1992

P. Hill
April 11, 1994

I was very pleased to re-examine your claimant, Laurie Benzaquen, on
April 11, 1994. She was previously examined on January 14, 1994 in
re1ation to injuries she had to her neck and lower back in a work-related
car accident which occurred on January 28', 1992.
•

• •••

•

The patient 'continues to receive chiropractic treatment at a'freqd~cyof
two times per week and she feels better, although she still has pAtd:in
her low back area on the left. She is, otherwise, asympt~~~ic. •• •
.r"f

•

• •
••••••
The patient is, ,cu'rrent1 y unemployed.
••••••
•• ••• •
': Height~: 4' 11" ' tall; Weiqht:' e1'"!SO ' potW~s..
PHYSICAL IXNlINATIOlf:
••••••
•
••••••
, ,
u~er Extremities:
•
•
,. •
••
••••

.

••••••
••
• •••••
• •••••• •
•• •••••
• e

•••••

There is full range of motion of the shoulders in forw~Q
elevation, backward elevation, abduction, adduction, ·~ternal
rotation, and internal rotation. There is full range of
motion of the elbows in flexion, pronation, and supination.
Range of motion of the wrists is full in dorsi flexion, palmar
flexion, radial deviation, and ulnar deviation. A full' fist
can be made bilaterally, and digital dexterity is normal.
There is full range of motion of the MP, PIP, and DIP joints
of both hands.

Lower Extremities:
There is tenderness of the left hip on palpation. There is
full range of motion, of the hips in forward flexion, backward
flexion, abduction, adduction, internal rotation, and external
rotatlon. Range of motion of the knees is full in flexion,
and there is no instability. Range of motion of the ankles is
normal in dorsi flexion, plantar. flexion, inversion, and,
eversion. Movement of the'toes is normal. There is no leg
. ,discrepancy. '

Cervical Spine:
The patient does not complain of vertebral tenderness. There
is no paravertebral spasm. Motion of the spine is full in

75·35 31st Avenue, East Elmhurst, New York 11370· Tel. (718) 426·6999· Toll Free (800) 551-5015· Fax (718) 426-8266

MEDICAL DETERMINATIONS, P.C.

Laurie Bensaquen - Page 2
flexion, extension, lateral bending, and rotation.
Compression and Soto-Ha11 Tests are negative.

Foraminal

'.rhoraooJ,"mhar spine:

The patient complains of minimal vertebral tenderness. There
is minimal paravertebral spasm. Motion of the spine is full
in flexion, extension, lateral bending, and rotation.
Straight leg raising is positive on the left in the supine
position. Kemp's, Goldthwait's, and Lasegue's are negative.
Gait.:

The patient ambulates with a normal gait.
Motor syst.em:

•

.......
to

~.

•••• to
••••
• •••

••• •••
aud..

.

Muscle strength measures 4/5 at the left quadr~geRs
• •••••
hamstrings; otherwise, muscle strength is norncal: -}n tltt·eppe~:: •••
and lower extremities. Inspection of the musq1~.9roupa..
• •••••
reveals no atrophy.

• ••• :.

••••••

• •••

Reflexes:

Deep tendon reflexes are present and symmetric.
pathologic reflexes present.

••• :
•
••• • ••
••••

•••••

There 'efl!'e no
• •••

sensation:
Sensory findings are normal.
Coordinat.ion:

Testing for coordination was essentially normal.
D:r:AGNOSIS:

Low back pain.
CONCLUSIOll:

This patient is doing much better since I last examined her on January
14, 1994. I feel she has achieved maximal improvement, and further
chiropractic treatment is not necessary for her work-related back pain.

..

••

..••••••
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Laurie Bensaquen - Page 3
I certify and affirm that the foregoing report is true to the best of my
lonowledge under the penalties of perjury.

~~ ~~)t?C

GP:sj

co:

Greg Perea, D.C.
Worker I s Compensation Board
Dr. ~dwin Thomas Arnold
• •••• •
••••

..

.

•••••

•• •

.••••••
• • ..•
••••••
•
••••••
••••••

• •••

••• ••••.•
•
• ..
••••••
•
.. ••••
.

•• .•

..

..
•• ••••
• •
•••

••••

••••••
••
••••••

.. ••••. .
•
•• •••••..
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MEDICAL DETERMINATIONS, P.C.

February 8, 1994
state Insurance Fund
Hempstead, NY
Frame Auto ColI. Inc.
Laurie Benzaquen

INSURANCE CO.:

ADDRESS:

INSURED:
CLAIMANT:
WeB CLAIM NO.:
CLAIM NO.:
DATE OF INJURY:
ATTENTION OF:
DATE OF EXAM:

29306832
35878693106(3)
January 28, 1992

P. Hill
January 14, 1994

Laurie Benzaquen came to my office on January 14, 1994 for a chiropractic
evaluation. She is a forty one year old female who, on January 28, 1992,
was involved in a work-related car accident.
PATIENT'S HISTORY:

The patient was driving her car on that' date and was struck from"Dehind
by another veh~cle~ ,She had injuries' to her neck and, back.' for wlirch she,
did not seek emergency room care.' She had consulted with two di{feient
chiropractors and a :private physiciah' "and had' ':x..:;rays "ctnd.·'lft·MRI tpken.
,'"

.

, ' .

.

' . '

,

....... ',....

.:: .. .

She is currently beiri4 treated wlth"physical 'therapy anl1·~1nal· ••••• , ...... .
manipulations three times per week, and she states she feel. bette~ now~···.
However, she still reports pain in her'head, neck, back;·T4rt upp~ and· •
left lower extremity, and difficulty walking, bending, ano·1iftin!.
:--:-:
••••••
• ••••
••
•
••
••
•
•
•
PAST HISTORY:
••••
•••••

Her past medical history includes hypothyroidism, for which sh~·1. on
medication. She states she had a whiplash injury in 1985 (but no further
details were provided). Her surgical history is unremarkable.

EMPLOYMENT

HISTORX:

The patient was working in a clerical position when this accident
occurred. She states she did not miss any time from work due to the
accident but is not currently working.
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:

Height: 5'3" tall; Weight: 150 pounds

Upper Extremities:
There :is tenaerness 'on 'pa'lpation o-f, the left shoulder, elbow,
,,:wrist and hand. ,The;re. ,i~ full range of motion of the
, , shOUlders in forward ,elevation, -baokward elevatio,n; , abduction,
adductIon, external rotat:ion, and, internal rotation,. There is
full range of motion 'of thEa' el,bows 'in flexion" pronation, and
supination. Range of motion 'of the wrists is full in dorsi

",1
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flexion, palmar flexion, radial deviation, and ulnar
deviation. A full fist can be made bilaterally, and digital
dexterity is normal. There is full range of motion of the MP,
PIP, and DIP joints of both hands.
Lower Extra.i ties:

There is full range of motion of 'che hips ill forward flexion,
backward flexion, abduction, adduction, internal rotation, and
external rotation. Fabere Patrick is negative on the right
and positive on the left. The left hip is tender on
palpation. At the left knee, there is decreased flexion to
130 degrees, associated with pain. There is tenderness on
palpation of the left knee. There is no ,instability. Range
of motion of the right knee is full in flexion. There is
tenderness at the left ankle. However, both ankles have a
full range of motion in dorsi flexion, plantar flexibn,.·
inversion, and eversion. The feet are normal bilatera11~.
The left leg is 1/2" shorter than the right.
-•••••

cervical Spine:

••••••
•
•••••

••••••
•• •••

•

••••
•
• ••• •

• •••••
••
• •••••
••••

The patient complains of moderate vertebral ~~rne~~ :Th~e.·
is moderate paravertebral spasm. Motion of t.be.)ipine iff
••••••
decreased to 40 degrees of flexion, extension~.And lat4ral : •••• :
bending, and 70 degrees of rotation. Pain is a~ocilt4~with
all movements. Foramina1 Compression and Soto-Hal,l are••••
•
Positive.
••••

Thoracolumbar Spine:
patient complains of moderate vertebral tenderness. There
is moderate paravertebral spasm. Motion of the spine is
decreased to 70 degrees of flexion, and 20 degrees of
extension, lateral bending, and rotation. All of these
movements are associated with pain. straight leg raising is
positive in the supine position and negative in the sitting
position, bilaterally. Kemp's is positive; Goldthwait's and
Valsalva Tests are negative.
Th~

Gait:

The patient ambulates with a normal gait.

Motor system:
There is a decrease in muscle strength to 4/5 at the entire
left upper and lower extremity, except for the extensor
hallucis longus and intrinsic muscles, which have normal

(
~I ,I'
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the lumbar spine, cervical flexion/extension injury.
DIAGNOSIS:

1.
2.-

Lumbar sprain and strain;
Cervical flexion/extension injury.

CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP:

If the patient's history is accurate, the diagnoses are causally
related to the above work-related incident.
CONCLUSIOlf:

Based on my examination findings today, .1 feel that there is no
need for further chiropractic treatment or therapy as maximal
benefit in my.field of specialty has been achieved.

IBMABIS:

ADDITIONaL

As per my April, 1993 exam recommendations, a home stretching
program WOuld be beneficial.
I

am available to testify on Tuesdays and Thursdays.

1 CERTIFY AND AFFIRM THAT THE FOREGOING REPORT IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF MY
KNOWLEDGE UNDER THE PENALTIES OF PERJURY.

~mbel'
cc:

Worker's compensation Board
Joseph Lacerenza, D.C.

••• •••
•••
• •
•

••••
•
••
••••

•••
• •••
.•••• •"•• ••• • •••••
• •" "
" •
•••
••••
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• •"

• •
••• •••
•••••
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•
••
•• •••
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PHYSl:CAL BDXlHATIOH:

Height: 4'11"; Weight: 150 pounds.
Ce~ieal

Spine:
The patient complains of minimal vertepral tenderness. There is
no paravertebral spasm. Motion of the spine in flexion,
extension, and lateral bending is full. Rotation is decreased to
65 degrees bilaterally. Foraminal Compression, Valsalva and soto
Hall tests are negative.

7horacolumbar spina:
Tbe patient complains o~ minimal vertebral tenderness. There is
moderate paravertebral spasm-. Motion of the spine in flexion is
decreased to 70 degrees, extension to 25 degrees, an~ lateral
J:',}endiil9' a·nd r.c:t;:a;tion.'to 30 degrees. Kemp's, GOldthwait·s,
Lasequets and Valsalva tests are negative.

Motor system:
Muscle strength is normal in the upper and lower extremities.
Inspection of the muscle groups reveals no atrophy.

l1ef'lexes:
Deep tendon reflexes are +2 bilaterally.
negative.

pathologic reflexes are

sensation:
Sensory findings are normal.

Higher Corti;.! Functions:
The patient is oriented x
BBYlBW 0' IBDlQALS:
A bill from Dr. Lacerenza

3.

.

•• ••.
••••••

•••••

•• • ..•
•..
..••• ••• .• ••• • •

... ..... ....
... ... ·•• ••...• • ..••••. .••.
•• ••
.. .... ."
. • • ••

gi~t~ ~ di~~is.9f:.sprain/strain
..
.. ..
•

•

&

•

..

••
•••
• ••
••••
•• ••
• • •
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•••••
••
••• •
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October 1, 1993
INS~CE COMPANY:
ADDRESS:
INSURED:
CLAIMANT:
CLAIM NUMBER:
DATE OF INJURY:
ATTENTION OF:
DATE OF EXAM:
WCB NO.:

state Insurance FUnd
Hempstead, New York
Frame Auto College Inc.
Laurie Benzaquen
35878693106(2)
January 28, 1992
~9't!!!4!4:::e-Wh,eeler

1993

On september 20" 1993, I exa
this 41-year-old, le'ft-handed female in
my Carle Place, New York office. Please note that this is are-evaluation.
I initially, examined-this patient on January 30,1993 and April 24, 1993.
PATXBKT'S HISfgBY:

The patient states that on January 28, 1992, she injured her neck and back.
She was driving west on the Northern state Parkway when a 1989 Chevrolet
struok her vehicle from the rear. The patient denies any lacerations and
did not seek emergency room care.
Since the accident, she has treated with an orthopedist and a chiropractor.
She has been receiving chiropractic care 2-3 times per week. She has also
been treated with medication.
Her current symptoms are neck and back pain. She suffers from difficulty
with walking, bending and lifting. At the present time she states she
feels the same to somewhat better.
BKPLOJKBNT HISTORY:

At the time of the accident, the patient wae ~iqyeq on a full-time basis
as a secretary. She is currently working a~.~~e~ ~~ in the same field.
• •• •••••
...

PAST

HISTORY:

........

Her past medical history includes a' C-s;c'lpn.·~q;:sta~s·~he was involved
in a prior accident in 1985 when she Wi' ~~r-~~Q ~t,~n~ther vehicle at a
stop light.
••
••
• ....
•• " • 0 •• •••
•.. •• ••
••
....

.... ... . .
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STATE OF NEW YORK

'NORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ATTENDING DOCTOR'S REPORT
PODIATRIST

Pkwy Ex 38 'vi
INJURED
PERSON

:~~~~'MU'Qalth

EMPLOYER"

F r arne Au to Co I lis i on

INSURANCE
CARRIER

Stat~

=

126-44-5048

St Fr SqNY

71 Denton Ave NHP.NY 11040
159 N Fr St Hempstead NY1155

Ins Fund

10. (a) ANY FACTORS DELAYING RECOVERY?

11.

IF "YES" OesCRIBE

(b) IS MEDICAL AND/OR VOCATIONAL
REHABILITATION INDICATED?
IF "YES" GIVE REFERRAL DETAILS
HERE

•

..

.. ....

••• • • •••

" IF AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECIAL SERVICES IS
REQUIRED, see ITEMS 4 ANO 5 ON REVERSe.

•

OF A
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;).y 3d' t..,y3'~

STATE OF NEW YORK

iORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD

ATTENDiNG DOCTOR'S REPORT

CHECK TYPe OF DOCTOR:

~

______~I

I~~P-OD-~-~-IS-T' f~~;OJ~;oRl

126-44-5046
INJURED

PERSON

~p~y~'

Frame Auto Col I ision

1 Denton Ave NHP NY 11040
. 159 N Fr St Hempstead NY1155

Lumbar\Cervicai Flex

10. (a) ANY FACTORS DELAYING RECOVERY?
IF "YES" DESCRIBE
!!AINU-

lTlOH

(b) IS MEDICAL AND/OR VOCATIONAL
REHABILITATION INDICATED?
IF "YES" Give REFEARAL DETAILS

*
OF
•

HAS

A nONDI.
A

STATE OF NEW YORK
HORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD

ATTENDING DOCTOR'S REPORT

Ex 33 W

126-44-5046

St Fr SqNY

INJURED

PERSON

EMPLOVER"

Frame Auto Coil ision

71 Denton Ave NHP NY 11040

INSURANCE
CARRIER

Stat""
I ns Fund
'"

159 N Fr· St Hempstead NY 1155

SUPERVISING
PHYSICIAN

01 any)

Lumbar\Cervical
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REHABIUTATION INDICATED?
IF "YES" GIVE REFERRAL DETAILS
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•••
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MEDICAL DETERMINAnONS, P.C.

Laurie Benzaquen - Paqe 3

strength bilaterally.
no atrophy.

I Inspection of

the muscle groups reveals

!

Reflexes:

Deep tendon reflexes are active and equal.
pathologic reflexe,s present.

There are no

sensation:

Sensory findings are normal.
, coordination:

Testing for coordination was essentially normal.
• •••
•.....
•
• •

Higher cortical FUnctions:

The patient 'is alert and oriented' in all 'spheres tes~eQ;
••••••
Higher cortical functions are intact.
•
•
•••••
••••••

•• • •..
••••••
•
••••••

DXAGNOSIS:
1. Cervicalgia.
2. Low back pain.

••••••
. •••

CONCLtJS:r::01f:

••••
• ••••

·

••• • •
••
•
0

...

". • •••• •

• •••••

••
• ••• •
0

• •••••

• •
•••• • •••
• •••••

•••••

I conclude after examining this patient and reviewing her history"' that
the above diagnoses are causally related to the work-related car accident
of January, 1992. She is not currently disabled. I recommend
chiropractic treatment for six more weeks, at a frequency of two times
per week, after which she will be at maximal medical improvement.
I certify and affirm that the foregoing report is true to the best of my
knowledge under the penalties of perjury.

~4 ~<..S-..;..:~,pC
GP:sj
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Greg Perea, D.C.
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11.
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• IF AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECIAL SERVICES IS .
REQUIRED, SEE ITEMS 4 AND 5 ON REVERSE,

Dr, Joseph Lacerenza
Or. \'ay Lev i ne
Or. Robert Moore
Chiropractors
P.O. Box 224
Frankl In Square N.Y. 11010

9/1/93

ReI Laurel Senzaquen
el: 35878693-106
SS':
To Whom It May Conoern:
The abov.e named patient has been trea.ted at this office slnoe
2/10/92 with only moderate suooess. She sti I I oomplains of lower

baok pain with Dain into her leg.

She is sti I I unable to sit for

extended periods of time and I feel we
5tro~gly

mu~t

rule out HPN.

request permission for MRI .study of her lower back.

If you have any questions please feel free to oat I.

Thank you

in advanoe for your oooperatlon,

.~J(.e~h
Sflrel.

IffJ~"1

aoerenza D.C •• DAAPM
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(b) IS MEDICAL ANDIOR VOCATIONAL
REHABILITATION INDICATED?
IF " YES" GIVE REFERRAL DETAILS

.. IF AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECIAL SERVICES IS
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CHECK TYPE OF DOCTOR:

1 '--1- - , - - - - - - ,

FiNAl 1

mm~~:w~,~lth

St Fr SqNY

1 Denton Ave NHP NY 11040

Au to Co I lis i or.

~~-------4------------------------------------~----------------------------------~------------~
INSURANce
Ins Fund
59 N Fr St Hempstead NY1155
CARRIER

L

0[:]

10. (a) ANY FACTORS DELAYING RECOVERY?
IF "YES" DESCRIBE
.
REKAlIIU-

NO

YES

(b) IS MEDICAL ANDIOR VOCATIONAL

TA1lON

REHABIUTATION INDICATED?
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REQUIRED, SEE ITEMS 4 AND 5 ON REVERSE.

PIOIBOX
lltdlWl Signature of
AttenOlng Doctor

(Facsimlre Not Accepted)

A
CHIROPRACToR OR PODIATRIST FlUNG THIS REPORT CERTIFIES THAT THE INJURY
nONeS) WHICH MAY LAWFULLY BE TREATED AS DEFINED IN THE EDUCATION LAW
THE rNJUREO PERSON TO CONSULT A PHYSICIAN OF HIS/HER CHOICE.

10

STATE' OF NEW YQRK

ATTENDING DOCTOR'S

WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ai:i5FU,,'I'

33 IN
INJURED

St Fr SqNY

PERSON

Frame Auto Col! ision

1 Denton Ave NHP NY 11040
,~-------+----------~~---------------------+----------------------------------+-----------~
L
EMPLOVER"

L
I

59 N Fr St Hempstead NY1155 +-__________
Ins Fund
-+State
__________________________________
-+__________________________________

INSURANCE
______
CARRIER

~

~

r

E
WI

~~~~~~----------------------------------~----------------------------------~----~----~

10. (a) ANY FACTORS OElJIY1NG RECOVERY?
IF "YES" DESCRIBE

REIWIIU.
TATION

(b) IS MEDICAL AND/OR VOCATIONAL
REHABIUTATION INOICATIED?
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MEDICAL DETERMINATIONS, P.C.

April 29, 1993

state Insurance Fund
Hempstead, NY 11550
Frame Auto Coll., Inc.
Laurie Benzaquen
35878693106(1)
January 28, 1992
April 24, 1993

INSURANCE CO.:

ADDRESS:
INSURED:

CLAIMANT:
CLAIM NUMBER:
DATE OF INJURY:
DATE OF EXAM:

P. Hill

ATTENTION OF:
TYPE OF EXAM:

CHIRO

Dear Sirs:
The above captioned claimant was examined in my office located in Carle
Place, New York on April 24, 1993. A chiropractic evaluation was requested
as a result of her problems associated with a work related incident that
took place on January 28, 1992. Please note that this is a re-evaluation, I
previously examined this claimant on January 30, 1993.
PATXENT'S HISTORY:

Laurie Benzaquen whose·stated date of birth is
, states that she
was driving a car on Northern state Parkway when her vehicle was rear ended.
She was wearing her seat belt at that time and sustained injury to her neck
and back. There were no lacerations or loss of consciousness and she did
not go to an emergency for evaluation of her.injuries following the
incident.
On February 10, 1992 she consulted with Dr. Laceranza, a chiropractor whom
she last saw on April 23, 1993. She also treated with Dr. Miller, an
orthopedist whom she last saw on April 20, 1993. She received conservative
treatment in the form of medication, spinal manipulations including heat,
modalities and ultrasound therapy and had diagnostic testing done.
A report form Dr. ~ceranza ~ated karbh 10, 1993 gave a diagnosis of
sprain/strain of the lumbar/~~i~t p~exion, extension.

.
.......
At the present time· she ·is receiving spinal manipulations 2 to 3 times per
.

~~.

.

week and hotes no change iIll her• .symptoms.. She complains of nervousness,
pain in her neck, back, r!qht· ~.and &bdakional numbness in the right arm.
She also has difficulty b4gain~ a~ i~tt~~9.
•• • • •
•••
••••
• ••

• • •••
••

•••

••
••
••• •
•••
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MEDICAL DETERMINATIONS, P.C.·

laurie Benllaquen Page 2.

At the time of the incident she was employed in a secretarial position on a
full time basis and did not miss work as a result. She is currently working
at a new job at Lilco on a full time basis.
PAST HISTORY:

She denies any other serious illnesses and doesn't take any medication. Her
surgical history includes a c-section in 1978 and a ONe in the 1980's. The
patient states that she was involved in a similar condition in 1985 when her
vehicle was struck from the rear and she sustained a whiplash type injury.
PHYSICAL EXUINA'l'ION:

Height' 4'11' tall; Weight 146 pounds.

OERVICAL SPINE:

The patient does not complain of vertebral tenderness. There is
moderate paravertebral spasm. Motion of the spine in flexion,
extension and lateral bending is full. Rotation was decreased to 70
degrees. Foraminal .COmpression, Valsalva and Soto Hall were
negative.
THORACOLtJJmp SPINE:

The patient complained of minimal vertebral tenderness. There is
moderate paravertebral spasm. Motion of the spine in extension,
rotation, and lateral bending is full. Flexion was decreased to 70
degrees. straight leg raising is full bilat~rally. Goldthwait's
and Valsalva are negative.
1I0TOR SYSTQ:

Muscle strength is normal.in the upper and lower extremities.
Inspection of the muscle groups reveals no atrophy.
REFLEXES:

Knee and ankle reflexes were active and equal.
are negative.
• • ••• • • •
••
• • e.
•• ••
•••
SENSATION:
:.::. :.:: ••
• •••••••••
Sensory findings are normal.
•
••
•••
•• • • • •
••
•
•
•
•
•• • •
••
•
•
•
••
••••
••• •••• ••
••
• ••••

•• • • •
•••
•••••
••
•••
• •• •

Pathologic reflexes
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••
••
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MEDICAL DETERMINAnONS, P.C.

laurie Benzaquen Page 3.
COORDINATION:

Testing, for coordination is normal.
XIIPREISION:

Cervical sprain\strain.
Myositis • .
Lumbar sprain\strain.
CONCLUSION:

There is no evidence of disability based upon these subjective
complaints and my physical findings.
Assuming the history is accurate, the above diagnoses are as a
consequence of the work related injury Ms. Benzaquen was involved in
on January 28, 1992. Although this patient has made progress since
the last examination on January 30, 1993, today's examination
reveals a significant amount of myofascial irritation in the
lumbogluteal region as well as the right shoulder girdle. It is my
opinion, that addres~ing these regions along with the home
stretching program should yield extensive benefits. The patient is
at maximal medical improvement from chiropractic treatment.
I .certify and affirm that the foregoing is true to the best of my
knowledge under the penalties of perjury.

£:amb~

D.C.

Specialty Code: DC

~.

cc: Workman's Compensation Board
cc: Dr. Laceranza
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•

! DATE OF YOUR FIRST
'ARE YOU CONTINUING! IF "YES" w.!1i.N WILt...
."
ONWHICHTHISAEPORT 03/09/93 ITREATMENT08/11/92 ITREATMENT? YES :PATtE"f"~SUN
6WKS
••
IS BASED
I
.AGAINl •• •••
..
••
5. OESCFlIBE TREATMENT RENDefitED AND PLANNEO FUTUFlE TREATMENT. IF PAY lENT WAS HOSPITALIZEC,..eo STATCOAHO GIVE
NAMe AND LOCATION OF HOSPITAL AND OATES OF HOSPITALIZATION.
•
•

4. DATE(S) OF eXAMINATION

M
E

.....

lumbar spine arid followup.

.see medical-hospital report

~

D
I

6. MAY THE INJURY RESUI.T IN PERMANENT
RESTRICTION, TOTAl,. OFI PARTIAL LOSS OF
I=UNCTION OF A PART OR MeMBER, OR PERMA·
NENTFACIAL,HEADOR NECK DISFIGUREMENT?

S

A
B

7. IS PATIENT

\,

WORKING?

r:::I

a

T

~

§]
Yes

f3
NO

. IF "YES" DeSCRIBe

d

•

ee me lcal-hospl.tal report

t.:.-------------- --------------

! IF "YES" ON WHAT DATE{S) DID PATieNT
I RESUME LIMITED \/\ORK OF ANY KIND
RESUME REGULAR WORK

x ~ :DATE:

DATE:

Vi.

IS PATIENT
DISASLED?

~~ I (.NO I

8. WAS THE OCCURRENCE DESCRIBED ABOVE (OR IN YOUR PREVIOUS REPORT WHICH GAVE THIS IN FOR·
MATION) THE COMPETENT PRODUCING CAUSE OF THE INJURY AND DISABIl.ITV (IF ANY) SUSTAINeD?

~

•• ••

I IF "VES" CHECK ONE

I,E"",

I

IIi

I

1~£AFlTIAL DISASI LITY
frOTAL DISA81LITY

~

~

~

~

9. (.) ANY FACTORS DELAYING RECOVERY?
IF "VES" DESCRISE
(b)
IS MEDICAL. ANO/OR VOCATIONAL
ATIO_
FlEHABIL.ITATIDN INDICATeD?
IF "YES" GIVE REFERRAL DETAILS
HAIILI·

10.ENTER HERE ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION, WORK LIMITATIONS, IF ANY, eTc.

~ ~~U-~'S'T fV~ rn r<-r

1-u.mbar ~
I_

ffyourtllSti"",onyshoufd ba necessarv In this case, ple.e
.........IF AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECt'ALSERVICES IS
Indicate the dllYllof tha_k and time of day (AM or PM)
I l .......c:::::.
1\ .tV\
REQUIRED, SEE ITEMS 4 ANP'S ON REVERSE.
~m~os~t~c~o~n~ve~n~i.~n~t~to~VO~u~f~o~r=m~ls~pu~rpo~"=:_________________~I~~~~~_~1lT'~J~
• 1--------~-----------------------~~~~'----------------1
DataCb3/09/93
1R!M)'8'~1."ladM'!'1!e~t~ndit7I1.t.tP~or
Addrass
FRANKLIN SQUA.RE/ NY 11010

*

rl

WCB Flatlna:~e

Written Signature of

Att;ding Ooctor
(F_lmU. Not Accepted)
A CHIROPRACTOR OR PODIATRIST FlUNG THIS REPORT CERTIFIES THAT THE INJURY DESCRIBED CONSISTS SOLEl.V OF A CDNDI,
TION(S) WHICH MAY LAWFULLY Be TREATeD AS DEFINED IN THE EDUCATION LAW AND. WHERE THIS DOES NOT OST'''' '''A
AOVISED THE INJUREO PERSON TO CONSULT A PHVSICIAN OF HIS/HER CHOICE.

3(~

.

-' ..

ATTeNOjN~DOCTOR'S

STATE OF NEW YORK

REPORT '

i-:) WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD

.NHP ,NY.

t

0....0...

10. (a) ANY FACTORS DELAYING RECOVERY?
IF "YES" DeSCRIBE

..

REHABIUTAnON INDICATED?

IF "YES" GIVE REFERRAL DETAILS

*

...

••
•• ••

(b) IS MEDICAL ANDIOR VOCATlONAL

• IF AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECIAL SERVICES IS
REQUIRED. SEE ITEMS 4 AND 5 ON REVERSE.

11010

,

OF

HAS

A

),11...

..

"

.,r,

-

STATE OF NEWVORK

COMPENSATION BOARD

ATJENDIMG DOCTOR'S REPORT
\./

(C~ilC) I)(JINITIAL.II
Wce CASE~O.
Uf Knawn

IPROGRESSII

CHE C K T YPE OF OOCTOR

~aure"1

(Middle Initial)

(First Neme'

~ lorthfi!rn

01/28/92 "

AG9

Benzaquen

INJURED PERSON'S
SOC.
NO.

sec.

St Pkwv Ex 33 W

!EfD"eSM'tVarflllMl; jNt'tl\ St" 'Fr SqNY

~ ~L.&f'9" NO.

{L.ut Name)

1 1 Denton Ave NHP NY 1'1040

Auto ,Co II j's ion

EMI"LOVE,Roi ~rame

IpOD;ATRIST) \;§;HIROPRACT03

EHYSICIAN! (

ADDRESS t':.ERE INJURY.~rCURReD
(CI
Town or Villa

DATE OF INJURY
AND TIME

~15S7SSga'.. i OS
INJURED
,PERSON

I

IFINAL.I

CARFUER CASE NO.
(If KnowrU

INsuRA~ee: ~tate, ,. ns Fund
CARRle"R'

" '1 59

N Fr St Hempstead NY1155

SUPeRVISING
PHYSICIAN
(If an-y)

0

• If treatment was'rendered under the Volunt.eer Firefighters' Benefit Law show as EMPLOYER the liable political subdivision and enter "X" here:
1. HAVE YOU FILED A PREVIOUS REPORT SETTING
~
IF "YES" ENTER DATE
IF "NO" COMPUTE
NO 10F SUCH REPORT:
FOf:lTff A HISTORY OF THE INJURY?
I AY:,ITEMS BELOW.
lAND COMPLETE ITEMS 3·10 BEL.OW.
A; STATE HOW'INJURY OCCURRED AND GIVE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. (IF CL.AIM IS FOR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE, INCL.UDE
OCCUPATIONAL. HISTORY AND DATE OF ONSET OF RELATED SYMPTOMS.)

i

§]

H

.-- ,C<>(nP I ete I y stopped' i

I

~

I ef t

~~ ,mer g i ng

,l.~(»t't'c..V\ D~ hi...., ..lA,(\~,

S

T
0

a .. ,WAS PATIENT PFlEVI~.sL.Y UN"ER
THE CARE OF ANOTHER DOCTOR
FOR THIS INJURY?

R

Y

§1
§]
YES
NO

t raf fie

~

AA,\..A.A.

~

yY\jL.>

,~f\t~h'\~Q ~ 20

I 1~J6IYES" ENTER HIS/HER NAMA~ND
I A
RESS. AND'REASON FOR TRA
PER
I IN ITEM 1~

8

§l

IC' WERE X·RAYS
TAKEN?

2. IF THERE IS ANY HISTORY OR EVIPENCIi OF PRe-eXISTING INJURY, DiseASE 01'1 PHYSICAL. IMPAIRMENT, DeSCRIBE SPECIFICAL.LY:

,

3.

I

... " Spra.in, St.ra 1n Lumb.a"r \ Ce r'v i ea I F,lex Ext
{.~

4.

T
R

E

s.

A

T

DESCRIBE NATURE AND EXTENT OF KNOWN OR REPOATED INJURY Oft DISEASE WHEN EXAMINED, AND IF APPL.ICABL.E. ANY
CHANGE OF CONDITION s'tNce L~T REPORT.
'

M

DA.iE(S) OF EXAMINATION'~'-L~

':.I_.{..

In~vr1
.....

o

to

,!!tV"!,!,,,?

SPINAL 'MANIPULATION

E

.1

in-=>

v

'--

>?FE YOU CONTINUING: IF "YES'! WHEN WILL
~
SEEN I\-QAJI,
~,\~~'fr THI~.:~EPO,~T ~ I"TREA.T.~~~ ~
~qZ,;
. "
, c 'IPATlE~eo
AGAIN
'.. ''1l''''-rv
DESCRI8E TREATMENT RENDERED, AND Pl.ANNED FUTURE TREATMENT. IF PATieNT ~ HOSPITAL.IZED. so STATE AND GIve
NAME AND L.OCATION. OF HOSPITAL. AND OATES of HOSPITALIZATION.
I DATE OF YOUR FIRST

\.M:
'

' ,

N

..

T

0, 6. MAV THE,INJUR,Y'RESULT IN PERMANENT
RESTRICTION, TOTAL OR PARTIAL LOSS OF
I

S

~

§l

t=-UNCTION OF A PART OR MEMBER. OR PERMA·
NeNT FACIAL. HEAD OR NECK OISFIGUAEME~T?
7. IS PATIENT
l.!.F "YES" ON WHAT DATE(S) DID PATIENT
IS PATIENT
WORKING?
....,.------------- --------------.
~
~ 1,~UMa UMITEO WIORK OF />NY KIND,
RESUME REGl!L.AR,WORK
'
'NO
'
NO
DATE:

Ii
8
I

L
I

V

--

'II

A~

i

WAS THE OCCURRENCE DESCRIBED ABOVE (OR IN YOUR PREVIOUS REPORT WHICH GAVE THIS INFORMATION) THE COMPETEN"( PRODUCING CAUSE OF THE INJUFtY AND DISABILITY (IF ANY) SUSTAINED?

9. (a) ANY FACTORS DEL.AYING RECOVERY?

IAIILI.

Ino.

IF "YES" OESCFIIBE
(b) IS MEDICAL AND/OR VOCATIONAL
REHABIL.ITATIDN INDICATED?
IF "YES" GIVE REFEf:lRAL. DETAILS

§] r§]"

DC,

"

Or Joseph, Laeerenza
WC8 Authorization NO'~ Telephone No.

DISA81LITYj

.

-iOTI-L DISABtL.IT....•

I

- -.

~1:.EJ
:
NO

.•

••••

e'

:.

'j.

most convenient to you for this purpose:
Typed or ~rlntec\ Name of Attending Doctor
Oned":> :~.'1 L.,

WCB Retlng Code

l ~AATrAL.

-.

'f your testlmonv .hou!d. be; n~rv In this " ... p l _
indlcat41 the days of the wMk and time of dav (AM or PM)

I

IF~iYt"_l:HeC~..QNE

••••••
• •

••••••
•
••••••
••••••

- -•

• ••

10.ENTEFI HERE ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION, WORK LIMITATIONS, IF ANY. ETC.

""~

I

•

~ ~

.

• •••••

rjifrl : I -..-.

1000e:

T

t
*"

IF "VES" DESCRIBE

•

IF AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECIAL SERVICES IS
RECiul REO., SEE ITEMS 4 AND 6 ON REVERSE.,

Aadr...

P.,O.BOX 224 F r a:n. kin, Sq tN. Y • 11010
Wrlttan Signature of

,

C020 14.',: 1:t 16 ) 775 - 5151

At;'din. Oo~tor

, fF_lmlle Not Accapted)

Th. // ~
•

A CHIROPRACTOR OR PODIATRI$T'FILINGTHIS REPORTCERTIFIESTHAT':rHE INJURY DESC.~~r~~LY OF AC'
TION(::;) .wHICH,MAY LAWFULLY BE TREATED AS DEFINED IN THE,EOUCATION L.AW AND. WHER
HIS 0
OT OBTAIN
ADVISED THE INJURED PERSON TO CONSUL.
T A PHYSJCIAN OF HIS/HER
CHOICe.
'
• ____ ".E" ___ ......_ ..
....
......... *.........
_ _ ..........
~_

~_

CII~.

~/7

STATE OF NEW YORK

An:ENDl~a-"DOCTOR'S REPORT.

(C~~)

:

I

.......

WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD

~

INITIAL

..

CHeCK TYPe OF DOCTOR:

IN PROGRESS I I I RNAL I

I I PHYSICIAN I '-1-..-----,

P~~~~~~~~~r=~~~-.--~~~~~~~==;=~~~~~
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S~.Hempstead.NY1.t55.
Ins Fun<t.
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• IF AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECIAL SERVICES IS'
REQUIRED. SEE ITEMS 4 AND 5 ON REVERSE.

•

or
I'

.

..•••••
•

Sl'ATE OF NEW VORK

...

ATTENDING-DOCTOR'S
~

WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
DI::I''''C'T

• •• .
...
••••

10. (a) ANY FACTORS DELAYING RECOVeRY?
IF "YES" DESCRIBE

~

.•
•• •
....
• ••

(b) IS MEDICAL AND/OR VOCATIONAL
REHABILITATION INDICATED?
IF "YES" GIVE REFERRAL DErAILS

..

• ••••
• ••••

.

11.

* IF AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECIAL SERVices IS
REQUIRED. see ITEMS 4 AND 5 ON REVERSE.

*

01.0:

PODIATRIST

FILING

THIS

LAWFULLY se TREATED AS
TO CONSULT A PHYSICIAN OF HIS/HER

,

OF /
HAS

311

.
STATE OF NEW YORK
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD

ATTENDING DOCTOR'S

.. , .

C F',rtE
"'.

CHECK TYPE OF DOCTOR:

P ~~:l~~~~~~~~~~1~12F~I~~~;IL:~~~__.-____~==~I~~PH§.Y~S~~I~~LI£I-;~'2-ro~~D-IA~~~I~S~T~LI~~~~~~
INJURED PERSON'S
~~__~~~~__4-____~~~____~____~~~~__~__________~~~~~~________~____~SOC~.S~E~C~.N~O~;____~

A
S

~~~;t]ffi~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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y~------~------------------------------~--~----------------------------------+-----------~
~
.Auto CQI.I ls.ion..
Oe.nton Av.e NHP NY 110'40
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I

~

______

~

__________________________________

~

__________

~

__________________

~~+-

__________

~
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E
M

s~~~~~--------------------------------~--------------------------------~----------~

.
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ANY

• ••••
• •
•• •
•• •• •

.

Extln

••
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••••••

.•.......
. •
•

10. (a) ANY FACTORS DELAYING RECOVERY?
IF "YES" DESCRISE

_u.

(b) IS MEDICAL ANDIOR VOCATIONAL
REHABILflA110N INDICATED?
IF "YES" GIVE REFERRAL DETAILS

TAllON

*

.. IF AUTHORIZA11ON FOR SPECIAL SERVICES IS
REQUIRED, SEE ITEMS 4 AND 5 ON REVERSE.

10

A

CHIROPRACTOR

OR

nONeS) WHICH MAY
THE fNJURED PERSON TO

FILING THIS REPORT CER11F1ES THAT THE INJURY
BE TREATED AS DEFINED IN THE EDUCATION LAW
A PHYSICIAN OF HIS/HER CHOICE.

A!TENDING DOCTOR'S

STATE OF NQ.,XQAK
WORKERS' COMPENSiti"tC>N BOARD
0.:.3/''':I'r'

p~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~rur__-r~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~D~~ffi~!~~~~~~~~~~
~~--~~~--~--~~~L----4~--~~~.-~~~~--~~~~~~~~-,--~--~~~~~--~
A

s

~~~~~~~~~~~~~Mr~~~~~~fri.~~~~~~~~~~:
~~-------r--------------------~~~----~--~--~----~----------~------------+-----------~

E

t~--~--~----------------------------------~--------~------------------------+-----------~
L
Ins :Fund "'.
",.
F.t\$t.~.Hemp5t:ead."NY'1155<

+~======~---------------------------------+---------------------------------+----------~
E
M

sr-~--~~------------------------------------~----------------------------------~------------~

10. (8) ANY FACTORS DELAYING AECOVERY?
IF "YES" OESCRIBE
_IL~

(b) IS MEDICAL AND/OR VOCATIONAL
REHABILITATION INDICATED?
IF "YES" GIVE REFERRAL DETAILS

TATION

Dj£]'··
YES,

;. ;"

NO.

11 .

*

* IF AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECIAL SERVICES IS
REQUIRED, SEE ITEMS 4 ANO 5 ON REVERSE.
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'YC
~
ILl /

STATE OF NEW YORK

WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD

CHECK TYPE OF OOCTOO:

EMPLOYER'

71 Denton Ave NHP NY 1t040

Frame Auto Col I i~ion

~~--------r-------------------------------------~-------------------------------------+------------~
IN5~~~E State'l ns Fund
159 N Fr St HeJT1pstead NY1155

I.
TI
E

~--------r-------------------------------------~-------------------------------------+------------~
SUPERVISING
PHYSICIAN
(If any)

M

S~~--~--L-------------------------------------~------------------------------------~------------~
, If treatment was rendered under the VFBL Of VAWBL shOW as EMPLOYER the liable political subdivision and enter "X" here; 0

0

\.q

'"W l.f Z

I IF "YES" eNTeR DATE
~
I
IF "NO" COMPLETe
I OF SUCH RepORT:
"" ITeMS BELOW.
YES
NO
I AND COMPLETe ITEMS 3-11 BELOW.
I
.....
A. STATe HOW INJURY OCCURRED AND GIVE SOURce OF THIS INFORMATION. (IF CLAIM IS FOR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE, INCLUDE OCCUPATIONAL HISTORY AND
DATE OF ONSET OF RELATED SYMPTOMS.)

rv1

1. HAVE YOU FILED A PRevIOUS REPORT SETllNG
FORTH A HISTORY OF THE INJURY?

H
I
S
T

o

R

Y

D
I

A

~

Completely stopped in left lane,Merging traf.f io'
S. WAS PA"ENT PREVIOUS1.Y UNDER

I IF "YES" eNTER HISIHER NAME AND
IC' WERE X·AAYS
.
I ADDRESS, AND REASON FOR TRANSFER
TAKEN?
-:-;;
liN ITEM 11.
rES
NO
I
2. IF THERE IS ANY HISTORY OR EVIDENCE OF PRE·EXIS11NG INJURY, DISEASE OR PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT, DESCRISE SPECIFICALLY: ....

THE CARE OF ANOTHER DOCTOR
FOR THIS INJURY?

.

O [:J

•

N

g
A
T

M

e

••

•

Sprain Strain Lumbar\Cervioal Flex Ext In

SI
:

'liES

NO

..,. ..

""

.
....
\

3. DESCRIBE NATURE AND EXTENT OF KNOWN OR REPORTED iNJURY OR DISEASE WHEN EXAMINED. AND If APPLICABLE. ANY CHANG,i.pF GONDITION SINCE.
LAST REPORT.
....
... ,,~ ..

G

T

......
.

[J .. ~
.....

g~wr~~THISREPORT.

.. :

....

•

'-l-! ""'"

,..

I ARE YOU CONTINUIN6 "~_·YES" ~~_~LL

I DATE OF YOUR FIRST

~

M"

•• •

•••••

.....

4. DATelS} OF EXAMINATION

..

:TREA~'f10/92 : TREATMENT? ye;e"'f~~I~~t~!b~2
5. DESCRIBE TREATMENT RENDERED AND PLANNED FUTURE TREATMENT. IF PATIENT WAS HOSPITAUZED. so STATE AND GIVE NAME AND t«ATION OF
HOSPITAL AND DATES OF HOSPITALIZATION.

SPINAL MANIPULATION

N

T

n ny
L.ni'

9. WAS TltE OCCURRENCE DESCRIBED ABOVE (OR IN YOUR PREVIOUS REPORT WHICH GAVE THIS INFORMATION) THE COMPETENT
PRODUCING CAUSE OF THE INJURY AND DISABILITY (IF ANY) SUSTAINED?
10. (a) ANY FACTORS DELAYING RECOVERY?
IF "YES" DESCRIBE

Dc:]
YES

(b) IS MEDICAL ANDIOR VOCATIONAL
REHABILITATION INDICATED?
IF "YES" GIVE ReFERRAL OETAlI..S

NO

D~
YES
NO

11. ENTER HERE ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMA"ON, WORK LIMITATIONS. IF ANY. ETC.

*

If your testimony should be

necessary in this case, please

* IF AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECIAL SERVICES IS
JI REQUIRED,
SEE ITEMS 4 AND 5 ON REVERSE.

Indicate the days of the week and time of day (AM or PM)
most convenient to you for thisJ)!,lr()O$&:
Dated

01122/92
weB Rating Code
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Typed or Printed Name of Attending Doctor

Address

P.O.BOX
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WCB Authorization No.
C02014-1
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.
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~icre of

1(516)115-5151 ~ Not%cepted)
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CHIROPRACTOR OR PODIATRIST FILING TliIS REPORT CERTIFIES THAT THE INJURY
nONeS) WHICH MAY LAWFUI-LY BE TREATED AS DEFINED IN THE EDUCATION LAW
THE INJUREO PERSON TO CONSULT A PHYSICIAN OF H!SIHER CHOICE.
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD

ArreNDING DOCTOR'S REPORT.
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10. (a) ANY FACTORS DELAYING
IF "YES" DESCRIBE
AEliA81'~

(b) IS MEDICAL AND/OR VOCATIONAL
REHABIUTATION INDICATED?
IF "YES" GIVE REFERAAL DETAILS

TAllON

'1.

*

ReCOVERY?

.. ,

D~
YES
NO
_ ETC.

* IF AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECIAL SERVICES IS
REOUIRED, seE ITEMS 4 AND 5 ON REVERSE.
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'HONE CALLS
Culm v.

Merc~

)ate

4/13/2009
4/13/2009
4/07/2009
4/07/2009
4/02/2009
4/0212009
3/30/2009
3/19/2009
3/19/2009
2/24/2009
1/07/2009
1/07/2009
1/06/2009
1/0212009
12118/2008
12118/2008
12118/2008
12/15/2008
1211512008
12/10/2008
12/09/2008
12/09/2008
11/12/2008
11/1212008
10/27/2008
10/15/2008
10/15/2008
10/15/2008
10102/2008
9/2612008
9/25/2008
9/25/2008
9/11/2008
9/05/2008
8/20/2008
7/21/2008
7/02/2008
6/27/2008
6/26/2008
6/18/2008
5/29/2008
5/2212008
5/15/2008
5/14/2008
5/12/2008

7/23/2009

Medical Center

To

.Er.2m

Laurel Kulm
ACM
Kate Beaudreau
ACM
ACM
COW
COW
COW
ACM
KKO
Laurel Kulm
COW
Laurel Kulm
Mary Barros
Laurel Kulm
Laurel Kulm
Kate Beaudreau
Laurel Kulm
COW
SNP
SNP
COW
Laurel Kulm
COW
Laurel Kulm
COW
ACM
Mary Barros
ACM
ACM
ACM
COW
COW
COW
COW
COW
ACM
Laurel Kulm
COW
Richard Radnovich
COW
COW
ACM
COW
ACM

ACM
Kate Beaudreau
ACM
Laurel Kulm
Laurel Kulm
Laurel Kulm
Laurel Kulm
Laurel Kulm
Kate Beaudreau
Laurel Kulm
ACM
Laurel Kulm
COW
COW
ACM
COW
ACM
COW
Laurel Kulm
Laurel Kulm
Laurel Kulm
Laurel Kulm
COW
Laurel Kulm
COW
Laurel Kulm
Mary Barros
ACM
Kate Beaudreau
Kate Beaudreau
Laurel Kulm
Laurel Kulm
Laurel Kulm
Kate Beaudreau
Laurel Kulm
Laurel Kulm
Laurel Kulm
ACM
Richard Radnovich
COW
Richard Radnovich
Laurel Kulm
Laurel Kulm
Richard Radnovich
Laurel Kulm

1

)HONE CALLS
<ulm v.

Merc~

7/23/2009

Medical Center

2!!t!

I2

From

5/09/2008
5/09/2008
5/09/2008
211812008
2115/2008
2114/2008
2114/2008
2108/2008
2/04/2008
1/31/2008
1/15/2008
1/04/2008
1/04/2008
1/04/2008
1/02/2008
12127/2007
12127/2007
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October 10, 2008

Mr. Andrew March

Attorney at Law_
Seiniger Law Offices
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

RE:

KULM, Laurel
DISABILITY EVALUAnON

TheMI07 report from Dr. Radnovichwas forwarded for detennination if the medicat
opinions expressed in that report impacted the disability opinion provided in the 8122108
report. Specifically, Dr. Radnovich diagnosed lumbar spondylosis with right-sided L3-L4
disc protrusion and lumbar and radicular pain secondary to this diagnosis. The
physician's ultimate rating was 12% of the whole person. He also noted the following
restrictions:
.
Prolonged, uninterrupted (greater than 30% of the workday) standing. No
repetitive (greater than 30% of the workday) bending, twisting, or stooping. No
exposure to low frequency vibration (as would be found in operating heavy
machinery). No lifting greater than 50 Ibs. occasional lift (less than 30% of the
workday) greater than 30 Ibs. okay, however... No lifting from a bent position
with outstretched arms (as wouJd happen with lifting over something or pulling a
patientupin bed). No lift and earry greater than 20 Ibs.

Discussion and Opinions
Based on Dr. Radnovich's limitations that include lifting and carrying to within the light
level of exertion, Laurel's labor market potential diminishes in the jobs that require not
only static lifting, but static lifting and carrying tathe level of light/medium. Considering
Dr. Radnovich's limitations, Laurel's disability would be 22%, inclusive of impairment.
Thank you for the opportunity of reviewing additional records on the case of Ms. Kulm.
The opinions expressed in this report are based on the information available at the time
of its writing. Should additional information become available, I would be happy to
review and provide a supplemental report should my opinions be affected. Please feel
free to corrtact me with
have.
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RE: KULM. Laurel
October 10, 2008
Page 2

Sincerely,

American Board of Vocational Experts-Diplomate
Certified Disability Management Specialist
certified Life Care Planner
certified Rehabilitation Counselor
Forensic Vocational Expert-Registered
National Counselor Certificate
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August 22, 2008

Mr. Breck Seiniger
Attorney at law
Seiniger law Offices
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
RE:

KULM, laurel

DISABIUTY EVALUATION
The case of Ms. Laurel Kulm was referred by her attorney. Mr. Breck Seiniger, to
perform a disability evaluation. I rnet with Ms. Kulm at my office on 02108108. The
purpose of the evaluation was explained to her, as were the limits of confidentiality. No
client-counselor relationship was developed, nor was one solicited. The release and
professional disclosure forms were reviewed and signed.
The records received and reviewed for this evaluation include:
•
•
•
•
•
•

1113/06 - 2121/07. Saltzer Medical Group
212107 - 3/2107, Advanced Open Imaging
2126107 - 511/07, Dr. Greenwald
415107, Intermountain Medical Imaging
6nl07 -7n/07, Dr. Radnovich
812107 - 1117/07, Dr. Rogers

Social History
Ms. Kulm was born on
in New York City. She has also lived in New Mexico,
Nevada, Wyoming, and Idaho. Her father was a lumberman and 'sharpened knives, and
her mother worked for some years with the U.S. Postal Service as a sorter and then as
a sales manager in department stores, but stopped working due to anxiety attacks. One
of laurel's sisters is a nurse educator at a university, but laurel does not keep up with
her oldest sister.
The claimant is divorced and has a 31-year-old son who WOrks as a heating and air
conditioning technician and as a massage therapist, and a daughter who is a
hairdresser in New York.

IIC'D AUG 2 G 2008
BilingualRehltblll/aflonOounaelor,
VocationIII Expert &Ufe Cal8 Planner

'P.O. Box 7511. 6oIse.ldaho83707-1511

PH..........•...208.229.8484
FX...........•. .208.279.6830

barfosmOctcweb·net

I

1
VOflATIONAi "RFRVIC'.FR

l

RE: KULM, Laurel
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11nlO7 Dr. Rogers: Assigned a 5% impairment. A 50# lifting restriction is a reasonable
work restriction for her.
Ms. Kulm treats with Dr. Mayes, a chiropractor. In November and December 2007, she
started treating with Dr. Rogers with the Spine Institute. She has also treated with
Dr. Terry, Dr. Greenwald, and Dr. Radnovich.
Ms. Kulm takes a long list of prescribed and herbal medications. These include
Levothyroxine, .125 mg tablet daily, Metoprolol Succinate ER, 50 mg per day, Three-InOne drink formula, 81 mg aspirin, food enzyme, coral calcium, potassium citrate,
calcium citrate, Min-Col Dietary Supplement, flax seed oil, red rice yeast, KBCs, pau
d'arco, Propancreas, calcium gluconate, and energy food. The herbal supplements are
prescribed by Mountain Family Wenness Clinic.
Laurel went to therapy at Mercy North, ending in 01/08. This included full therapy,
which she believed helped her condition. She has no formal home treatment program
aside from continuing to do the exercises that were provided to her.
Pre-existing the most recent industrial injury, the claimant indicates that she had a
meniscus tear and underwent repair on 09121/06, but this resulted in no limitations.
Subjectively, Laurel indicates no limitations with forward reaching, balancing, gripping,
handling, fingering, talking, hearing, vision, tasting, or smelling. She indicates, however,
the following limitations:
•
•
•
•

Standing
Walking
Sitting
Lifting/carrying

•

Pushing/pulling

•

Bending/stooping

•
•

Twistingltuming
Reaching overhead

•

Squatting/crouching

Twenty to thirty minutes.
One to two minutes.
Every 30 minutes.
Fifty pounds, although she could only lift 25-30
pounds over short distances and has to drag a
40-pound bag of dog food.
She has difficulty pulling heavy weights, such
as helping people get in and out of bed
(St Luke's has two technicians at a time for
support these kind of activities).
Can do this activity but not for prolonged
periods.
Gets sore after twisting for awhile.
Needs to use step stools and ladders due to
her short stature to bring things closer to her.
Difficult due to her knees and back.
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•

Climbing/balancing

•
•
•

Kneeling/crawling
Controls
Sleeping

•

Driving

Is slow in the use of ladders and needs to take
one step at a time since this will pull on her
back and make her feel like she is losing her
balance.
Is slow in these activities.
Does not operate a stick shift.
Goes to bed at night at 9:00 p.m. and awakens
at 7:00 a.m. and has fragmented sleep
(believes this is due to effects of menopause).
although she uses a CPAP.
Can drive an automatic transmission for 3-4
hours at a time but needs to get out and walk.

Education
Laurel graduated from John Bawne High School in Fleshing, New York, in 1970. In
1971, she completed the Berkeley Claremont Secretarial School. In 1990, she
completed a certificate program from Delphi University.
Due to her registry as a polysomnographer, she has had ongoing continuing education
units she has eamed through difference conferences. As a polysomnographer. she
possesses the registered RPSGT designation at the national level and a license to
practice in the State of Idaho.

Vocational and Avocational Histories
After graduating from high school but before entering into the field of polysomnography,
Laurel worked as a staff clerk with Long Island Lighting and held a variety of secretarial
and paralegal jobs. The paralegal jobs were over a four-year period in general practice
law, mostly dealing with custody issues and family practice.
In 01194, she started working with University of New Mexico as a transcriptionist in the
Sleep Department. This introduced her to the field of sleep science where she started
training on the job in sleep technology.
By 12194, she had acquired a second job in the field and was earning between $7.50
and $8.25 per hour between both employers.

By 10197, she relocated to the Reno area where she started working as a
polysomnographic technician with Washoe Sleep Disorder Center. She was on site
with this facility through 10/05. However, she continues to do scoring for this center on
a contract basis with her earnings received on a 1099. Simultaneous with this job, she
worked with Mount Medical Sleep Disorder Center in Carson City from 2001 through
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2003. With the second employer, she was under the tutelage of Dr. Zimmennan who
was the Medical Director for the Washoe Sleep Disorder Center.
In 10/03 she relocated to Cheyenne, Wyoming, where she resided through 06105 when
she moved to the Treasure Valley. While in Cheyenne, she continued to work on a
contract basis, doing scoring of sleep analysis studies.
Upon relocating to the Treasure Valley, laurel started working with Mercy Medical
Center in 06105 and was employed with them through 05/07. She was the lead
technician and the clinical director. Throughout this whole time she continued to do
scoring on a very part-time basis.
Beginning in 01/07/08, Ms. Kulm started working with St luke's. Although she has
been in the sleep technology field for over a dozen years, she is still considered a
potysomnographer in training. This is a part-time position of twenty hours/week. She
also continues to do about twenty hours/week of scoring with fonner employers in other
states. laurel indicates that she seeks a full-time position since she has always worked
two jobs, one full time and the other part time. At St. luke's, she has the capacity to be
in an accommodated position because the hospital has two technicians on at a time
who could assist with lifting and pulling activities from which she is precluded.
laurel describes herself as a "can-do· lead technician who seeks to enter into
management or supervisory roles within the polysomnography or sleep science field.
Avocationally, Ms. Kulm states that she "can't keep up with the grandkids." Thus, since
she has always been very active, this tends to get her down and make her feel like she
is limited and cannot live her life fully. She has difficulty going up and down stairs and
doing such activities as scooping up after her dogs, making her bed, or cleaning her
eaves.

Transferable and Cross-Functional Sldlls
Skills are transferable when skilled or semiskilled work activities done in past work can
be used to meet the requirements of either skilled or semiskilled work activities. Skills
are only transferable if the individual has not been precluded from activities allowing
himlher to utilize these and other work activities of the same or lesser degree of skill,
the same or similar tools or machines are used, and the same or similar raw materials,
products, processes, or services are involved. The O*NET describes "cross-functional
skills," as those that can be used across different classes of jobs.
Ms. Kulm retains the ability to understand the policies and principles of
polysomnographic technology and of sleep science; she can score sleep studies; apply
electrodes to surface areas that do not require the movement of large and heavy limbs
(e.g., head); to monitor diagnostic machines; to operate a close circuit television to
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observe patients undergoing sleep studies; to operate polysomnographic equipment to
record electrical activity and other information; to monitor patient's vital signs; to enter
and retrieve information from a computer; to do research; to write reports; to
communicate with patients and other staff orally and in writing.

Vocational Exploration
The position of polysomnographic technician is classified as Medium exertional work by
the US Department of Labor. However, both the Dictionary of Occupational TItles
(1991) and the O*NET indicate that their data is highly aggregated and may not reflect
how a job is carried out within a specific region or location. Therefore, all sleep centers
that could be located within the Treasure Valley were contacted and asked the following
research questions:
1) Do you hire polysomnographic techs/sleep techs?
2) If so, at what level (e.g., technician, lead technician, management, scorer)?
3) What would be the pay for each level mentioned?
4) If someone has a 50# lifting restriction, would they be able to do this work (at
any level)?
5) How about if they had the lifting restriction and experience (over 10 years)?
6) If they can't do the work of a technician or lead technician with a lifting
restriction and they have experience, what other kinds of jobs do they have in
their facility they might be able to do?

Employer
St
Alphonsus
Sleep
Disorders

Contact

Number

Judy

367.2008

Data
8/18

o

Results
1) Hire? Yes.
2) Level? Prefer to hire respiratory therapists
(RT) as techs, aJllevels. Have 13 techs and 12
beds.
3) Pay? Starts $121hr. If RT, the rate can be
higher. Each level is different and they have
them all.
4) Restriction? Yes - Sometimes they have
clients, so techs would have to lift but could
have help from others.
5) Restriction and experience? Yes.
6) Other jobs? None. St AI's is on a hiring
freeze.

RE: KULM. Laurel
August 22, 2008
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Idaho Sleep
Disorder
Center

Bev

Sleep
Evaluation
Labs

Stacy

706.5380

8/18

.

342.7700

8/18

1) Hire? Yes.
2) Level? Registered, non-registered, trainee.
3) Pay? $15-$20Ihrto start. Pay after that just
depends on a variety of factors.
4) Restriction? Someone could help.
5) Restriction and experience? Yes, but
advancement goes by seniority not so much
experience/
6) Other jobs? Scoring; these are seniority
positions
1) Hire? Yes.
2) level? All levels. Must be a registered
technician or trainee.
3) Pay? Depending on experience, $20Ihour.
4) Restriction? No problem. Help patients get
up once in awhile; always others to heJp you.
5) Restriction and experience? Yes.
6) Other jobs? No.
www.sleepevaluationlabs.com

Off of website under iobs:
We are seeking compaSSionate, hard-working,
self-directed employees to work as : RPSGT,
Registered Polysomnography
Technologists/Technicianffrainee
Must be profiCient with computers and work well
independently. Duties include data acquisition,
analysis and documentation as well as,
explaining procedures and applying monitoring
systems on patients. Previous sleep study
experience desired but not
mandatory. Assistance will be provided to get
employee compliant with all certifications
required by The Idaho State Board of
Medicine. This is a long term career opportunity
with an established sleep lab. Pay DOE FT
8pm-7am Email Resumes to
mail@kimvorsemd.com or fax 1-208-725-0028.
Please indicate which location applying for.
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Western
Sleep
Disorders
Center

Shawn

455.2400

8/18

1) Hire? Yes.
2) Level? Respiratory therapists. After so
many hours, a trainee can do night duties. then
all duties. Thereafter, someone gets licensed.
3) Pay? Depends on the person.
4) Restriction? Possibly. We would have to
meet her and talk with her. We have some pretty
large patients that sometimes need help.
S} Restriction and experience? Yes and
experience helps.
6) Other jobs? Scoring.

West Valley
Medical
Center

Marissa

459.4641

8/18 .

1} Hire? Yes.
2) Level? All levels :technician 11/111 and sleep
lab coordinator.
3) Pay? Only the director of HR maintains the
pay information.
4} Restriction? No problem. If lifting someone,
there is some help. Job description says "up to
50#."
5) Restriction and experience? Yes.
6) Other jobs? Did not know.

Discussion and Opinions
The case of Ms. Laurel Kulm was referred with a request that a disability evaluation be
perfonned. Laurel presents as a 56-year-old single mother of two who has worked the
majority of her recent worklife as a polysomnographic technician and continues to
perfonn this work full time through two part-time positions.
She has been provided with a 50# work restriction by Dr. Rogers, which is the only
restriction available after Laurel's underwent her surgery. This restriction is consistent
with how the occupational is classified by the US Department of Labor with respect to
exertion standards. Therefore, it was necessary to contact all the employers in the local
metropolitan statistical area for a better analysis of whether that restriction will impact
her access to the labor market. Most employers indicated that this could be
accommodated through the use of others in the workplace and one employer thought it
might be a problem. To move to lighter jobs, it appears that most sleep laboratories
consider seniority over experience.
Laurel has moved around the Western United States considerably within the last
several years. Therefore, a broader review of the labor market was conducted where
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245 polysomnographic positions were located nationwide. Very few of these positions
listed lifting restrictions, except for one with Primary Children's Hospital in Salt Lake City
that indicated occasional lifting >50#. Therefore, although it appears that there has
been some impact on Laurel's access to the labor market, this is considered to be less
than 20% as suggested by contacts to local employers. The limitations combined with
age may be her greatest barrier to placeability in more competitive markets. Pay rates
for local polysomnographic technicians range from $12 to $20. Consequently, Ms.
Laurel should not sustain a loss of pay rate as a result of the injury. In short, the nonmedical factors that contribute to Laurel's disability include a slight erosion of the labor
market and her age (although this is not considered to be significant). It is this
evaluator's opinion that Laurel has sustained a 7% to 10% disability, inclusive of
impairment.
Thank you for the opportunity of evaluating Ms. Kulm. The opinions expressed in this
report are based on the information available at the time of its writing. Should additional
information become available, I would be happy to review and provide a supplemental
report should my opinions be affected. Please feel free to contact me with any
questions you may have.
Sincerely,

, CLCP, Nee, DIABVE
American Board of Vocational Experts-Diplomate
Certified Disability Management Specialist
Certified Ufe Care Planner
Certified Rehabl7itation Counselor
Forensic Vocational Expert-Registered
National Counselor Certificate
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LAVV OFFICES
Professional Association
WM. BRECK SEINIGER, JR.
Idaho, Oregon, Washington, and the District of Columbia
JULIE MARsH SEINIGER
Idaho, Indiana, and the District of Columbia

ANDREW C. MARsH
Idaho, Indiana, and Missouri

September 18,2008
VIA FAX TO (208) 388-8734

Kate Beaudreau
Industrial Claims Management
1150 W. State Street, Ste 330
Boise, ID 83702
RE:

Claimant:
Employer:
Date of Injury:
Surety Case No.:

LaurelKulm
Mercy Medical Center
11102/2006
06-54899

Dear Ms. Beaudreau:
Attached please find a copy of a vocational evaluation report dated 8/22/08 prepared by
Dr. Mary Barros-Bailey for Laurel, in which she makes a conclusion of a permanent
partial disability of 7% to 10%.
Please make arrangements to begin paying PPD benefits as provided by work comp law.
Please contact me if you have any questions. Thank you for your kind attention.
Sincerely,

~A(~ Andrew Marsh
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
Enclosures: As Stated
cc: Laurel Kulm

942 W. MYR1LE STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702

(208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700

Andrew@SeinigerLaw.com
www.SeinigerLaw.com

SEliNliGE1R
LAVV OFF I CES
Professional Association
ilNDREW C. MARsH

WM. BRECKSEINIGER,JR.
Idaho, Oregon, Washington, and the District of Columbia

Idaho, Indiana, and Missouri

JULIE MARSH SEINIGER
Idaho, Indiana, and the District of Columbia

September 28,2008
VIA FAX TO (208) 388-8734
Kate Beaudreau
Industrial Claims Management
1150 W. State Street, Ste 330
Boise, ID 83702

RE:

Claimant:
Employer:
Date of Injury:
Surety Case No.:

Laurel Kulm
Mercy Medical Center
11102/2006
06-54899

Dear Ms. Beaudreau:
Thank you for your call Friday. You acknowledged that you received a vocational
evaluation report dated 8/22/08 prepared by Dr. Mary Barros-Bailey, but you stated that
the surety does not intend to begin paying PPD benefits pending receipt of a lump sum
settlement offer from claimant.
Although it is true that my client intends to make an offer ofLSS, I wanted to clarify that
it is our position that Idaho work comp law requires the surety to begin timely payment of
PPD benefits, or any undisputed portion thereof, even while negotiations are pending.
Please make arrangements accordingly.
Please contact me if you have any questions. Thank you for your kind attention.
Sincerely,

~~~ ..
Andrew Marsh
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

942 W. MYR1LE STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702

(208) 345-1000
(208) 345-4700

Fax:

Andrew@SeinigerLaw.com
www.SeinigerLaw.com
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OFt~AH:§
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:z.:

LAUREL KULM,
Claimant,
I.C. No. 06-012770

mD -. U

vs.
MERCY MEDICAL CENTER,
Employer,
and

STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT,
RELEASE AND LUMP SUM
SETTLEMENT, AND ORDER OF
APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE

INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY
OF NORTH AMERICA,
Surety,
Defendants.

In consideration of the premises and promises and covenants hereinafter
set forth and subject to the Commission's approval and Order of Discharge
pursuant thereto, the above-entitled par~o stipulate and agree as follows.
On or about November 2, 2006, Laurel Kulm, hereinafter referred to as
Claimant, suffered an industrial accident arising out of and in the course of her
employment with Mercy Medical Center, hereinafter referred to as Employer.
On the date of the accident, the Employer had assured its liability under the
Worker's Compensation Laws of the State of Idaho with Indemnity Insurance
Company of North America, hereinafter referred to as Surety. The Employer,
Surety and the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho received adequate and
timely notice of the accident and injury.
_ . .- - _
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At the time of said accident, Claimant was 54 years of age, single, and had
no children under the age of 18. Claimant worked various hours per week and
earned $22.60 per hour. Claimant incurred no time loss as a result of the injury.
In the accident of November 2, 2006, Claimant was walking when she slipped
and fell, injuring her lower/mid back, neck, and both knees.
Claimant's prior medical history is significant for hypertension,
hypothyroidism, type II diabetes, sleep apnea, neck and lower back injuries, and
bilateral meniscal tears and repairs in the summer of 2006.
On November 3, 2006, Claimant presented to Saltzer Medical Group
complaining of pain after falling. Claimant advised that while she had fallen onto
her knees, she had hit her back against the wall. Claimant denied any numbness
or tingling, as well as any swelling, decreased range of motion, instability,
crepitus or joint pain. Other than tenderness with palpation over the paraspinous
musculature throughout the entire spine, the examination was within normal
limits . Claimant was released to modified duty with no lifting, bending or pulling
over 15 pounds, as well as no twisting.
On November 15, 2006, Claimant returned to Saltzer Medical Group
complaining of bilateral k.nee pain with somewhat limited range of motion.
Claimant had no gross swelling but she was tender at the medial line. The
assessment was sprain/strain of the medial and collateral ligaments. She was
placed in a right k.nee brace. She was later given a left knee brace.
Claimant returned to Saltzer Medical on November 29, 2006, at which time
she was released to full duty with no restrictions.
On January 1 7, 2007 I Claimant returned to Saltzer Medical for right leg
pain and "pulling" since January 12, 2007, when she was injured while walking
down a hall after physical therapy when her low back went out causing her to
almost fall. She advised that she had low back, right hip, and right leg pain.
There was weakness noted of the left leg and Claimant complained of weakness
in the left lower back, hip and leg. Claimant was assessed with strain/sprain of
the hip/thigh, low back and groin. She was placed on modified duty.
Claimant returned to Saltzer Medical on February 21, 2007 and reported
that overall she was doing much better, with the majority of her complaints in the
lumbar area. With regard to the knees, it was opined that she was fixed and
stable. Claimant was released to full duty, no restrictions.
On February 26, 2007, Claimant presented to Nancy Greenwald, M.D . . Dr.
Greenwald noted that Claimant's gait was good and she was able to walk without
difficulty. Straight leg raise was negative. Sensory and manual muscle testing in
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the lower extremities was normal. Claimant/s knees were back to baseline. It
was noted that Claimant had preexisting arthritis and had already established a
relationship with a chiropractor when she moved to Idaho. Dr. Greenwald felt
that Claimant had mild soft tissue injuries and there were no radicular findings.
Claimant could continue working without restriction.
Claimant saw Dr. Greenwald on March 15 2007. Dr. Greenwald noted
that a lumbar spine of the hip demonstrated a larger right piriformis and a cyst.
Claimant's main complaint was right buttock pain. Dr. Greenwald recommended
pool therapy.
1

Claimant returned to Dr. Greenwald on April 4, 2007, complaining of a new
onset of right leg pain and numbness, beginning about two weeks earlier when
she awoke.
She was continuing regular chiropractic treatments and Dr.
Greenwaid advised her to discontinue those. Straight leg raise was negative. Dr.
Greenwald ordered an MRI.
In an April 26, 2007 letter to the Surety, Dr. Greenwald noted that an April
5, 2007 MRI showed a moderate-sized disc herniation at L3-4 which was right
paracentral in location with mass effect upon the descending right L4 nerve root I
the epidural space. Claimant denied any acute incident, accident, hobby or
activity that caused the sudden extreme pain.
Essentially, Claimant had
awakened with pain down her right side. In order to address causation, Dr.
Greenwald recommended review of all chiropractic and other prior medical
records.
In a June 6, 2007 letter to
review of Claimant's prior records,
of 2007 followed therapy which
2006, injury, then that near-fall
related.

the Surety, Dr. Greenwald advised, following
that if the physical therapy incident in January
was prescribed for Claimant/s November 2,
and subsequent right sided pain were work

On June 12, 2007, Claimant's position with the Employer was discontinued
due to a reduction in work force.
On August 2, 2007, Claimant presented to Beth Rogers, M.D., for
complaints of right anterior leg pain, low back pain, right knee pain, and
occasional non-radiating cervical pain.
Dr. Rogers' impression was right L4
radiculopathy, status post bilateral partial medial meniscectomies with underlying
degenerative changes in both knees, left greater than right, with the right knee
being more symptomatic, resolving patellofemoral contusion, and mild cervical
strain. Dr. Rogers noted that in review of Claimant's medical records, there were
approximately 122 visits for chiropractic care to address issues with Claimant's
cervical spine, lumbar spine and bilateral knees. The visits occurred both prior
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND
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and subsequent to the November 2006 industrial injury. Due to the complaints
that Claimant had following that injury, she believed the lumbar radiculopathy was
a result of said injury. She felt Claimant's knees were at baseline and she
recommended a right L4 transforaminal epidural, as well as a directed course of
physical therapy. She placed Claimant on mOdified work. On August 6, 2007,
Dr. Rogers released Claimant for her regular work.
On November 7 2007, Claimant advised Dr. Rogers that she had no pain in
the right leg and overall her back was much better. Dr. Rogers felt Claimant was
medically stable and gave her a 5% whole person impairment. Dr. Rogers also
felt that, given Claimant's disc protrusion, a 50 pound weight limit was a
reasonable permanent restriction and therefore Claimant could continue doing her
time of injury job.
f

...,/

In August of 2008, Claimant's counsel has a disability evaluation performed
by Mary Barros-Bailey, Ph.D., CRC, CDMS, CLCP, NCC, D/ABVE. Following her
interview of Claimant, and a labor market survey, Dr. Barros opined that Claimant
sustained a 7- to 10% disability inclusive of impairment.
f

Claimant is working at St. Luke's Regional Medical Center.
Pertinent medical records are attached to the original Agreement as Exhibit
1/

A".

There are genuine and substantial disputes and differences between the
parties as to the degree, if any, of Claimant's impairment and disability, the need
for retraining, and the need for future medical benefits.
Claimant and Defendants, desiring to settle the controversies in an amicable
way and to avoid the cost and delay of litigation of this claim and to buy their
peace, have entered into a settlement agreement which is acceptable to Claimant
and to the Defendants and which is in the best interest of the parties. By reason
of said settlement agreement, the parties hereto desire to settle and forever
conclude Claimant's rights under the Worker's Compensation Laws of the State of
Idaho. Claimant has offered to accept and the Defendants have offered to pay
the sum of $13,000.00, as itemized below, as full and final settlement of
Claimant's claim. The parties agree that settlement is in the best interests of the
parties.
It is stipulated and agreed that the aforementioned settlement consideration
includes loss of wage earning capacity and non-medical factors, should such
exist.
The parties waive any Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as part of
the consideration for this agreement. Claimant hereto specifically and expressly
waives all rights to reconsideration of an award otherwise provided for under
Idaho Code § 72-718.
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND
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In processing this claim, medical expenses in the amount of $12,651.99
have been incurred by Claimant and paid by the Surety as itemized below:
Doctors:
Physical Therapy:
Miscellaneous:
Pharmacy:
Diagnostic Tests:

$ 4,659.89

TOTAL

$12,651.99

1,736.97
3,631.74
84.87
2(538.52

CLAIMANT UNDERSTANDS AND AGREES THAT ANY MEDICAL EXPENSES
NOT ITEMIZED AS BEING PAID ARE HER RESPONSIBILITY AND THAT UPON
APPROVAL OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE DEFENDANTS WILL HAVE NO FURTHER
RESPONSIBILITY FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES INCURRED TO DATE OR TO BE
INCURRED IN THE FUTURE, EXCEPT AS HEREIN BEFORE PROVIDED.
y

Claimant hereby attests that 1) she is not currently on Medicare; and 2)
does not expect to be on Medicare in 30 months and that she does not have a
settlement of over $250,000.00 Claimant attests that neither she nor any of her
medical providers to her knowledge received Medicare benefits, as provided under
42 USC Section 1395, as a result of the work-related injuries sustained on
November 2, 2006, set forth herein.
The parties hereby recognize that errors running to the benefit of either
party may have been made in the benefit computations while processing
Claimant's claim and hereby agree and stipulate that the lump sum consideration
to be paid upon approval of this agreement takes into account all such errors
found in the accounting and further stipulate and agree that the Industrial
Commission is empowered to make any necessary corrections in the accounting
without the necessity of any party creating an addendum, so long as the amount
to be paid Claimant, $13,000.00, is not affected.
An itemization of Claimant's claim as required by the Industrial Commission
is as follows:
Permanent Physical Impairment5 % of the whole person
25 weeks @ $310.75 per week

$ 7,768.75

Permanent Partial Disability9%\lo f the whole person,
including impairment, or 4%
20 weeks @ $310.75 per week

6,215.00

Lump Sum Consideration(Includes any decreased wage earning
capacity, non-medical factors and
permanent partial disability, if any)
TOTAL:

12,223.13
$26,206.88

STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND
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LESS:
PPI benefits paid to date
PPD benefits paid to date

7,768.75v
5.438.13

AMOUNT DUE CLAIMANT

$13,000.00

CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS:

A.

Attorney fees taken prior to LSS

B.

Costs taken prior to LSS

C.

Additional attorney fees to be
taken from lSS

D.

Additional costs to be taken
from LSS

($550 Dr. Radnovich &

$3,301.72
$1,394 . 37

$823.50 Dr . Barros-Bailey)
$3,250.00

$10 . 00

ITEMIZED LIST OF OUTSTANDING MEDICALS
Do not deduct from lump sum settlementl
amount due Claimant
NONE

ITEMIZED LIST OF OUTSTANDING MEDICALS
TO BE PAID BY CLAIMANT FROM LUMP SUM
SETTLEMENT BALANCE: (List provider & amount)
NONE

E.

Total of Outstanding Medicals
To be deducted from lump sum settlementl
amount due Claimant
NET AMOUNT TO CLAIMANT
(Subtract Lines C & 0 relating
to attorney fees, and line E
relating
to
outstanding
medicals,
from
the
total
amount due Claimant of this
lSS)

$0.00

$9,740.00/'

The parties acknowledge that the nature and extent of this injury,
temporary and permanent partial disability, permanent impairment, medical and
related expenses in this matter are uncertain and may be continuing or
progressive and may exceed those hereinbefore set forth, and the above shall not
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND
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limit the scope of this agreement or the order of discharge entered by the
Commission pursuant hereto, both of which contemplate and include all rights and
claims to all permanent and temporary compensation and all medical and related
benefits whether or not known, herein listed, discovered or contemplated by the
'parties, except as herein before specifically provided.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and subject to the
approval of this entire agreement by the Industrial Commission of the State of
Idaho, the parties hereby stipulate and agree that the Commission may make and
enter its order approving a lump sum settlement of this claim by the payment to
Claimant by the Surety of the sum of $13,000.00.
IT IS STIPULATED AND AGREED that this payment is in full and final
settlement and release of all claims of Claimant, her heirs and representatives, for
compensation for total and partial temporary disability, medical expenses, both
past and future, specific indemnity for permanent disability, decreased wage
earning capacity, and any and all claims which Claimant and her heirs now have
or may have against the Defendants in the future on account of such accident
and/or injury under the worker's compensation laws of the State of Idaho.
IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that the Defendant Surety shall
pay the sum within thirty days following their receipt of the approved and
conformed copy of this entire agreement. Any interest allowable under the
Workmen's Compensation Laws of the State of Idaho will not begin to accrue
until after the thirty-day period.
IT IS FURTHER REPRESENTED, STIPULATED AND AGREED that Claimant
understands that by entering into this agreement, and upon its approval by the
Industrial Commission, her compensation claims and all rights in connection
therewith will be finally and forever settled and closed and that she will be forever
barred from reopening this claim or otherwise claiming additional compensation
benefits on account of such accident andlor injury.
Claimant does agree to INDEMNIFY, DEFEND and HOLD MERCY MEDICAL,
CENTER and INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA,
HARMLESS from and against any further claim for benefit which is, or may be,
payable pursuant to the Worker's Compensation Laws of the State of Idaho and
which arose out of or is related to said accident andlor injury.
This
indemnification and hold harmless agreement shall in no way inure to the benefit
of any third party or any party not herein specifically named.
IT IS FURTHER REPRESENTED AND AGREED by the parties that it is in their
best interests that this claim be finally and forever settled, satisfied and
discharged, and the parties hereto acknowledge that this agreement is made at
Claimant's request and is the acceptance of her offer by the Defendants.
Claimant acknowledges that she has carefully read this agreement and legal
instrument in its entirety, has received the advice of her counsel, and that she
understands its contents and has signed the same knowing that this agreement
forever concludes and fully disposes of any and all claims of any kind and
character that she has or may have against the Defendants on account of the
above injuries.
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND
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LAUELKULM, Claimant

•

By
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•

~J{(~

ANOAMARSH,
;~
Attorney for Claimant

MERCY MEDICAL CENTER, Employer, and

INDEMNITY INSURANCE
NORTH A

COMPANY OF

RICA, Surety

A

J..jt.Ul~

STATE OF f.B~IIO
/'

\

County of ':» ~m

}
\: 55.
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LAUREL KULM~ being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says;

That she is the Claimant in the above-entitled claim;
That she has read the foregoing lump sum agreement, knows the contents
thereof and believes the same to be true to the best of I"ler knowledge,

day

,
'. tit

•

of
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ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE
UPON LUMP SUM AGREEMENT
The foregoing stipulation, agreement and petition having duly and regularly
come before this Commission, and it appearing that the interests of justice and
the best interests of the parties herein are, and will be, served by approving this
agreement granting the order of discharge as prayed for,
NOW, THEREFORE, the foregoing stipulation and agreement shall be and
the same herein is approved, and further, the above-entitled proceedings are
hereby dismissed and concluded with prejudice.
DATED this

day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,2009.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSiON

___________________________

By~~

Chairman

By~M7e-m~be-r-------------------------

By~

__

~

_________________________

Member
ATTEST:

By~~

__

~

________________

Assistant Secretary
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on
, a true and correct copy
of STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT,
AND ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE and STIPULATION AND ORDER OF
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE, I.C. No.: 06-012770, was served by the method
indicated below upon each of the following:

_ _ U.S. MAIL

_ _ COURIER _ _ HAND DELIVERED

Andrew Marsh
942 W Myrtle
Boise, ID 83702
Kate Beaudreau
leM, Inc.
1150 W State, #330
Boise, 10 83702
Alan K. Hull
Anderson, Julian & Hull
250 South 5 th , #700
P. O. Box 7426
Boise, 10 83707

,-

(

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
LAUREL KULM,
Claimant,
I.C. No.: 08-012770
vs.
STIPULATION AND ORDER OF
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

MERCY MEDICAL CENTER,
Employer,
and
INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF
NORTH AMERICA,
Surety,
Defendants.

COME NOW the above-named parties, by and through their undersigned
counsel of record, Andrew Marsh, attorney for Claimant, and Mercy Medical
Center/ Employer, and Indemnity Insurance Company of North America, Surety, by
and through their counsel of record/ and hereby move this Commission for its
Order dismissing the above-captioned claim pending before this honorable
Commission with prejudice on the ground and for the reason that the same has
been fully and finally disposed of in accordance with that certain Stipulation and
Agreement, Release and Lump Sum Settlement, and Order of Approval and
Discharge on file with "the above-captioned Commission.

By

~JJ/A

-

/~

AND~,~~
Attorl1~y

for Claimant

ANJjERSON, JULIAN & HULL

~_

Bl--.-:-c:-:--·

~K. H.ULI:! Of the Firm

-

Attor~efendants

STIPULATION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE - 1
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ORDER
The above stipulation having duly come before this Commission and the
Stipulation and Agreement, Release and Lump Sum Settlement having been
presented to this Commission and this Commission having fully considered all of
the pleadings and evidence, both written and oral, herein and having approved said
Stipulation and Agreement, Release and Lump Sum Settlement as in the best
interests of Claimant and Defendants, and there appearing good cause therefor.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, and this does ORDER, that the above-captioned
claim now pending before this Commission is hereby dismissed with prejudice as
against the Defendants, and each of them.
DATED this _ _ day of ____________________ ,2009.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

____________________________
Chairman

By~~

By

7M7e-m~be-r--------------------------

By

7M~e-m~be-r--------------------------

ATTEST:

-=___________________

__
Assistant Secretary

By~~
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· LJ COpy
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES. P.A.

942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise. Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Laurel Kulm,
Claimant,
I.C. No. 06-012770
vs.
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES
and
STATEMENT OF
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL

Mercy Medical Center,
Employer,
and
Industrial Claims Management,
Surety,
Defendants.

COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in
support of his claim. of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds
of the settlement of the above captioned case.
REPORT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES

In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528. Idaho Code. this form shall be filled out
and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final
court, within 30 days following a final ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal, the totals
specified below shall include the expenses, costs, or fees incurred in the appeal.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES. P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

(208) 345-1000

FORM 1022. REPORT OF EXPENSES
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BENEFITS, paid prior to Lump Sum, subjected to arty fees
ATTORNEY FEES, paid prior to Lump Sum, on the above
COSTS, incurred in litigation, previously reimbursed to attorney (incl.
experts Radnovich and Barros-Bailey)

LUMP SUM AMOUNT, New Money
ATTORNEY FEES & COSTS, to be paid from LSS
Attorney Fees
Costs
TOTAL, Attorney Fees and Costs, to be paid from LSS
MEDICAL BILLS, to be paid from Lump Sum
NET LUMP SUM AMOUNT TO CLAIMANT

$13,206.88
$3301.72
$1,394.37

$13,000.00
-$3,250.00
-$10.00
-$3,260.00
-$0.00
$9,740.00

Attachments: Statement of Costs incurred in litigation, reimbursable to attorney
Attorney Fee Agreement including Disclosure Statement
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL
1.

Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. ("Counsel") was retained by Laurel Kuhn

("Claimant") on or about 5/30/2007.
2.

Counsel initiated this case by interviewing Claimant concerning the facts and

.circumstances of employment, the facts and circumstances of the injury, the status of benefits,
the status of medical treatment, and the background of Claimant as it relates to potential
disability beyond impairment, etc.
3.

Counsel advised Claimant as to the procedures involved in processing a claim for

benefits under the Idaho Workers Compensation Act. Counsel advised Claimant as to the need
for cooperation with treating physicians, the Idaho Industrial Commission Rehabilitation
Division, and Seiniger Law Offices, P.A.

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA.

942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES
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4.

Counsel advised Claimant as to the disclosures required by the Idaho Industrial

Commission.
5.

Counsel created a database file for Claimant in which pertinent infonnation was

recorded for use in the handling of the claim.
6.

During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the

following documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer statement
meeting the requirements of the Idaho Industrial Commission; medical releases; employment
release; a letter of representation and inquiry to the surety; a letter of representation to the Idaho
Industrial Commission requesting copies of Claimanf s file; a letter to the treating medical
providers requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing records; and a client
intake questionnaire for the initial gathering of relevant infonnation concerning the client's
employment, educational, medical and health, military, vocational, and accident history.
7.

Counsel reviewed all medical records, employment records, and other requested

documents as they were received, and consulted with Claimant about the status of the case on a
periodic basis.
8.

Counsel advised Claimant concerning the need to keep medical appointments,

aspects of medical treatment which might potentially affect Claimant's impairment rating, and
strategic issues relating to medical care which can impact the result of a worker's compensation
case.
9.

Before Counsel was retained, Defendants denied, discontinued, or disputed

Claimant's right to additional medical benefits and treatment, time loss benefits, and impairment

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES
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impairment compensation and disability beyond impairment compensation.
Counsel advised Claimant to undergo a new and separate independent medical
evaluation by a medical expert of Claimant's choosing; advised Claimant of the meaning and
import of the 1MB report; and advised Claimant on the effect of the expert's report on the need
for present and future medical treatment, the claim for benefits, and lump sum settlement.
11.

Counsel advised Claimant to undergo a new and separate vocational evaluation by

a vocational evaluation expert of Claimant's choosing; advised Claimant of the meaning and
import of the vocational report; and advised Claimant on the effect of the expert's report on the
need for retraining, the claim for benefits, and lump sum settlement.
12.

Counsel reviewed the file in preparation for settlement Counsel engaged in

extensive negotiations with Defendants. Counsel had extensive communications with Claimant
concerning the status of the case, and the strategic and tactical decisions that had to be made with
respect to settlement discussions and preparation for hearing.
13.

Counsel advised Claimant of the risks of going to hearing and the costs that would

be incurred in connection with obtaining sworn testimony from Claimant's medical providers.
Counsel further advised Claimant of the delay that would be involved in submitting this case for
resolution to the Commission.
14.

Counsel obtained a compromise settlement with representatives of the defendants

resulting in the payment of benefits over and above those which were conceded at the time that
Claimant initiated the attorney/client relationship.

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES. P.A

942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise. Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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15.

Claimant elected to settle the case based upon Claimant's best judgment and

personal situation, and on the basis set forth in the lump sum agreement which has been
submitted to the Commission for its approval.
16.

Counsel reviewed and analyzed the lump sum settlement agreement, completed

portions of the agreement, and reviewed the lump sum agreement with Claimant.
17.

Counsel reviewed and analyzed the file; reviewed and analyzed time and billing

program entries; reviewed and analyzed books of account to ascertain client costs advanced and
other financial data required by the Idaho Industrial Commission; and prepared Idaho Industrial
Commission Form 1022.
18.

As part of~e consideration supporting the contract entered into between

Claimant and Counsel. Counsel provided legal services to Claimant from approximately
5/30/2007 until the present time. During that time, Counsel limited his practice by declining
certain cases because of the size of his caseload, which included Claimant's case. Counsel
maintained an office and staff, including the services of a full-time legal assistant, to be able to
handle whatever needs Claimant had in connection with this case, as well as the needs of his
other clients.
19.

Claimant is presently employed.

Dated May 5, 2009.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

~&::-Attorney for Claimant

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES. P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I CERTIFY that on May 5, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to
be served as follows:
Alan Hull
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL
250 South 5th, Ste. 700 PO Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426

liD Hand Delivered
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

H4~ewMarsh
Attorney for Claimant

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myr1le Street

Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES
AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL
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CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENT
IN A WORKER'S COMPENSATION CASE
This is an agreement for representation and consultation in a worker's
compensation claim before the Idaho Industrial Commission. This agreement is
between SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A., 942 Myrtle Street, Boise, Idaho
83702, (hereafter referred to as "Attorney") and Laurel Kulm, (hereafter referred
to as "Client").
ATIORNEY AND CLIENT AGREE AS FOLLOWS:
1) Attorney will represent Client in the following action: Kulm v. Mercy Medical
Center with respeet to worker's compensation claim for date of injury of
. November 2, 2006 only.
2) For their representation of Client, Attorneys will be paid a fee which will be in
lien upon the cause of action and will be equal to a portion of all amounts
recovered by way of settlement, or award including attorney fees, and
including sums recovered in satisfaction thereof from any third party. That
portion will be as follows:

i) Twenty-five percent (25 0,4) of all amounts obtained for Client after
execution of this agreement if the case is settled before a, hearing. If
Client is receiving temporary disability benefits at the '"time of the
execution of this agreement, Attorney will not take a percentage of that
benefit Wltil such time as the surety discontinues or threatens to
discontinue payment of said benefit; if Client has received an
impairment rating which has been admitted and is being paid, Attorney
will not take a percentage of the balance of the impairment rating unless
it is later disputed.

ii) Thirty percent (30°;') of such amounts after a hearing and the claim is
resolved without the filing of an appeal by either party;
, iii) Forty percent (40%) of such amounts if the claim is resolved after an
appeal has been filed by either party;

Attorney wiD take a percentage of any benefits obtained by Client with
respect to permanent partial impairment if a rating is given after the parties
execute this agreement. In the event that there are attorney fees awarded against
the defendant(s) by the commission Attorney shall be entitled to be paid those
attorney fees or the percentage calculated above, whichever is greater.

3) Client will not be required to pay attorney fees to Attorney if nothing is
recovered by way of settlement or award unless Attorney withdraws due to
lack of cooperation by Client. In the event that Attorney is required to
withdraw due to lack of cooperation in presenting and prosecuting Client's
claim, he will be compensated as set forth in paragraph 7' below.
4) Actual costs ~equired to prepare and prosecute Client's claim by Attorney,
or to achieve a settlement, are to be paid by Client; if advanced by
Attorney, these costs will be repaid from Client's portion of amounts
recover~ as defined in Section 2, above; if a settlement is not reached in your
case, you will be responsible to make payments on these costs until they are
paid in full. These costs include fees for investigators if hired by Attorney,
filing fees, fees for co}lrt'reporters, travel expenses, costs of service of process,
costs for medical records and reports, costs for expert witnesses and
physicians, long distance telephone and fax charges, postage and related
mailing costs~ and all other costs associated with the prosecution of Client's
claim. Attorney is authorized, but not obligated, to pay all medical bills .
outstanding at the time of settlement of Clientts claim out of any funds received
by Attorney to the health care provider or their designated agent. .
5) Client agrees that he will not make settlement except with Attorney's prior
approval, which approval shall not be reasonably withheld. Should Client do
so in violation of this Agreement, Client agrees to pay Attorney the sum and
share indicated in Paragraph 2(ii), above; upon settlement Attorney is
authorized to pay any outstanding medical bills of Client directly to the
provider. Attorney shall not settle the case without Client's prior approval.
6) Attorney makes no representations concerning the likelihood of a successful
resolution of Client's case, and does not guarantee to obtain sufficient funds to
reimburse Client for the costs or expenses incurred in the prosecution of the
case; it is expressly agreed that all statements of Attorney on these matters are
good faith statements of opinion only;
7) Attorney may be discharged by Client at any time. If Attorney is discharged
Attorney will be compensated for services rendered to the date of discharge, as
well as for all.costs, expenses and disbursements, as follows:

i) If Attorney is discharged before the case is settled or tried, Attoq1ey
shall be paid at the rate ofS150.00 per hour or a percentage calculated
in accordance with paragraph 2 (based upon the highest settlement offer,
ifany, made by the defendants at the time of the discharge) whichever is
greater; Attorney will furnish Client with an itemized statement of such
services.

!Wi1>'--
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ii) If Attorney is discharged after the case is settled or tried, the
compensation of Attorney shall be computed in accordance with the

provisions of this agreement just as if the verdict, award, determination
or judgment had actually been collected in full for Client.
iii) Attorney has the right to retain possession of Clienfs documents and

money until Attorney's bill is paid in full by Client, and Attorney shall
have a lien on the cause of action.
.

8) Clieat 'Nill pay te AtteHley 8ft initial ref&iflef as an &&\'anee against the eests
refeFfe8 te iii PSfftgmph 4 aeeye Hi 1he 8fB:9\IBt ef$100.
9) Client agrees that any interest earned on any of Client's funds held in trust will
be donated to the Idaho State Bar in connection with its Interest on Lawyer
Trust Accounts program.
10)Both Client and Attorney have read this agreement, have a copy of it, and
agree to its terms and conditions. There are no other oral or written
representations between Client and Attorney. Any modifications of this
contract shall be made in writing.
11 )This Agreement shall be binding upon the heirs, successors, representatives
and assigns of Client and Attorney.
12)Client has been advised that Client may pick up a copy of the file in this case
within 30 days after settlement or after the, attorney client relationship is
terminated by either party to this agreement. After that time, Attorney's fde,
and ali documents and things in it from whatever sou.rce will be destroyed.
13)Client has been advised that Attorney may be retained on an hourly basis of
$150 per hour by depositing a retainer with Attorney of $2,000.00 which shall
be replenished as Attorney charges against it. In the event that Attorney is
retained on an hourly basis, Attorney shall not be entitled to any percentage of
any settlement or benefits recovered by Client. Client has declined to retain
Attorney on an hourly basis. and has chosen to retain Attorney on the
contingent basis described herein.

I have read the
basis, this

Ii!"

fOregOin~e to retain

the attorney on
, 200,.L.

day of

~AdQ.~·

LallKulm, Cient.

.

aD

hourly

.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
1. In workers' cqmpensation matters, attorney's fees normally do not exceed
twenty-five percent (25%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you in a case in
which no hearing on the merits has been completed. In a case in which a hearing
on the merits has been completed, attorney's fees normally do not exceed thirty
percent (30%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you.

-I
I
I

2. Depending upon the circumstances -of your case, you and your attorney may
agree to a higher or lower percentage which would -be subject to Commission
approval. Further, if you and your attorney have a dispute regarding attorney fe~s,
either of you may petition the Industrial Commission to resolve the dispute.

II

I certify that I have read and undentand this disclosure statement and
Contingency Fee AgreemeDt, aDd agree to the terms contaiDed- herein.
DATED this

I~

day of

~

,2001-.

~Q.~

LaurelKulm

Wm. Breck Seiniger, •
SEINlGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
Attorney for Client
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SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

Statement of Costs

942 W. MYRTLE STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702
(208) 345·1000
Andrew@ldahoRights.com

I

I

DATE
4/16/09

CLIENT NAME
LaurelKulm

DATE
07/31107
OS/07/07
OS/07/07
12113/07
12/27/07
12127/07
02/01108
02101/08
02/01108
02128/08
07116/08
09/04/08
10/03/0S
10/27/08
01113/09
04/13/09

ATTORNEY

OUR FILE NO.

ACM

2S27

AMOUNT

DESCRIPTION
Balance forward
Copies - NY work comp to Radnovich
Postage
Kulm, Laurel Impairment rating
Copies - Ltr to Rogers with Radnovich report
Postage
Copies - L to Barros w- CD
Postage
compact disc
PMT #400151830. Kulm, L. costs
PMT #400131602. Kulm, L. costs for upcoming voc eval
2/8108,4/15/08,8/1108, 8/1S/08, 8/22108 (6.1 hours at $135.00 per)
Long Distance
PMT #400058744. Kulm, L. costs
PMT #1695. Kulm, Laurel expert payment
File Closing

9.60
2.33
550.00
1.80
0.41
0.15
0.58
5.00
-569.87
-500.00
823.50
1.00
-30.13
-294.37
10.00

I

BALANCE DUE

II

BALANCE
0.00
9.60
11.93
561.93
563.73
564.14
564.29
564.87
569.87
0.00
-500.00
323.50
324.50
294.37
0.00
10.00

$10.00

Thank you for allowing us to represent you. As of this date we have concluded our work on your case and have closed your file. If
you would like to have a copy of the file within the next 30 days you may do so at $.20 per page. If you choose to obtain your file
at a later date there will be a $30.00 retrieval fee in addition to copying charges of $.20 per page. Your file will be destroyed two (2)
years from the above date.

I

09/09/16

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

Attorney Fees Received Prior to Lump Sum Settlement
for Laurel Kulm
Date

Memo

01/07/2008
02/15/2008
03/21/2008
05/14/2008
05/27/2008
10/27/2008
12/12/2008
12/19/2008
12/31/2008

PPI atty fee
PPI atty fee
PPI atty fee
PPI atty fee
PPI atty fee
PPD atty fee
PPD atty fee
PPD atty fee
PPD atty fee

TOTAL

Fees on PPI

Total

Fees on PPD

621.50
310.75
310.75
388.44
310.75
310.75
310.75
310.75
427.28
1,942.19

1,359.53

3,301.72
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Total Atty Fee to Pay via
Settlement: $3250.00
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SEINIGER LAW OFFICES,
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Total Unreasonable Atty
Fee: $3495.94

Atty Fee to be paid
back: $245.94
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Paid before S_ettlement, $0.00
To Pay via Settlement, $3055.710

To Pay via Settlement, $194.22,'

~
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Paid before Settlement, $1359.53

.'.

,

,
.

Atty Fee Due, 25%: $3055.78

Atty Fee Due, 25%: $1553.75

Paid before Settlement, $1942.191-

B

"Reasonable" PPD

PAjJf181~OQ.~ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

';

J

LJ COP
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (lSB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SElNIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant
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BEFORE TIlE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Laurel Kulm,
Claimant,
I.C. No. 06-012770

vs.
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH
IN SUPPORT OF

Mercy Medical Center,
Employer,

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

And
Industrial Claims Management,
Surety,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)ss
)

Andrew C. Marsh, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:
1. I am an associate attorney of the finn Seiniger Law Offices, P.A., and attorney of record

for the Claimant in the above-entitled matter. I make this Affidavit based on personal
knowledge.
2. Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. was retained by Claimant in regard to the above matter on or
about 5/30/07. A copy of the engagement agreement has been previously proVided to the

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA.

942 W. Myrtle Street
BoIse, IdahO 83702
(208) 345-1000

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH
IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF LAW
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Commission as an attachment to my Form 1022. The engagement agreement reads in
pertinent part:
Attorney will take a percentage of any benefits obtained by
Client with respect to permanent partial impairment if a rating
is given after the parties execute this agreement.

The above clause was in typed in bold in the original. The meaning and import of a
permanent partial impamnent rating was explained and discussed with Claimant prior to
execution.
3. In retaining Counsel, Claimant specifically sought the services of Counsel as counselor
and as advocate.
4. At that time of retaining Counsel, Claimant wanted advice and assistance on, inter alia,
what she viewed as efforts by the surety and the doctor to prevent her from receiving
worker's compensation benefits. In a written "Workmen's (sic) Compensation Summary"
provided to Counsel on or about the time Counsel was retained, she stated as follows:
"Dr. Greenwald and Steve Haase want all medical records from Dr. Mayes (Chiropractic)

trying to claim that my injury is 'not' Workmen's Compensation Related. Prior Injury
related."

S. On many occasions, Counsel provided legal counseling and/or legal advocacy on many
topics and issues, including: Claimant's rights under the work comp statutes; the work
comp process and procedure; the medical treatment issues as they related to work comp
law and procedure; maximum. medical improvement (MMI) issues; permanent partial
impairment (pPI) issues; pennanent work restriction issues; vocational evaluation expert
issues; permanent partial disability (PPD) issues; the right of the employer to terminate
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. tvttrtte S1reet
BoIse, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH
IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF LAW
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her; and the effect of an employer-proposed "Separation Agreement and General
Release" on her rights to worker's compensation benefits.
6. In representing Claimant. this office drafted, reviewed, analyzed, and/or acted upon the
documents attached hereto as Exhibit A. This includes hundred of pages of
correspondence, damages and bills, fee and cost records. Industrial Commission records,
and medical records.
7. In representing Claimant, this office engaged in many phone transactions as listed in

Exhibit B, email transactions as listed in Exhibit C, and meeting and note transactions as
listed in Exhibit D.
8. The benefits paid prior to Lump Sum Settlement (listed in my Fonn 1022) include PPI

benefits of $7768.75, on which attorney fees of $1942.19 were paid, and PPD benefits of
$5438.13, on which attorney fees of $1359.53 were paid (see demand letters to the surety

dated 9118/08 and 9/28/08, attached hereto as Exhibit E and Exhibit F respectively).
FURTHER SAYETH YOUR AFFIANT NAUGHT.
Dated July 24,2009.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

~~

Attorney for Claimant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on July 24.2009.

A"00~~
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Notary Public for Idaho
Residing a~: J:.l""~ lJ"kQ
My Comnu.sslon eipires: 1/ zs- /;"0/2...

t-0!ll

"~,p9~"'#
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Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH
IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF LAW
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IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER, GOVERNOR

POBox 83720
Boise,1O 8372()..(){)41
(208)334-6000 - FAX (208) 334-2321
1-800-950-2110

COMMISSIONERS
R.D. Maynard. Chainnan
Thomas E. Limbaugh
Thoma.. P. B...kin
Mindy Muntgomery. Director

September 3, 2009
Andrew Marsh
Seiniger Law Office
942 W Myrtle'
Boise, ID 83702
Re:

Claimant: Laurel Kulm
Ie #: 2006-012770
Proposed settlement with Indemnity Insurance Company of America

Dear Mr. Marsh:
The Industrial Commission (Commission) is in receipt of the proposed settlement agreement
referenced above. In our review of the proposed settlement, the Commission has also considered
your letters and attachments of May 5, July 24, and August 12 regarding your representation of
the claimant and your proposed fees. The Commission staff has made an initial determination
that the settlement is in the best interests of the parties, except for the portion of the requested
fees related to benefits in excess of the $12,223.13 Lump Sum Consideration, which have not
been found to be reasonable per IDAPA 17.02.08.033.
Please be aware that this is an initial determination, and, in accordance with IDAPA
17.02.08.033.03, you may request a hearing on the matter within fourteen days. Also in
accordance with this rule, the Commission will shortly be issuing a partial order releasing
available funds, and fees which have been determined to be reasonable.
Thank you for your assistance in the review of this proposed settlement.
Sincerely,

~

Scott McDougall
Manager, Claims and Benefits

EXHIBIT

I
700 So. Clearwater Ln., Boise, TD
Equal Opportunity Employer
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